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13. ON BEING AN OPPORTUNIST .............................. 551
INTRODUCTION

This collection, arranged in a more or less chronological order, brings
together a dozen talks that I have prepared since 1988 about political and
judicial applications of constitutional doctrines. A distinguished critic
explained, in describing a collection of another author's work that he had
compiled: "The arrangement of the following section is chronological, on the
theory that time's arrangement is the most revealing."' Critical to talks such
as those found in this collection are the circumstances in which they were
originally prepared and delivered. Relevant circumstances, which are useful
for understanding what is said in these talks and why, are noticed in the first
note for each of the thirteen parts of this collection. An awareness of
circumstances is usually critical, of course, to any understanding of legal and
political matters, just as it is for the study of any other exploratory dialogue.
I remind the reader, from time to time, of the date when a particular talk was
originally given.
The immediate background against which all ofthese talks were prepared
is provided by the constitutional system of this country. That system is
examined in the commentaries on the Constitution of the United States that I
have prepared for some thirty years. References to those commentaries are
provided in the notes.' Even so, enough should be available in the text of each
part of this collection to permit the reader to identify immediately the
questions being suggested on each occasion that may be worthy of further
consideration. The materials surveyed in the notes, prepared for the most part

I. THE VIKING PORTABLE LIBRARYOFWALT WHITMAN 57 (Mark Van Doren ed., 1945).
Mr. Van Doren observes that even "a collection ofjottings and memoranda" may have "unity
because of the man who is writing." Id. at 473; see also infranote 6. The dates of the thirteen
parts of my collection are the following: (1) 1988, (2) 1990, (3) 2002, (4) 1990, (5) 1992, (6)
1992, (7) 1994, (8) 1993, (9) 1998, (10) 1998, (11) 2000, (12) 2001, (13) 2000. There are three
variations from a strictly chronological arrangement of these talks (3, 7, 13). The "Primer"
seemed better early; the personal reminiscences seemed better at the end. The third variation,
a slight one, points up the centrality of great events for our political/legal system. Each ofthese
talks was prepared independently of the other twelve. They can, therefore, be read in any order.
Most of the footnotes have been prepared at this time.
2. For the most extensive commentaries I have prepared, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT (197 1) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST]; GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY

(1989) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION];
Good: Explorations, 70 TENN. L.

CONSTITUTION OF 1787]; GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
A COMMENTARY (1995) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE
see also George Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand the
REV. (Forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Anastaplo,

Constitutionalismand the Good].
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at this time (that is, in 2003), include references to various published pieces
of mine that spell out points that need therefore to be no more than touched
upon in these talks.
The intellectual tradition, long taken for granted in the West but very
neglected these days in law schools (if not also, more and more, in
undergraduate programs), provides the deeper background for inquiries into
constitutional and legal issues as well as for reflections upon them. It can
sometimes help, when one attempts to assess what the Western tradition
means, to compare what is said and done here with what has been done and
said in various other (that is, non-Western) parts of the world.3
It can also help one understand these matters to consider how poets and
prophets have assessed, reinforced, and modified what political leaders and
their sometimes philosophical teachers and allies have managed to establish.
In the West itself, however, there has been tension for millennia between the
reasoned teachings of the philosophers and the inspired guidance offered by
the poets. Still, it may well be that there is something of the philosophical in
the greatest poets, just as there is something of the poetic in the greatest
philosophers."
Be this as it may, the poet sometimes serves as a mediator, even as a
bridge, between the philosopher and the prophet-two practitioners between
whom there may be even more tension than there is between the philosopher
and the poet. Certainly, the prophet is likely to reach and to move many more
people than the philosopher does, at least in "the short run." The prophet is
particularly likely to be effective if he has poetic images, and not merely
syllogisms, at his disposal.5

3. See, e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLo, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY: SEVEN INTRODUCTIONS TO
NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (2002) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOsOPHY]. On the
Western tradition as applied to American circumstances, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
AMERICAN MORALIST: ON LAW ETHICS, AND GOVERNMENT (1992) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO,
THE AMERICAN MORALIST]; see also infra note 180.
4. On relations between philosophy and art, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS
ARTIST: FROM HOMER TO PLATO & ARISTOTLE (1997) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER
AS ARTIST]; GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER: FROM SHAKESPEARE TO JOYCE

(1983) [hereinafter

ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER]. For the perspective from which
GEORGE ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN: ESSAYS ON
VIRTUE, FREEDOM, AND THE COMMON GOOD (1975) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING

these relations are viewed, see
AND CITIZEN].

5. Consider, however, the following comment I had occasion to make on the work of
Moses Maimonides:

There is more than a reminder of Aristotle in what Maimonides says of the contemplative
life as the ultimate perfection of the human being. Notice... [his] suggestion, "[I]f a man
happens to exist [in the condition of the fully rational man], I would not say that he is
inferior to the prophets." This can make one wonder what Maimonides takes revelation
to mean.
ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 73.
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Poetic inspiration is also needed if the character of citizens is to be shaped
and preserved in a way appropriate for the institutions of their regime. Some,
especially those of an "individualistic" turn of mind, are likely to raise
questions as to whether such shaping is an appropriate concern of the
community itself, acting through its various governments. The talks collected
here address, sometimes only in passing, these and like questions, which are
prominent in Law and Literature materials these days.6
The factors to be considered in examining the principles of a regime can
vary, if only because of ever-changing circumstances. This collection places
emphasis on the workings of the judicial system, even as the political and
philosophical features of this system are noted. One movement evident in
these talks is from the bold innovations of an early republican, Niccol6
Machiavelli, to the sober cautions of an aristocratic champion of modem
democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville. This collection provides glimpses
throughout of other paths that thoughtful citizens might also follow.7 The way
that these glimpses are provided testifies to the generosity of the editors of this
law review in permitting an unconventional mode of discussing the
conventions of another day.

6. Citations to my Law and Literature collections are provided in infra notes 7, 13,222,
314, 357. As suggestive of matters about which the American community might want to be
concerned, consider this observation about Walt Whitman's Democratic Vistas:
In a single paragraph Whitman diagnoses the "deep disease" of America as "hollowness
of heart." Hypocrisy, superciliousness, deceit, depravity, corruption, and flippancy are
among the terms he flings at a people whose manners have disillusioned him. The prophet
of 1855 has sobered down: He has not lost his faith in the future, but the future is the only
thing that gives him hope. Neither has he lost faith in his theory of democracy, which for
him is still the theory of America. It is simply that he must imagine a golden age to come
rather than hail one that is here. For none is here among the "vulgarians of his time."
...[This] was a hard book for Whitman to feel and write, and it has been found a hard
book to read. But it is a necessary book, not only for the notes it provides on the
disillusionment that followed the Civil War, but for the criticism it gives ofa society which
always can benefit, as any live society can, from chastisement by its best lovers.
Van Doren, supra note 1, at 387-88. "Vulgarians"--that is, the thoughtless-are not limited
to Whitman's day. On "the epistemological and moral self-contradictions inherent in the
behaviorist's claim for the truth and beneficiency of behaviorism," see ANASTAPLO, HUMAN
BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 282-83 n.7 (containing an exchange with B. F. Skinner);
Leon R. Kass, Appreciatingthe Phenomenon of Life, 23 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY J.
51-52 (The New School, 2001); see infra notes 296, 351 and accompanying text; see also
Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand the Good, supra note 2, at Part 7 (Appendix).
7. For additional glimpses, see the bibliographies of my work found in the following
collections: LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: THE PRACTICE OF THEORY 1073-1145 (John A. Murley,

William T. Braithwaite & Robert L. Stone eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAW AND PHILOSOPHY];
George Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand the Moderns: Explorations,20N. ILL U. L. REv. 251,
581-710 (2000) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Law & Literatureandthe Moderns];George Anastaplo,
Constitutionalism, The Rule of Rules: Explorations, 39 BRANDEIS L. J. 17, 219-287 (2000)
[hereinafter Anastaplo, Constitutionalism, The Rule of Rules].
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1. MACHIAVELLI, RELIGION, AND THE RULE OF LAW'

I do not think I could myself, be brought to support a man for
office, whom I knew to be an open enemy of, and scoffer at,
religion. Leaving the higher matter of eternal consequences,
between him and his Maker, I still do not think any man has the
right thus to insult the feelings, and injure the morals, of the
community in which he may live....
Abraham Lincoln9
I.
It is only natural that the birthday of the first American President should
remind us of the conditions for the establishment of this Republic.
Particularly intriguing today, especially in the light of current controversies
about church and state relations and about the place of clergymen in public
life, is an inquiry about the proper place of religion in the commonwealth.' 0
It is often difficult for us today to see and to appreciate what was thought
about these matters two centuries ago. It can be particularly instructive to
consider how Niccol6 Machiavelli spoke about such matters some five
centuries ago. He was, despite (let us hope not because of) his moral
flexibility, perhaps the first prominent republican in modernity. Although he
is not known to have been a pious man, his guidance with respect to
politically-minded religion can be useful. For this purpose we will examine
the fourteenth chapter of the first book of his Discourses."
II.
The chapter begins:

"Not only were auguries

. . .

in large part the

foundation of the ancient religion of the Gentiles, but they also were the cause

8. A talk given at the Wake Forest University Law School, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, February 22, 1988.
9. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, COLLECTED WORKS [, at 382 (Roy P. Baslered., 1953)(1846);
see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A CONSTITUTIONAL BIOGRAPHY 66,239,245,
248,301,350-51 (1999) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN].
10. See, e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
2, at 47; George Anastaplo, Church and State: Explorations, 19 LOY. U. CH. L.J. 61 (1987);
George Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,'! I MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 151
(1980).
11. The complete title of this book is Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius.
On Machiavelli, see LEO PAUL S. DE ALVAREz, THE MACIAVELLIAN ENTERPRISE: A
COMMENTARY ON THE PRINCE (1999); ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3,

at 516; LEO STRAUSS, THOUGHTS ON MACHIAVELLI (1958).
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of the well-being of the Roman Republic."' 2 Thus, Machiavelli seems to
approve of the use of auguries, however comic his account here may be in
certain respects. It is useful for the student of law to observe not only how
religion can be treated but also how one may read the more careful writers. 3
Earlier chapters of the first book of the Discoursessuggest the usefulness
of religion, especially in republics. It is indicated there as well that religious
reassurances can make an army more confident than it might otherwise be.
Well-conducted auguries can suggest that the world makes sense, that the gods
care for human beings. They can also suggest that virtue and success are
intimately related, or at least that the Romans enjoy advantages because of
their superior ability to read the signs and their greater determination to
respect them.'
The prince of the hen-men, we are told [in the chapter appended to this
1988 talk], made a false report to Papirius, the consul. The truth should have
been given to the consul, permitting him to decide how best to use it. 5 He
may, for example, have decided to postpone action until the next day,
providing in the meantime that the chickens not be fed until then. A
postponement for this reason could have a salutary effect, for it could instruct
the army that these matters are being scrupulously observed by its leaders.
Appearances are very important in religion: if things can always be
figured out without some kind of revelation (or appearance), then there would
be no need for divine intervention or guidance. But, the prince of the hen-men
in effect said, appearances do not matter, but only what the consul wanted.
In this effort to cater to what he took to be the consul's desire, the prince of
the hen-men resorted to a form of usurpation. One can be reminded of the
insistence in Plato's Republic that it is not proper to lie either to one's doctor
or to one's ruler, for that keeps the man nominally in charge from truly
governing what is to happen."6

1m.
One problem with the way that the prince of the hen-men proceeded may
12. This chapter of Machiavelli's Discourses (1, 14) is appended to this talk in the text
accompanying infra note 33.
13. On how to read serious texts, see George Anastaplo, Law & Literature and the
Austen-Dostoevsly Axis: Explorations,46 S.D. L. REv. 741,751,758 (2001); Anastaplo, Law
& Literatureand the Moderns, supra note 7, at 254.
14. On Delphi, the site of perhaps the most celebrated source of oracles in the Classical
world, see ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER As ARTIST, supra note 4, at 93.
15. The prince of the hen-men, in proceeding as he did, was usurping the power of the
consul (the commanding officer); that is, he was attempting to rule. "Above all, the prince must
be able to see through deceptions." DE ALVAREZ, supra note 11, at 114; see also infra text
accompanying note 17.
16. On Plato's Republic, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 278281; ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 303, 316.
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be seen in what happened: the truth did get out among the soldiers, threatening
to demoralize the army. Should not the prince have conducted his "inquiry"
of the chickens altogether alone, or with completely reliable associates, if he
was going to falsify the report?
Papirius rebuked his nephew for bringing the report to him about the
chickens: each is to do his assigned duties, not someone else's. The prince
of the hen-men should have done what the nephew is now doing, if anyone
did. Instead, the prince of the hen-men had performed the duty of the consul:
he decided what to do about the information he had rather than allowing the
consul to decide. The rebuke of the nephew is called for; Machiavelli teaches
elsewhere that a leader should permit only those whom he has asked to
counsel him to do so, adding that he should diligently ask for counsel. 7
Papirius had asked the hen-men about the chickens. I suspect that a leader did
not resort to the hen-men until he was fairly sure that he wanted a favorable
answer: are not chickens highly likely to eat whenever an opportunity is
offered to them?
Papirius insists to his nephew that "as for him and the army the auspices
were good"' 8-and on this basis he could go into battle with high
expectations. But "if the [prince of the hen-men] had said lies, these would
turn to his prejudice."19 One can be reminded of Thomas Hobbes's advice
that one obey one's ruler, as transmitter of messages from God. If the ruler
is mistaken, the blame is his to expiate, not that of the obedient subject."
Although Papirius rebuked his nephew, he did make use of what he
learned from him; he placed the hen-men in the forefront of the fighting.2
This should teach them, or their successors, to tell the truth in the future.
IV.
The chance killing of the prince of the hen-men and the approving
comment by Papirius show how a prudent man can make use of chance. 2
Was the killing, truly by chance? It seems to be suggested that Papirius is
better able to discipline his men (the nephew, the prince of the hen-men, the
army) than the prince of the hen-men had been able to discipline his talkative
associates.

17. See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. 23. The first reliable translation of this treatise
into English is by Leo Paul S. de Alvarez. It was published by the University of Dallas Press
in 1980 and thereafter by the Waveland Press. See infra notes 386-87.
18. See the appendix to this talk, paragraph 2.
19.
20.

Id.
See Laurence Berns, Thomas Hobbes, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 390-93

(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 1972).
21. See the appendix to this talk, paragraph 2.
22. Id. Is the "prognostication" referred to that of the prince of the hen-men or that of
Papirius?
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We can see, with this "chance" killing of the prince of the hen-men, that
Papirius surely would have found a way to proceed in a satisfactory fashion
if the prince of the hen-men had reported the truth to him.23 We can also see
the tough-mindedness of the Romans: good intentions did not suffice,
especially since the prince of the hen-men had put Papirius in "an impossible
situation."
Machiavelli shows that he understands such matters and invites the
thoughtful reader to join him. The requirements of a republican regime are
kept in view by him, something that iconoclastic intellectuals of recent
decades have been careless about. 4
V.
The second story in our fourteenth chapter exhibits the wrong way to
respond to unfavorable auspices-the drowning of the chickens.25 This is far
too blatant a response, however "understandable" the exasperation of Appius
Pulchrius may have been. It is, we are taught, far better to dispose of the
prince of the hen-men the way Papirius did than to dispose of the chickens the
way Appius Pulchrius did-better, that is, for good order in the military.
What accounts for Appius Pulchrius' defeat? Was defeat in battle
somehow to be expected from someone who had been as careless as Appius
Pulchrius had been about the chickens? Furthermore, did his army learn of
what he had done to the chickens, thereby becoming demoralized?
Thus, Machiavelli teaches us, the auspices are and are not to be taken
seriously-and this is properly the duty of the prudent leader to determine.
VI.
The chapter (I, 14) we have drawn upon has been supplemented, of
course, by others in the Discouirses on the use and abuse of religion in the
commonwealth. In Chapter 9 of Book I, for example, the introduction of
religion accompanies Romulus' fratricide as well as his killing of a
colleague.26 These unnatural killings are described and condoned by
Machiavelli.

23. "1hold thee fast, Africa. [Teneo te, Africa.]" is what Julius Caesar is said to have
improvised upon inauspiciously falling to the ground while disembarking for the campaign he
was leading into that continent. All this was in full view of his superstitious army, which had
been horrified upon seeing him stumble thus. See A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON
HISTORICAL PRiNCIPLES 20 (H. L. Mencken ed., 1942).
24. For statesmanlike cautions against irresponsible disparagements of religion, see supra
text accompanying note 9; infra note 32; see also supra note 10; infra notes 29, 30.
25. See the appendix to this talk, paragraph 3.
26. On Romulus, see MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. 6.
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Further on, in Chapter 15, Papirius plays down the effect of the oath the
enemy had taken, disparaging it as a sign of weakness in the circumstances."
He also discounts the evidently impressive crests that the enemy sported:
"Crests do not cause wounds," he insists. 28 Are we to be reminded by these
crests of the fateful chickens in Chapter 14?
In any event, Machiavelli advocates "religion well-used." If the soldiers
had known what Papirius knew, Machiavelli seems to say, they would not
have needed the auspices. By resorting to the auspices, Papirius permitted the
soldiers to share, as much as they could, his own understanding of the military
situation. Thus the auspices did for the soldiers what skill in war did for
Papirius.
VII.
What use can the prudent man today make of all this? Should not
churches be recognized, if only tacitly, for what they contribute to the
community? Does 29
it not help to be aware of how serious men could once deal
with such matters?
Even in this enlightened age, subterranean religious passions are still to
be reckoned with. It remains to be seen who can make the most sensible use
of such passions in our public life. The more that sophisticated men and
women disparage such passions, the more likely will it be that others with
inferior understanding and of dubious civic-mindedness will exploit such
passions."
All this is related to questions of how one reads and what one knows
about human nature.3 A great gulf divides those who read properly and those
who merely read. Proper reading in legal and political things depends, at least
in part, upon returning again and again to fundamentals-to the study of the
Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution, and other high
expressions of the American mind, as well as to the study of the lives of our
greatest men and the thoughts of the best teachers elsewhere.

27. Is not this before the battle prepared for in Chapter 14?
28. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 12, at I, ch. 15. Even so, warriors inspired by crests
or other adornments may certainly cause wounds.
29. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 8, 97, 203, 214;
see also supra note 24.
30. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 214,319,327,341,
345,527.
31. Do not these two questions go together? Certainly, what one knows about human
nature can be critical for how well one reads discussions of human things. In addition, may not
what one knows about human nature help one prepare oneself for aproper study of non-human
things? One may be helped, for instance, if one has learned what it means to know and if one
has developed an awareness of what is likely to impede understanding. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO,
THE ARTIST AS THINKER, supra note 4, at 7; ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3,
at 303; infra note 392.
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Thus, in thinking further about the problems posed by Machiavelli in the
Discourses chapter we have begun to look at, we should take to heart the
advice given by President Washington in his Farewell Address in 1796:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion
and morality are indispensable supports.... And let us with caution indulge
the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever
may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar
structure, reason and experience forbid us to expect that national morality
can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. 2
3
Appendix: MACHIAVELLI, DiscouRsEs, I, 141

14. The Romans interpreted the auspices according to necessity, and with
prudence made a show of observing religion when forced not to observe
it; and if anyone rashly disparaged it, they were punished.
Not only were the auguries, as has been discussed above, in large part
the foundation of the ancient religion of the Gentiles, but they also were the
cause of the well being of the Roman Republic. Hence the Romans had
greater care of them than of any other order of theirs; using them in the
consular assemblies, in the beginnings of enterprises, in leading out the
armies, in engaging in battles, and in every important action of theirs, either
civil or military; never would they go on an expedition that they had not
persuaded the soldiers that the Gods [Deil promised them victory. And
among other auspices they had in the armies were certain orders of
haruspices, who were called hen-men. [pullari. See Livy x.40] And
whenever they gave the order to engage the enemy in battle, they turned to
the hen-men to make their auspices-if the chickens pecked, they fought
with a good augury; not pecking, they abstained from the battle.
Nonetheless, when reason showed them that a thing ought to be done,
notwithstanding that the auspices were adverse, they did it in every mode,
but turning it about with words and modes so suited that it did not seem that
they had done it with a disparagement of religion.
These terms were used by Papirius, the consul, in a most important battle
that he made against the Samnites, after which they remained wholly
weakened and distressed. For when Papirius was in camp opposite to the
Samnites, and it seemed to him that victory was certain in the fight, and
wishing because of this to go into battle, he commanded the hen-men to
make their auspices. But the chickens not pecking, and the prince of the henmen seeing the great disposition of the army for combat, and the opinion of
the captain and all the soldiers that they would conquer, in order not to take

32. ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINcOLN, supra note 9, at 25-26.
33. The Leo Paul S.de Alvarez translation of the Discoursesdrawn upon here has not yet
been published. I used some years ago, with considerable success, photocopies of this
translation in a Jurisprudence course at the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. See
infra note 117.
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away from that army the occasion of good action, he reported to the consul
that the auspices had gone well. So Papirius was drawing up the square,
when some of the hen-men said to certain soldiers that the chickens had not
pecked, and these told Spurius Papirius, nephew of the consul; and when he
reported it to the consul, he was immediately answered that he should attend
to doing well his own office, that as for him and the army the auspices were
good, and if the hen-man had said lies, these would turn to his prejudice. So
that the effect might correspond with the prognostication, he commanded the
legates that the hen-men should be drawn up in the forefront of the battle.
Whence it came about that in going against the enemy, a Roman soldier cast
a dart and by chance killed the prince of the hen-men. Upon hearing of it the
consul said that everything had proceeded well and with the favor of the
Gods, for the death of that liar had purged the army of every fault and of
whatever wrath they might have had against him. Thus through knowing
well how to accommodate his plans with the auspices, he decided to enter
into battle without the army's becoming aware that he had in any way
neglected the orders of that religion.
The contrary was done by Appius Pulchrius in Sicily, during the First
Punic War. Wishing to do battle with the Carthaginian army, he had the
auspices made by the hen-men, and upon their reporting to him that the
chickens did not peck, he said "Let us see if they want to drink!," and threw
them into the sea. Whence, upon fighting, he lost the day. And when he was
condemned in Rome and Papirius honored, it was not so much because one
had lost and the other had won, but that one had acted prudently regarding
auspices, and the other rashly. Nor did this mode of divining tend to any
other end than to make the soldiers confidently go into battle, from which
confidence victory almost always arises. This thing was not only used by the
Romans but also foreigners, of which, I think [mipare-literally, it seems
to me], I shall give an example in the following chapter. [End of Appendix].
34

2. JUDGES, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION

We still have to discuss the judge. Above all he must be sure not to
depart from the statutes, imperial pronouncements, and custom.
Justinian I

What should judges, especially federal appellate judges, do in applying
the Constitution of the United States? Should judges limit themselves to
interpreting the original Constitution or should they adjust constitutional law
34.

A talk given at the Skokie Public Library, Skokie, Illinois, April 30, 1990.
IV JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 17. On Justinian, see George Anastaplo, Rome, Piety, and
Law: Explorations,39 Loy. (New Orleans) L. REv. 1,98 (1993) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Rome,

35.

Piety, and Law].
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to our time? Continuous modification of constitutional law is said to be
necessary if our system of government is to be adapted to changing
circumstances. On the other hand, if people generally appreciated how
practical the Framers of the original Constitution were, there would be far less
talk of a need to adapt the Constitution to our circumstances.
Vital to a proper consideration of this subject is the determination of what
the Constitution of 1787 says, not only aboutjudges but also about the general
powers of the National Government. One negative effect of the unfortunate
politicizing of judges is that wary legislators have come to rely upon judges
to make various tough (that is, politically-risky) decisions that legislatures are
usually better equipped to make than are judges.
II.
What does the Constitution provide with respect to judges? There is no
provision at all in the Constitution for judicial review of Acts of Congress.
It is doubtful that the Framers of the Constitution anticipated that courts
would be able, as a general practice, to assess Acts of Congress for their
constitutionality. If the Framers had anticipated this, they almost certainly
would have made provision for it in a way comparable to the provisions they
made for the exercise of the Presidential veto.36 Various narrow readings of
the Constitution, especially of the Commerce Clause, intensified the problems
of judicial review for a century or so before the late 1930s." The same can
be said of the distorted readings of the Due Process Clauses, which led to the
questionable rulings in Dred Scott,a" Lochner,39 and the Abortion Cases4" (of
1857, 1905, and 1973, respectively).
The provisions made in the Constitution for selection of the federal
judiciary suggest thatj udges were intended to be used primarily for traditional
judicial functions, not for the exercise ofjudicial review, which was virtually
unprecedented in 1787."' The constitutional qualifications for the President
and for Members of Congress include age and residence requirements. No

36.

ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, 47-48.

37.
38.

See, e.g., id. at 58; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111(1942).
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). On Dred Scott, see
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,supra note 2, at 333; ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 457; ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9,
at 363.
39. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
40. SeeRoev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113(1973); Doev. Bolton,410 U.S. 179 (1973). Onthe

Abortion Cases, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 185;
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 455; ANASTAPLO, THE
AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 389-90, 399.
41. On judicial review, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONOF 1787,supranote 2, at 335;
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supranote 2, at 460; see also infra text
accompanying notes 294-300, 359.
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such requirements are indicated for judges; rather, the President and Senate
collaborate in the selection ofjudges, with no strings attached. The Framers
probably believed that such selection would be based, as it had traditionally
been said to be based in the British system, primarily upon considerations of
learning and character.
Character, especially if grounded in natural-right teachings, and learning
are essential if federal judges are to conduct themselves properly not only in
interpreting and applying the laws made by Congress but also in developing
the common law. To speak of the judicial function in this way is to expect of
judges thereafter what had long been expected of them theretofore in the wellestablished legal system with which the Framers were most familiar.

mI.
This is not to deny that the United States Constitution was to be
important for all judges in the United States. For example, the laws of the
various States have to conform to the Constitution. The principal concern
here, however, under the Constitution of 1787, is to make sure that the States
do not interfere with the National Government's effective exercise of the
powers available to it under the Constitution.42 The development of judicial
review of Acts of Congress and the imposition of critical restraints by the
Fourteenth Amendment on the States have necessarily madejudges both more
political and lessjudicial than anticipated by the Constitution of 1787." 3 The
rarely-noticed fact that there is no constitutional mandate that federal judges
even be citizens of the United States suggests how a-political the Framers
once considered judges to be.
If, however, federal judges are to continue to conduct themselves in the
political manner to which they and we have become accustomed, they should
probably be men and women with considerable political experience." This
means, among other things, that judges should not be coming from the
appointed officers of the Executive Branch of the Government or from law
school faculties, except in rare instances. Even most practicing lawyers,
including many United States attorneys, may not have enough political savvy
to qualify.
42. On the Supremacy Clause, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note
2, at 338; see also infra text accompanying note 298.
43. Judges, even before the Fourteenth Amendment was available to them, attempted (as
in Dred Scott) to settle the great political issues of the day. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text; infra note 44 and accompanying text.
44. Would United States Supreme Court Justices with more political experience have
steered clear of the 2000 presidential election, leaving the matter to the Congress to resolve in
accordance with the relevant constitutional provisions? See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Bush v.
Gore and a Proper Separation of Powers, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 131 (2002) [hereinafter
Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore and aproperseparationofPowers];see also infra note 133; infra text

accompanying note 374.
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Of course, not all politicians would do well as judges, since many of them
are not technically competent in the law. But it is salutary to emphasize the
advantages, in our circumstances, of politically-experienced men and women
on the bench. Experienced politicians do tend to be better equipped than
either Executive Branch personnel or legal scholars to make political
decisions; they tend to be better attuned to the political life of the country.
The politician, in order to survive, has to learn how to talk to people sensibly.
Politicians do develop a healthy respect for the opinions of the community at
large. Prudence is thereby encouraged, including an awareness of what can
and cannot work. Or, as a distinguished law school classmate of mine put it
a decade ago with the Abortion Cases immediately in mind: "The political
branches of government, in their own halting and sometimes frustrating way,
'
tailor the pace of social change to what society as a whole can accept."45
Another way of putting all this is to say that the politician is apt to be
sensitive to the demands, or at least to the rhetoric, of natural-right principles.
Certainly, the successful politician is hardly apt to be a proclaimed moral
relativist or positivist, as all too many intellectuals (conservatives and liberals
alike, in government and out) tend to be today. Routinely looking to
competent politicians to supply the federal bench might have the happy sideeffect of discouraging the dubious "litmus-test" approach that is unfortunately
politicizing selection of the judiciary at this time.'
47
3. A PRIMER ON CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Making ...due allowance for one or two shining exceptions,
experience may teach us to foretell that a lawyer... educated to
the bar [only] in subservience to attorneys and solicitors will find
he has begun at the wrong end. If practice be the whole he is
taught, practice must also be the whole he will ever know: if he
be uninstructed in the elements and first principles upon which
the rule of practice is founded, the least variation from established
precedents will totally distract and bewilder him: ita lex scripta
est is the utmost his knowledge will arrive at; he must never
aspire to form, and seldom expect to comprehend, any arguments
drawn a priori, from the spirit of the laws and the natural
foundations of justice.
William Blackstone48

45.

Abner J. Mivka, The Courts andPolitics: When They Mix and When They Don 't, 14

INT'L SOC'Y OF BARRISTERS

46.

Q. 345,350 (1979);

see infra text accompanying notes 372-73.

This lament by me was voiced in 1990. The dubious "litmus-test" approach has been

relied upon even more since then. On the "natural-right principles" referred to, see ANASTAPLO,
BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303.
47. A talk given at the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, Chicago, Illinois,
April 4, 2002.
48.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 32.
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PROLOGUE

Students of the Constitution should be encouraged to recognize that
sensible people will find ways, sometimes rather contrived ways, to do what
needs to be done to deal with the pressing problems of their day. The ways
actually resorted to may be called for because of the supposed constitutional
barriers to any reliance upon the obvious and more sensible ways that would
otherwise be developed.
These barriers may be due to accidents of one kind or another, including
accidents grounded in misreadings of constitutional texts and accidents
resulting from partisan manipulations. To recognize that people will do what
needs to be done is to be reminded that people shy away from obviously
suicidal courses.
I.
The Heart ofAtlanta Motel case reveals much more about the "situation"
than contemporary constitutional authorities seem to recognize. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 challenged in that case had been enacted by Congress
because of profound concerns nationwide about race relations.49
This was obvious to everyone involved in this and like cases, on all sides
of the issues litigated. It is disingenuous, or at least misleading, to ignore the
primary concern here with racial justice. Even so, those who considered
themselves the champions of racial justice had had to ground their legislation
and litigation primarily on supposed commercial assessments.50
11.
The objective-the elimination of racial discrimination in public
accommodations-had been approached, for some time, by contrived or
roundabout ways. That is, the Commerce Clause was used as the ostensible
basis for the legislation relied upon here.5'
Lawmakers, in developing the 1964 legislation, also referred to the
Fourteenth Amendment, with its obvious bearing on racerelations, but that
Amendment took second place to invocations of the Commerce Clause. The
Opinion of the Court in Heartof Atlanta was aware of this somewhat odd
state of affairs, even as it pretty much set the Fourteenth Amendment to the
side and devoted itself primarily to Commerce Clause issues.52

49. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); see also infra note 51.
50. See infra text accompanying note 337.
51.
See GERALDGUNTHER,CONSTITUTIONALLAW 146-51 (12thed. 1991); seealsoinfra
text accompanying note 265.
52. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250-52.
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Ill.
This odd state of affairs goes back to a series of events sketched out in this
way in the Heart of Atlanta Opinion:
Congress first evidenced its interest in civil rights legislation in the Civil
Rights or Enforcement Act of April 9, 1866.1"1 There followed four Acts,
with a fifth, the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, culminating the series.
In 1883 this Court struck down the public accommodations sections of the
1875 Act in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. No major legislation in this
field had been enacted by Congress for 82 years when the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 became law. It was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1960....
[In 1964,] the Civil Rights Act of 1964, here under attack, was finally
passed.'
We can see from these dates (1866-1875) that the original Civil Rights
Acts had immediately followed the Civil War, drawing thereby on both the
principles and the passions of the victors. That was during the first decade
after the War.
We can also see, however, that two decades after the Civil War, a period
of "reconciliation" had set in between North and South to which the interests
of the emancipated slaves can be said to have been sacrificed. In that
campaign for reconciliation, it had been considered proper to relax restraints
upon the exercise of racial prejudice and to minimize the "reach" of the
Fourteenth Amendment, confining it to more or less explicit "State actions"
denying equal protection to everyone.
IV.
In the Heart ofAtlanta case, the Court's Opinion recognized that the 1883
Civil Rights Cases had severely restricted what the Courts could say and do
with the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to public accommodations
legislation." In its 1964 Opinion, the Court noticed that the 1883 cases had
shaped how Congress conducted itself when it decided to serve the objective
that guided the Congress in 1875.56
The Court also recognized in the Heart of Atlanta Opinion that long
before the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 the United States Supreme Court had
acknowledged that the Commerce Clause authorized the Congressional
regulation of virtually the entire economy of the country. Passages from

53. The Civil War, it should be remembered, ended in 1865.
54. See Heartof Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 245-46 (footnotes omitted).
55. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also Heartof Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S.
at 250-52.
56. See id. at 251.
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Gibbons v. Ogden are quoted to this effect.5 7
V.
The HeartofAtlanta Court reinforces its preference for relying upon the
Commerce Clause rather than upon the Fourteenth Amendment in upholding
the public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights legislation.
Perhaps this contributed to the discouragement of any dissents from what the
Court did on this occasion.
Evident throughout the Heart of Atlanta opinion is something artificial
about the Court's primary reliance upon the Commerce Clause. This
approach conforms with the desire of lawyers to "play it safe" in controversial
matters, preferring to win rather than to be right. We can see, in the
reluctance to rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment here, how important
precedents tend to be for those steeped in the law.
VI.
The Concurring Opinion of Justice Douglas reminded the HeartofAtlanta
Court of what it already knew. That is, Justice Douglas tells the Court that
there is indeed something artificial, if not even unrealistic, in treating this kind
of case as primarily a Commerce Clause case instead of as a Fourteenth
Amendment case.58
Indeed, Justice Douglas argues that forthright reliance upon the
Fourteenth Amendment would discourage the subterfuges and the
obstructiveness encountered again and again in such cases. It seems, however,
the Justices did not believe that they could retain their desired united front if
they attacked frontally the 1883 precedent.59
VII.
The limitations of courts in such matters can be seen in another feature of
the 1883 opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. This is the insistence by that
Court that it was discussing only the Fourteenth Amendment issue and not the
Commerce Clause issue.
That is, the 1883 Court acknowledged that its assessment of the 1875
Civil Rights Act might have been different if it had also considered the
authority provided to Congress in these matters by the Commerce Clause.
The Court added, however, that it was not considering the Commerce Clause
in that case inasmuch as the parties had not argued it.6'

57.
58.
59.
60.

See id.
See id. 279-80.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 19.
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VII.
This, it seems to me, is a shocking state of affairs. An obviously
important Act of Congress, conceived as an effort to promote racial justice,
is invalidated by a Court which admits that there may be grounds on which
that Act could be sustained.
Nothing is said about why the parties were not asked to submit further
briefs and arguments drawing upon Commerce Clause considerations. Nor is
anything said about why the Court itself, independent of the parties to this
litigation, could not use its own resources to determine how the Commerce
Clause bore upon this matter.
Ix.
Even more shocking is that this sort of thing should be generally accepted,
with little challenge and for so long. The limitations of much contemporary
discourse about constitutional law are thereby exposed."'
X.
The obvious defense of standard practice here looks to well-established
rules about raising issues in litigation. It must be asked, however, in what
circumstances do such rules make sense?
A certain efficiency is promoted, and lawyerly diligence is encouraged,
when such rules govern most civil litigation and routine prosecutions. But is
not prudence, and not a mindless reliance upon rules, called for when great
matters of state are involved?
XI.
After all, it should be remembered, the Constitution nowhere suggests that
Congress must specify the constitutional provisions it draws upon. The
Constitution only suggests, in effect, that Congress may, when it sees fit,
exercise the powers with which it is entrusted.
Of course, Members of Congress, in the debates to which proposed
legislation may be subjected, can raise questions about constitutional
authority, as may the President when he considers whether to sign whatever
has been passed by Congress. In due course, the People can pass their own
judgment upon whether Congress is sound in its assessment of its
constitutional powers.

61. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, How to Read the Constitution ofthe United States, 17
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. I (1985) [hereinafter Anastaplo, How to Read the Constitution]; George
Anastaplo, Samplings: Nine Talks, 27POL. Sci. REviEWER345,373 (1998); see also supra note
44. On the importance of political will in these matters, see Part 10 of this article.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 472 2002-2003

2003]

LAW, JUDGES,AND THE PRINCIPLES OFREGIMES

473

XII.
Such considerations should make judges reluctant to intervene by way of
invalidating acts of Congress. This kind of reluctance was anticipated by
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison when he indicated that courts
would appreciate the seriousness of any future invalidation by them of an Act
of Congress, something that was not done for a half-century thereafter.62
Do courts today ever express the kind of reluctance that the Chief Justice
did? This kind ofreluctance-recognizing the proper place of and the respect
due to courts in our constitutional system-is drawn upon as well by Abraham
Lincoln in his 1861 Presidential addresses. 63
XIII.
We should be reminded by these observations of the inherent limitations
of courts as adjudicators of constitutional issues. For one thing, it is virtually
impossible to eliminate policy (that is, political) considerations from
constitutional determinations, considerations for which judges are not
properly prepared.
If such constitutional determinations are desired, it makes far more sense
to have a specially-designated constitutional court which routinely subjects all
Congressional legislation to scrutiny, similar to what the President does. This
court would be, in effect, the third house of the legislature, subject to
whatever control the People want to impose upon it.
XIV.
It is well to notice why the typical judge is not properly prepared to deal
sensibly with the policy issues that are likely to be a part of any constitutional
determination. For one thing, judges do tend to be "out of touch" with the
issues of the day, not least because they do tend to be older than legislators.
We do want judges to be somewhat "out of touch" when passing on
individual cases, the effects of which are pretty much limited to the parties
involved (and which can be corrected by legislation). The advanced age of
judges can be useful there, making a dispassionate assessment of the particular
facts and equities more likely.
Xv.
The 1920 case of Missouri v. HollandM reminds us of the contrivances to

62. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). The case, a halfcentury later, was Dred Scott. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
63. Compare Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); infra text accompanying note 299.
64. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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which ill-conceived constitutional determinations by courts can lead. The
effort to regulate the hunting of migratory birds in this country could have
been grounded in that expansive view of the Commerce Clause promoted by
Chief Justice Marshall.
By 1920, however, that view had been replaced by a much narrower
reading of the Commerce Clause, obliging Congress and the president to
"import" sufficient regulatory power here by negotiating a treaty with Great
Britain. It is odd that nowhere in the Opinion of the Court by a learned Justice
is there any question raised about the series of constitutional adjudications
which had driven responsible legislators to such a bizarre remedy as a treaty
devised to empower Congress to legislate on this obviously domestic matter.6"
XVI.
Why does not common sense make us wonder whether something may be
fundamentally wrong with our premises about constitutional adjudication? Is
it consistent with our traditions about the wisdom of the Framers of the
Constitution that they should have left the United States without elementary
powers entrusted to the governments of civilized countries everywhere?
Along with the insistence by the Courts of the United States upon
invalidation prerogatives that do not seem to have been intended in the scope
to which we have had to become accustomed, there has been the abdication
by those Courts of truly judicial powers related to the contribution they (and
only they) could make to the shaping of the common law in the United States.
Thus, at about the same time that those Courts were beginning to return to the
Marshall view of the Commerce Power, they tried to abandon their traditional
and inherent powers as common law courts."
XVII.
The Courts did come to their senses with respect to the Commerce Clause
in time to keep the Great Depression Congresses from looking, in their
desperation, to such gimmicks as that relied upon in Missouriv. Holland. In
other circumstances, the War Power might be used to permit Congress to do
what it believes vital for the common good.6

65. This Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., did recognize that the matter under
consideration (the protection of migratory birds) bore upon vital interests of the United States.
See Holland, 252 U.S. at 435; see also infra note 263; infra text accompanying note 286.
66. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787,supranote 2, at 128-37. On the common law, see id. at 332. See also
Part 8 of this article; infra text accompanying notes 270, 361.
67. Consider, also, how President Lincoln used his powers as Commander-in-Chief to
support his issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. See ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
supra note 9, at 197; ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 114, 316 n.77.
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Judicially-imposed shackles upon Congressional powers are probably
fewer now than they have been since early in the Nineteenth Century. This
is not to deny, however, that there do remain misreadings of the Fourteenth
Amendment which can inhibit what might have to be done from time to time
in the interest of racial justice and, hence, domestic tranquility.
EPILOGUE

One should not criticize the limitations of judicial experiments in
constitutional determination without recognizing the importance, since the
Second World War, of the rulings in Brown v. Board of Education" and
thereafter. The praise due here, however, should be tempered by a further
recognition that Brown might not have been needed if the Court had done
6 9 and in the Slaughter-House
what it should have done in Plessy v. Ferguson
Cases,7" as well as in the Civil Rights Cases.7
It is only prudent to add here that all too many calls for reliance upon
"original intent" today come from jurists and others who do not suspect that
a proper understanding of "original intent" would concede far more powers
to the Government of the United States than they are comfortable with.72 It
is also prudent to expect that sensible people, confident of their moral as well
as their political competence, will work out satisfactory ways of doing what
has to be done, no matter what courts and their champions may happen to say
from time to time.
7
4. BILLS OF RIGHTS-ANCIENT, MODERN, AND NATURAL?

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The Ninth Amendment 4
Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
68.

347 U.S. 482 (1954); see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 2, at 168, 184, 439 n.209.
69. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
70.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see ANASTAPLO, THE

AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 176-77.
71. 109 U.S. 3(1883).
72. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, "McCarthyism, "the Cold War, and TheirAftermath, 43
S.D. L. REv. 103, 147, 150-51 (1998) [hereinafter Anastaplo, "McCarthyism, "the Cold War,
and Their Aftermath].
73. A talk given at a panel of the American Political Science Association Annual
Convention in San Francisco, California, August 29, 1990. For another talk that I gave at that
Convention, see George Anastaplo, Lessons for the Student ofLaw: The Oklahoma Lectures,
20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 19, 133 (1995) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Lessons for the Student of
Law].
74. See infra text accompanying note 98; see also infra note 273.
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Professor Gary Glenn has called to our attention the precision of Publius
and others in their use of the term "bill of rights," a precision that continued
in some American writers through the Nineteenth Century.75
It has been pointed out to us that writers shied away from calling the first
eight (or ten) amendments to the Constitution a "bill of rights." How much
this reluctance relates to the instructive distinction drawn by Professor Glenn
between a bill of rights as a "community-defining declaration" and a bill of
rights as a "judicially-enforceable law" is a question that his paper invites us
to consider.7'
One reason that some legal writers were reluctant to use the term "bill of
rights" to refer to our constitutional amendments may have been that the term
had a technical meaning going back to the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
That bill, which took the form of a parliamentary statute, restricted the powers
of the Crown and asserted various powers and immunities of "the Lords
Spirituall and Temperall and Commons.""
We can see laid out in the Bill of Rights of 1689 the conditions upon
which "their said Majestyes [William and Mary, Prince and Princess of
Orange] did accept the Crowne and Royall Dignitie of the Kingdoms of
England France and Ireland and the Dominions thereunto belonging."78 This
instrument included various fundamental provisions similar to the distribution
of powers found in the Constitution of 1787. In this sense, the initial
amendments to the Constitution are not a "bill of rights." Writers learned in
the law and in British constitutional history were aware of this.
In a popular sense, however, the term "bill of rights" was more widely
used. "During the controversy with Great Britain, from 1763 to 1776," we
have been told, "American editors frequently reprinted the English Bill of
Rights, and American leaders hailed it as 'the second Magna Carta. ' '79 Half
of the State constitutions in 1787 had affixed to them, usually at the
beginning, affirmations of rights called "bills of rights." This was a loose
usage perhaps, but it was widespread. Not only did these affirmations exhibit
the spirit of the English Bill of Rights, but they also drew upon their
illustrious English predecessor for specific provisions. For example, the
75. Professor Glenn is a senior member of the faculty of the Northern Illinois University
Political Science Department. See Gary D. Glenn, Cyrus' CorruptionofAristocracy,in LAW
AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 146.

76. It was assumed in the Glenn paper that judicial review, as understood today, would
apply "Judicially-Enforceable Law."
77. For the text of the 1689 Bill of Rights, see THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 142-45
(1819). See also ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 263-

68.
See ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 267.
79. Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights (English), in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 113 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1986).

78.
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Eighth Amendment to the Constitution was anticipated by the English Bill of
Rights, which provided that "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.""0
It seems to have been sensed by the public at large that the initial
amendments to the Constitution provided some of the assurances that the
celebrated Bill of Rights of 1689 had provided. It took more than a century
for the full extent and character of the English instrument to be generally
forgotten in the United States. 8'
II.
Mr. Glenn reminds us that various early apologists for the Constitution of
1787, such as the Publius of the Federalist,justified the lack of the bill of
rights that some critics of the proposed constitution were making so much of.
Among the justifications for what turned out to be an embarrassing omission
was the argument that many of the provisions proposed by critics were vague,
imprecise, and otherwise indefinite.82
Political motivations were not inconsequential in determining how these
arguments were developed. If the Framers of the Constitution had anticipated
how much would be said about the absence of a formal bill of rights, they
would almost certainly have produced one in the course of their Philadelphia
deliberations. 3 On the other hand, the more determined critics of the
proposed Constitution in 1787-1788 were not thinking of the kind of
amendments produced in the First Congress in 1789, but much preferred
instead significant limitations upon the substantial powers of Congress,
something that the Federalists who controlled the First Congress had no
intention of providing. 4 The Anti-Federalists' failure is reflected in their
inability, in the First Congress, to get the term "expressly" added to what is
now the Tenth Amendment. 5
Political motivations aside, what about the criticisms, voiced to this day,
about the imprecision of various provisions in the initial amendments? Most
of the provisions are fairly clear, providing sufficient guidance on their own
80. ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 265.
81. This forgetting is reflected in the materials that Professor Glenn sifted for us.
82. The Publius referred to here is the nominal author of The Federalist, the papers
produced in 1787-1788 by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison for the New
York State electorate. On The Federalist, see Anastaplo, Constitutionalism and the Good,

supra note 2, at Part 13.
83. The proponents of the proposed Constitution were moved, during the ratification
campaign, to make some perhaps dubious arguments against all bills of rights once the agitation
about the lack of a bill of rights threatened their desired speedy ratification of the Constitution.
84. For some of the significant limitations proposed by critics of the Constitution, see
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 298-313.
85. On the term "expressly," see id. at 458. Judges and other expositors sometimes read
"expressly" into the Tenth Amendment.
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terms. This may be seen as well in the two sets of provisions, dealing with
Congressional districts and with the compensation of members of Congress,
found in the two proposed amendments that were not ratified by the State
legislatures in 1789-1791. These two barely missed ratification, which
suggests that they were not clearly regarded as simply inappropriate as
amendments.8 6 Various initial amendments were probably considered to be
as precise as, say, the Eleventh Amendment a few years later, which asserted
certain immunities of the States with respect to the jurisdiction of the Courts
of the United States. 7
Also, it should be noticed, most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights of
1789-1791 draw on traditional formulations that had long served to provide
reliable guidance in English law and practice. Even the much-abused term
"due process of law" had in 1789 a fairly precise meaning that went back, at
least in spirit, to Magna Carta. s"
Mr. Glenn reminds us that Publius, in FederalistNo. 84, singles out the
term "liberty of the press" as a striking instance of imprecision: "What
signifies a declaration that 'the liberty of the press shall be inviolably
preserved?' What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition
which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?" 9 Liberty of the
press, in English constitutional history, stood at least for the rule against
previous restraints (or a system of press censorship). This is one element in
the formulation now included in the First Amendment language "freedom of
speech, and of the press." Some scholars in our time have tried to limit that
provision to the prohibition of prior restraints (as explained by Blackstone)."
This effort, however, does not take due account of what had happened in
America when the ultimate "sovereignty" moved from Parliament to people
at large. What freedom ofspeech means under this radically new dispensation
is suggested by the traditional assurance incorporated in the Bill of Rights of
1689: "That the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in
Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out
My observations here lend support to Publius' oftof Parlyament."'
questioned insistence in FederalistNo. 84 that "the constitution is itself, in

86. In fact, Congressional practice has, in effect, always accepted the principles reflected
in the two proposed amendments not ratified in 1791. The second of these originally-notratified amendments was "ratified" in 1992 and is now known as the Twenty-seventh
Amendment. On this amendment, see ANASTAPLO,THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, at 465 (Index).
87. On the Eleventh Amendment, see id. at 458 (Index).
88. On due process of law, see id. at 457 (Index).
89. On freedom of speech or of the press, see id. at 459 (Index).
90. See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN,supra note 4, at 33. For the usefulness
of the anti-censorship no-prior-restraint (or no-previous-restraint) rule today, see ANASTAPLO,
THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 680-82 n. 18.
91. See ANASTAPLO,THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 265.
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every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS."9 2
Thus, just as the Bill of Rights of 1689 defined the relation between Crown
and Parliament, so the Constitution of 1787 (even without its amendments)
defined the relation between the Government and the People, with the People
the position occupied by the Parliament in the British constitutional
now in 93
system.
Although some of the Bill of Rights-like provisions in the Constitution of
1787, as well as in the initial amendments, may seem imprecise, that may be
in large part because the craftsmanship of the Constitution itself is not
generally appreciated. The considerable reliance now placed upon judicial
review of Acts of Congress also reflect a dubious reading of the overall
Constitution, a system of government which would have been significantly
different in many particulars if modem judicial review had indeed been
provided for in the Constitution.94
II.
I have found instructive Gary Glenn's vigorous distinctions, with respect
to bills ofrights, between "community-defining declarations" and "judiciallyenforceable law." We need not consider here whether these are the only
alternatives. We can notice that the Preamble to the Constitution does serve
as a "community-defining declaration." 9'
It can be said that the initial amendments to the Constitution are not
precise enough to be judicially enforceable and certain things are believed to
follow from this as to the status of the rights set forth there. But when we
notice the order in which the elements in the twelve amendments proposed in
1789 were arranged, we can see that some of them were directed primarily to
the Congress, some to the Executive, and some to the Courts. The
implications of this arrangement should be noticed.
Take the provisions, such as the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments,
which are clearly directed to the Courts. Suppose the Courts do not conduct
trials as prescribed in those amendments. We would not expect to find a
remedy or "enforcement" elsewhere in the system short of a recourse to
legislative impeachment of judges. Thus, we rely here on the courts to be
respectful of and to adhere to the provisions that bind them. Similarly, the

92. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84. The English Bill of Rights of 1689, on the other hand,
is in large part a constitution, defining and limiting the powers of the monarchy.
93. One consequence of this shift is that the People need, for effective governance by
them, the freedom of speech originally developed for members of Parliament. See, e.g.,
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 93-129.
94. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 36; see also supra note 41.
95. We need not consider here the part that the Preamble was intended to play in
interpretations of the body of the Constitution. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, supra note 2, at 336 (Index).
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provisions that bind the Legislature and the Executive depend, for the most
part, on the willingness of those branches, subject to the supervision of the
electorate, to be respectful of whatever pertains to them. Thus, we need not
assume that those provisions have to be enforceable by any other branch of
government in order for them to be significant restraints upon government.
But have we not always been aware of this? After all, we know that most
actions taken by the Government of the United States may not be routinely
subjected to judicial review. The degree to which State actions are judicially
reviewable is different, and intended to be different, not only since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also in the Constitution of 1787
with its Supremacy Clause. In fact, it is not only the Courts of the United
States that can review what the States do, but Congress and the President also,
as may be seen upon considering the much-neglected "Republican Form of
'
Government Guarantee." 96
In the Constitution of 1787, there are no
provisions for the supervision of Congressional activity, aside from the
qualified Presidential veto, whereas there are provisions for the national
supervision of the activities of State governments.
The extensive recourse to judicial review of Acts of Congress since the
Civil War has not unnaturally led to questions about how the various rights in
the original Constitution, as well as in its amendments, should be regarded.
I have suggested that routine reliance on judicial review of Acts of Congress
reflect a failure to understand the extent to which the Congress was intended
to be the dominant branch of the Government of the United States. Perhaps
the severe limitations placed upon the States in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which were intended to be enforced by the Judiciary as well as by other
branches of the Government of the United States, got judges into the
questionable habit of believing that all legislatures have been created equal.9 7
I suspect that the belief widely held among us is that the fundamental
rights recognized in our Bill of Rights are imprecise, equivocal, and
unenforceable depends in large part upon the also prevalent opinion today that

96.

On the Republican Form of Government Guarantee, see id. at 337 (Index);

ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note

2,

at 463 (Index).

97. The belief that the three branches of government established by the Constitution of
1787 are equal is also questionable. On legislative supremacy, see ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONOF 1787, supra note 2, at 333. Consider, as well, the following letter that I wrote
to the Chicago Tribune, in March 2001, which was not published:
One of your readers, understandably troubled by radical measures resorted to
unilaterally these days by the Bush Administration, argues that "the U.S. Constitution
stipulates in no uncertain terms that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches are
equal branches." [Letters to the Editor, Cin. TIU., Mar. 10, 2002, sec. 2, at 6.]
Sometimes the judiciary, as we saw in December 2000, acts as if it is supposed to be the
dominant branch. At other times, as we now see, the executive acts that way.
But what the Constitution actually provides is that Congress, with such powers as those
of the Purse and of Impeachment, is to be the dominant branch of the National
Government, always subject of course to the sovereign Will of the People.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 480 2002-2003

2003]

LAW, JUDGES,AND THE PRINCIPLES OFREGIMES

481

the moral element in those fundamental rights shall not be taken seriously in
legal reasoning. The argument in opposition to the prevalent opinion means,
among other things, that various of these rights would be binding on our
governments whether or not set forth explicitly in the Constitution. The Ninth
Amendment reflects this approach.98 In any event, if the moral element in our
fundamental rights is recognized, then prudence should be intrinsic to the
interpretation and application of these rights.
5. THE MASS MEDIA AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER99

But anyway, in our consideration of the nature of the land and the
order of the laws, we're looking now to the virtue of the regime.
We do not hold, as the many do, that preservation and mere
existence are what is most honorable for human beings; what is
most honorable is for them to become as excellent as possible and
remain so for as long a time as they may exist. This, too, I think,
was said already, in our earlier discussions.
The Athenian Stranger'"
I.
About a quarter of a century ago, in the course of an archaeological tour
that I was conducting in Greece, our tour bus pulled into the village of
Mavromati in the southwestern comer of the country. We had made our way
to that remote place, off the beaten tourist track, to see the miles of ancient
walls that had survived the depredations that had been visited over millennia
on similar walls in the more populated parts of Greece. By the time we
finished walking as much of those walls as we wanted, it was early afternoon,
a hot summer afternoon. The shaded outdoor taverna to which we then went
was a very nice place to rest and refresh ourselves for an hour or so before
getting back into our bus for our next stop, Nestor's and Thucydides' Pylos.
I had heard that there were even older ruins in the valley above which our
village was placed, a valley that could be reached by scrambling several
hundred feet (or so it seemed) down a steep footpath. A visit to that site
meant, however, that lunch would have to be foregone-and none of my tour
group could be persuaded that the promised ruins would be worth that
sacrifice. They were probably right about that, for I do not now recall the
ruins I did manage to find once I got to the floor of that valley, where there

98. For the Ninth Amendment, see supra text accompanying note 74. All this bears on
the underlying and much-neglected issues in the puzzling case of Barronv. Baltimore,32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See infra Part 9 of this article.
99. A talk given to the Politics Department of The University of Dallas, Irving, Texas,
April 23, 1992.
100. PLATO, LAWS 707D.
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was no other sign of human life-and by that time it was very hot indeed. But
what made the descent not only worthwhile but even one of my most
memorable experiences as a traveler were the multitudes of colorful butterflies
I found in that abandoned comer of the world, a sea of butterflies in which I
could swim and refresh myself to my heart's content.
Another descent, a much more recent one has been far less exhilarating.
That was into the tunnels, forty and more feet under the surface of Chicago's
downtown area. We in that city have all, in a manner of speaking, been
plunged below the surface of the city since we learned that hundreds of
millions of gallons of water from the Chicago River had gushed into those
tunnels, flooding the basements of many buildings in the Loop and shutting
off the electric power for a considerable area. The damage we sustained ran
into the hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps into the billions.''
I have said that this descent into the Chicago "flood" has been far less
exhilarating than that into the sea of butterflies at Mavromati. It is even sad
for me personally because I had to some extent anticipated what
happened-and had done nothing about it but mention it to a few people as a
problem. I had wondered for some time about what precautions had been
taken to block the flow of water into the subway train system in the event of
a break in the tunnel overhead at one of the two places where that train system
goes under the Chicago River. In fact, I had planned to write about this to
people that I knew in City Hall, once during the present administration, and
once during a previous administration. But I had put it off, partly because I
was busy, and partly because of another reason to which I will return.
I was, therefore, bothered, even more than most of my fellow Chicagoans,
when I learned of our subterranean flood, a massive flood that could have
been significantly moderated if there had been floodgates installed on either
side of those places where tunnels run under the River, something which I
have long thought should have been done-and for all I knew may have been
done already. Once the news came of the flood, I was personally bothered
because I sensed that I might have been of help if I had spoken up when I had
been first moved to do so. One experiences here that sense of responsibility
that a citizen can, probably should, have for the common good.
In such self-accusing circumstances, it is natural to find solace as well,
since it is probably not healthy to make very much even of what one is truly
responsible for. It is somewhat of a relief to see how people have risen to the
challenge posed by this calamity-and a number of interesting things have
come to light. It is also some solace to recognize that probably nothing I
might have done would have made any difference anyway, especially as it
became evident that there were many more tunnels under the River than the
two subway train tunnels I had been concerned about. Many more than the
four floodgates I had envisioned may have been needed. I was reinforced in
my assessment that the expression of my concerns would not have made any
101.

See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at Al.
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difference when we all learned that the City had received warnings about a
serious break in one tunnel under the River as early as last January [I could
say in 1992], warnings that were even backed up, it seems, with video pictures
of what was happening. Little, if anything, was done in response to those
ominous reports. We should not be surprised to learn a year from now that
little, if anything, has been done to install the dozen or more floodgates that
are still needed. We tend, "naturally" enough, to devote our attention and
resources to immediately pressing problems.
It should be instructive to consider what contingencies are routinely
provided for in our large cities, probably many more than most of us are ever
aware of. Public servants are usually far more conscientious that we give
them credit for. Even in the Chicago-tunnels situation, it is not clear that
anyone recognized that the break that had been discovered by January was
under the River. The failings of public servants, as for must of us, tend to lie
in the realm of imagination, not in the realm of dedication to the common
good. It is remarkable, for example, how cavalier people of a century ago
evidently were in tunneling again and again under the Chicago River. But
then, consider how cavalier we have been in our own time with the building
of nuclear plants and the generating of immense quantities of lethal wastes
that we do not really know what to do with. We are now becoming mightily
concerned about this, just as we have long been concerned about the
proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. Concerns about nuclear
plants devoted to peaceful purposes are reinforced by news about the
thousands of deaths in Ukraine because of the troubles in 1986 at
Chernobyl.'0 2
U.
What does it mean to say, as I have said, that "the City" had received,
several months ago, warnings about a break in a tunnel? Some people in city
government were told something; questions are now raised about how many
of them there were told, how high up the hierarchy they were, and what was
said to them. We can see here a problem that we face again and again: What
does it mean to have a community? You will recall that Aristotle argued that
Babylon was not a polis, observing that part of Babylon was once taken by an
enemy without other parts of it knowing that this had happened. 3 The parts
of a truepolis,like a living organism, share experiences much more than the
parts of Babylon could share.

102.

See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 1; see also IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCIDENT

AT CHERNOBYL FOR SAFE REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL NuCLEAR PLANTS IN THE UNITED

STATES (United States Nuclear Regulatory Comn'n, 1989).

103. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1276a28-31; see also ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORALIST, supra note 3, at 459.
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In matters of public concern, all, or almost all, of the significant things are
likely to be known somewhere in a large association. Almost always there is
likely to be some information in the system that would be useful if it were put
in the hands of the right people. We can see this, for example, when we
examine what information was available to the American military in
November and December 1941 before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor."°4
Sometimes the key or most revealing information is the sudden lack of
available information (or a "blackout") about certain matters.
Consider the significance here of the research done by lawyers and judges
into statutes and precedents that may have long been forgotten. What does it
mean that the information sought might be considered relevant? Is it not odd
that such long-forgotten things are looked to for authoritative guidance as to
what "the law" is? A community, as an organic whole, seems to be taken for
granted by such reliance upon what is buried somewhere in the recorded
memory of a people.
To some extent, the critical binding together of a people may depend on
the catastrophes that they have shared. Consider, for example, the baptism in
blood that the Civil War provided for the American nation. In that case, infant
baptism-that is, the sentiments and experiences of the Revolutionary War
period-had not been sufficient. We should at once notice, however, that
even the Civil War would not have sufficed here if it had not been illuminated
and guided by enduring principles that gave it special meaning." 5
III.
Similarly, we must think about what lends significance to our "everyday"
catastrophes, such as our recent experience with the Chicago River. If one
hole in a tunnel under the River-a crack about twenty feet long, the size of
a large pickup truck--can have the remarkable effects that we have been
witnessing, what about a modem war? Does not this suggest the folly (if only
the remarkable inadequacy) of much of the planning and preparation since
1945 for a nuclear war? In Chicago, we had decades of air-raid-warning tests
every Tuesday morning, with all fire-station sirens in the city (or so it seemed)
wailing in unison at 10:30. It was never clear what we were supposed to do
if we ever had the real thing. A number of people did panic on the one
occasion that those sirens were let loose at another time of day--one night
when Richard J. Daley, a devoted White Sox fan, celebrated his team's

104. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Clausewitz and Intelligence: Some Preliminary
Observations, 16 TEACHING POL. SCL: POL. IN PERSP. 77 (1989); George Anastaplo, On
Freedom: Explorations,17 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 465,645 (1992) [hereinafter Anastaplo, On
Freedom].
105. Consider, for example, how President Lincoln, in the Gettysburg Address, applied the
principles ofthe Declaration of Independence to the circumstances of the war. SeeANASTAPLO,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 229.
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winning of a divisional baseball championship."°6 Be that as it may, the
regular Tuesday morning sirens did permit us to check our clocks. A few of
us could hope that the Russians did not choose that time for their moment of
madness. 07
Even more important than what we believe we can endure from a nuclear
assault and how is what we have been preparing and are willing to do to
others. The strongest nations-and it should have long been obvious that we
are by far the strongest of the strong-should be sensitive to the moral and
other restraints that they must impose upon themselves. I am afraid that we
saw in the recent Gulf War [I could say in 1992] how devastating, if not
unconscionable, our use of overwhelming power can be-and how useful it
had been for us to be somewhat moderated by our respect for Russian
power.108

It should be evident that modem societies are very complicated and hence
very vulnerable." ° ' That is, our liabilities are intimately related to our assets
and advantages, including the considerable freedom each of us has to choose
his own way of life. All this is related to our precarious relation with the
natural, as we do conquer nature to a considerable extent. Our vulnerability,
heightened in certain respects by our long-cherished liberty, shows up in
epidemics, spiritual as well as physical. These can be interrelated, as may be
seen in the worldwide AIDS epidemic, in the serial killings of our time in this
country, and in the mass-extermination programs of the Twentieth Century
abroad. 10
IV.
I return to the second reason why I did not deliver my warning to City
Hall about tunnel flooding: one does not want to turn into a Cassandra. Or,
put another way, one should ration out the warnings one issues, knowing that
otherwise one's credibility is likely to be soon squandered otherwise.
Much of my own credibility as a prophet has been invested in recent
decades in efforts to play down the extent of the Russian threat to the United
States, the perception of which has had such unfortunate effects upon
106. The White Sox won, in 1959, their first pennant since 1919.
107. One precaution here would have been to have had the major cities in the country use
different times for such testing. Perhaps that was done-or did the differences in time zones
take care of this risk? However that may be, this too I did not bother to suggest to anyone in
authority.
108. See Anastaplo, On Freedom, supra note 104, at 589, 604.
109. This was most recently dramatized by the deadly gas-main explosion in Guadalajara
the day before this talk of April 23, 1992.
I110. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, On Trial: Explorations, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 763, 977
(1991) [hereinafter Anastaplo, On Trial]. The September 11, 2001 assaults in New York and
Washington can now be added to this list. (The On Trialcollection is to be published in book

form by Lexington Books.)
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American life, both materially and spiritually. Long ago I decided and said
that we confronted in the Soviet Union, a seriously anemic giant, capable of
inflicting severe blows perhaps but also very limited in its true strength,
ultimately because of its political order. My suspicions were confirmed by a
fortnight spent in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1960.1 "
We are considerably more sensible these days about the Russians. But
some of our foolishness abroad continues, as was seen in the way we
approached the Gulf War."2 This is not to deny, I should at once add, that
other peoples, such as the Iranians, the Saudis, the Iraqis, the Kuwaitis, and
the Japanese, have been foolish as well. The most sensible participants in the
international struggles in which we have been interested in recent decades
have long seemed to me to be the Israelis, despite their obvious recent
shortcomings (with respect both to their Lebanese incursions and to the
Intifada). It is not encouraging [I could say in 1992] to watch the United
States now treat the Israelis as the "bad guys" in the Middle East." 3 This is
to be contrasted with our accommodations toward the barbaric Khmer Rouge
faction in Cambodia.
V.
I have glanced at both domestic crises and foreign crises. These are not
unrelated, especially since our excessive concerns with the Russians have
contributed to the neglect of our cities (and their infrastructure) which neglect
in turn very much affects our domestic institutions (including living
conditions, educational facilities, employment opportunities, and urban
violence).
Far more serious than either domestic troubles or foreign policy concerns
is another longstanding problem: What kind of a people should we be? This
has long been the most serious problem from which we have been diverted by
foreign challenges and domestic crises. Particularly vital here is whether this
question-What kind of a people should we be?-ought to be a matter of
community concern.
A prior question is (as I have indicated) whether there is a
community-an association which should take itself seriously. To ask
whether there is a community is to ask whether we can be informed enough,
both as to "facts" and as to standards of the good and the bad, to be justified
in being confident in what we may and should do.

I 11. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 3.
112. See supra text accompanying note 108. The moralizing temptations of the powerful
may be seen in how the Iraqi threat came to be spoken of in 2002 and 2003.
113. Israel, a decade later, appears better to us, but perhaps for the wrong reasons. On the
case for Israel, see ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 155; Anastaplo,
On Freedom, supra note 104, at 622.
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A critical obstacle here is the growing opinion, even among some of the
more influential politically-connected people in the academy, that each one
of us should be on his own, that it is no business of government to guide us in
what to believe, and that we are entitled to act as we please (that is, as we
chance to please) so long as we hurt no one else-and what "hurt" means is
narrowly construed.
All of this can be reinforced by some extraordinary notions (especially
among "conservatives") about the origins, nature, and prerogatives of private
property, notions which tend (at least in our time) to legitimate as well as to
support privacy and hedonism." 4
VI.
What kind of a people should we be? Certainly, we should be more civicminded than we seem to be these days. There is considerable concern among
us for our people's health, prosperity, and longevity, all of which are facets
of an emphasis upon government as necessary to protect us physically.
Civic-mindedness includes patriotism and self-sacrifice for the good of the
whole. The last time I talked at the University of Dallas, during the 1988
Presidential campaign, I had some things to say about the impropriety of
having a vice-presidential candidate who had the gall to hide himself in the
National Guard in order to avoid service in that war in Vietnam which he and
his influential family had been pushing.'15 Now we have [in 1992] a leading
Presidential candidate who also avoided the draft in questionable ways, but
he at least did not support the war that he avoided. In the "good old days,"
any self-interested shirking of military service would, once exposed, have
meant the end of a serious political career in this country." 6
We are all doing some shirking of our own these days, however, as may
be seen in our animus toward anyone who presumes to raise our taxes. We
can indulge ourselves in this even though our national debt escalates,
threatening (or so it seems) our economic health and hence our political
morale and long-term social stability.
VII.
I again ask: What kind of a people should we be? The answer to this
question must address not only issues of patriotism, but also of education,

114.

On the case for private property in our regime, see

ANASTAPLO,

THE

supra note 2, at 213-17. See also Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand the
Good, supra note 2, at Parts 2 and 3; infra notes 121, 144.
115. See ANASTAPLO,THE AMERICANMORALIST,supra note 3, at 108.
116. We have seen, since this 1992 talk, that remarkable switch in positions which has had
a Democratic Administration presiding over aBudget surplus and a Republican Administration
preparing to preside over an unprecedented Budget deficit.
CONSTrUTIONALIST,
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especially the education appropriate for a republican people.
I have found particularly instructive here Machiavelli's Discourses,a text
for republicans that is now available in a first-rate translation by Leo Paul de
Alvarez.' t 7 Whatever reservations one should ultimately have about
Machiavelli, he does offer us lessons that it is prudent to ponder.
Among the lessons to be drawn from Machiavelli are a depreciation of
private interests, as ordinarily understood (whatever may be ultimately done
with glory), a moderation of wealth in a republican regime, and an
endorsement of that clear thinking which is apt to be enhanced by a study of
the doings and sayings of the prudent men of other times and places.
Vital to a proper education of a people is that instruction which helps us
grasp what we need to study and to know in order to understand what is
required for sensible action in a variety of circumstances. This capacity is
what the Politics Program here at the University of Dallas has long been
interested in developing. 1 8
VIII.
I ask once more: What kind of a people should we be? This is a question
not only of patriotism and of education, but also of moral character. It is
character which can keep patriotism from deteriorating into the extremes of
either militant chauvinism or debilitating self-absorption. It is character
which can keep education from being diverted into either sophistry or
pedantry.
What is the state of the character of the American people today? Has
there not been a steady decline in the morals, including the tastes and
language, of the American people? Certainly the sense of morality exhibited
in our mass media, including the music and films we have become accustomed
to, is not elevated or elevating. What makes this particularly troubling is that
many of our more gifted people are devoted to these enterprises.
I return to my Cassandra mode by reminding you of my advocacy of the
abolition of broadcast television in this country, a decades-long advocacy
which has (so far as I know) made no converts and which (I am afraid) has
undermined my credibility."1 9 Some of those who might agree that there is
something wrong with television and its imitators are dubious about
governmental intervention in such matters. Aside from the concerns they may
have about dictators and a general repressiveness, there is for them an

117. That translation by Professor de Alvarez, drawn upon by me in Part I of this Article
(in the text accompanying supra note 33), has yet to be published. Recently, a reliable
translation of the Discourses has been published by Harvey Mansfield, Jr. and Nathan Tarcov.
118. See, e.g., WlLLMOORE KENDALL: MAVERICK OF AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES (John
A. Murley & John E. Alvis eds., 2002).
119. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supranote 3, at 245; see also infra text
accompanying notes 135, 354.
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underlying problem: they have serious reservations about anyone's ability to
know the good or about the legitimacy of any communal efforts to impose or
act upon moral standards. 2 0
IX.
I now shift to a more positive note, away from the more "negative" mode
seen in my quixotic abolition-of-television advocacy.
My longstanding concerns about the American character were vividly
brought home to me during a two-week, five-thousand mile drive across the
United States over the New Year's holiday, a drive from Chicago to the Grand
Canyon and then home again by way of a meeting in San Antonio. The people
on exhibit during this odyssey were decent and attractive, and the countryside
was engaging. But it was depressing to notice, on the radio bands of the
country, what the people of this country are routinely subjected to, day and
night-what is offered as entertainment and as information.
It is obvious that most people do not appreciate how bad the stuff is to
which they are subjected, including much that passes for religious worship
and for political discussion. They have long since lost, if they ever had, the
capacity to judge how low a "culture" is being propagated over the air waves,
a "culture" which is very much occupied with selling. The way of life
encountered there is so massive that it probably reflects much of what people
are feeling and thinking these days. So far as I can tell, the market is not
likely to correct this decline on its own. In fact, the market may even make
matters worse since large-scale broadcasting requires more and more
resources and hence larger and larger audiences to pay for all this. The least
common denominator must be used in determining what is to be catered to.
The market which is made so much of-as may be seen in the current rage
for "deregulation"--does contribute to a more efficient use of resources, with
efficiency measured primarily with a view to material well-being. The market
tends to permit us to be left alone so that we can personally control our lives
to a considerable extent. But this is consistent with, if not likely to lead to, a
steady lowering of standards, even as technology can improve products and
expand choices.
Even so, an effective market economy depends upon a people that are
disciplined in a certain way. Such a people is not simply the product of this
kind of economy. A market economy may reinforce the habits of the
disciplined, but it can also, depending on the circumstances, lead to the
subversion of character and hence of the discipline upon which this kind of
economy relies. 2 '

120.

See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303.
121.
See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Legal Education, Economics, and Law School
Governance: Explorations, 46 S.D. L. REv. 102, 132 (2001) thereinafter Anastaplo, Legal
Education,Economics, and Law School Governance];see also supra note 114; infra note 144;
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However enamored we may be of the principle of choice and selfdetermination, we cannot really control our own lives if we do not know what
we are doing and if we do not know what is better and worse-that is, if we
are not virtuous. The lessons taught and the tastes catered to and encouraged
by the mass media are hardly conducive to the maintenance and deepening of
morality among us.
The positive note which I have promised follows upon the observation
that one can better notice how low the stuff is that is typically broadcast these
days by comparing it (as we did in our recent fortnight on the road) with what
is now readily available on hundreds, if not thousands, of cassettes. For our
trip, a couple of dozen cassettes were selected from the readings of complete
plays, poems, novels, and other forms of literature available at reasonable
prices. Two quite different "worlds" were thus available to us as we
alternated between the broadcast bands and the cassettes.
I set aside, for this occasion, the questions raised by the images and the
music with which we are inundated these days. It is with the words we hear
and read that I am most concerned, those words upon which we primarily
depend for moral instruction, including instruction about how to use and even
respond to music and images.
As we moved across the country, I was struck by how good it would be
if all motorists (as well as people at home) could easily do what we were
doing: switch to recordings of the best that can be read among us. We now
have the technology and there is already more than enough material recorded
to permit the establishment of a publicly-funded nationwide radio network
that would do nothing but broadcast the kinds of recordings I have been
describing. This could be done twenty-four hours a day, perhaps on the same
frequency across the country, with the broadcast schedule of works to be
announced in advance and perhaps in the daily newspapers. Very few people
would be needed to do this, for only an occasional (pre-recorded)
announcement of what is being read would be required. The mechanical
details of such an enterprise could easily be worked out once it was
determined that it should be done. Nor need it be limited to one such network.
Of course, any one of us could choose to do this sort of thing for himself.
But is it not good for the community to affirm the standards it would by
embarking on this kind of endeavor? It would certainly support those who are
interested in such affirmation, including teachers who could work announced
broadcasts into school assignments and who could come to expect the
common discourse of the community to be higher than it is now. Besides, all
too many of us would not choose to do this on our own, certainly far fewer
than those who might be "exposed" to this sort of thing and who would come
to find it attractive once it was broadcast routinely. I do not believe that the
critical question here is the mode of selection of the materials to be broadcast.
Reasonable accommodations can be made here; political partisanship can be
infra text accompanying notes 135, 337, 354.
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avoided by those determined to avoid it. It is well to be reminded of how well
the B.B.C. has served the British people for many years. The enterprise Iam
advocating could reasonably be expected to elevate the general tone of our
language and public discourse, both secular and sacred.
I return, in closing, to the tunnels under Chicago, for they do serve as a
metaphor for the tunnels that underlie our life as a community. Those psychic
and social tunnels, which are useful in many ways, do have to be cared for, for
what happens in those subterranean passages can, even when they are barely
noticed on the surface, affect the quality, if not the very possibility, of
everyday life.
I am told my television-abolition proposal has provided the occasion for
productive discussions in college classrooms, especially since it has been
incorporated in a fine political science reader.' I venture to suggest that the
proposal for a national Network for the Written Word (NWW), which I am
launching here, can also provide occasions for discussions of what we should
stand for and what we may properly do to advance the good and to retard the
bad. 123
Certainly, a "statement" of significance would be made by this kind of
venture. We should remind ourselves that there is out there, in the words of
an old song, "a valley of love and delight," something far better than the selfcenteredness and hedonism to which we have been permitted, if not even
encouraged, to become addicted. 12 That is, there is "out there" a sea of
butterflies in which all of us can swim to our souls' content.
12
6. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND A SOFT CAESARISM 1

Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed
That he is grown so great?
12 6

Cassius

I am grateful [I could say in 1992] for this opportunity to sort out my

122. The reader was edited by Mary P. Nichols. See also supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
123. Thus far, I have not heard of any attempt to establish a national Network for the
Written Word (NWW). For my proposal for a "singing bus" (also not yet attempted), consider
Cornelia Grumman, Wrong Question, CI. TRIB. MAG., Nov. 26, 2000, at 14, 24.
124. The song drawn upon here is the Shaker classic, Simple Gifts. See infra the text
accompanying note 276.
125. A talk given to the Politics Department of The University of Dallas, Irving, Texas,
October 23, 1992. The original title of this talk was "Upon What Meat ....?":American
Constitutionalismand the Perot Intervention.
126. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act I, sc. 2.
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thoughts about the Ross Perot candidacy-and to do so in Mr. Perot's own
State, especially since he is the only real Texan in the Presidential contest this
year. In fact, since he lives in Dallas, I am addressing this "phenomenon" in
his backyard.
Mr. Perot, in the last 'presidential debate of the current campaign,
suggested that experience as the governor of a small State such as Arkansas
does not significantly qualify one for the Presidency of the United States. It
would be, he argued, as if managing a comer grocery store were regarded as
qualification for running Wal-Mart. The audience's response to this argument
seemed to endorse the wisdom of Mr. Perot's witticism.
But is not a governor of even a small State, especially if he has had to deal
with legislators and face electorates repeatedly, likely to be better equipped
for political life than even the most successful businessman? Such a
businessman, however distinguished he may be, may not have what a political
leader or a military commander, such as General Eisenhower, is likely to have
had-that is, experience in politically organizing diverse groups of people.
It also helps to develop one's political instincts
if one has, as politician, lost
127
an election or two early in one's career.
Mr. Perot's experience in or with government has been, for the most part,
behind the scenes where he could build up and then use effectively his vast
fortune. He has had to get used to what most politicians must learn to deal
with, the rough and tumble of political life. It is likely that his inability to deal
effectively with such rough and tumble encounters contributed both to his
bizarre withdrawal in July [ 1992] and to his determination to insulate himself
as much as possible from press conferences and the like upon reentering the
race. We can suspect that he is aware of his vulnerabilities here,
vulnerabilities for which no one in high office would long be able to
compensate.
We may wonder, therefore, whether the skills of the successful
businessman, however impressive they may be, are readily transferred to
political life. Whether such skills are usually transferable even from one
industry to another may be a question.
II.
A Perot advertisement I heard yesterday included this exhortation, "It is
not time for business as usual. It is time to get down to business."
We should notice that business is a way of life for which profits and
losses matter a great deal, for which deficits and debts can be decisive. Mr.
Perot has made us take the national debt even more seriously than we already
did and in such a way as to remind us that the typical popular issue is apt to

127. How one loses can affect what one is able to do thereafter. Thus, Abraham Lincoln's
loss in the 1858 Senatorial contest in Illinois helped him in his bid for the Presidency in 1860.
See ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 157.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 492 2002-2003

2003]

LAW, JUDGES,AND THE PRINCIPLES OF REGIMES

493

have something behind it.
But is the deficit as important as businessmen are inclined, not
unnaturally, to make it out to be? I have noticed that the balance sheet is
likely to be an overriding concern for a businessman or, if not for him, for his
stockholders and creditors. But should it be the overriding concern for
government?' 2 8 Those who make much of the deficit often talk as if we did
not get anything, or have anything to show, for all the debt we have run up.
Since I am here at the University of Dallas I venture to illustrate what I
have been saying by reminding you of the opinion about justice expressed by
Cephalus in the first book of Plato's Republic. The formula for justice that
Cephalus comes up with, about telling the truth and paying debts, evidently
comes out of his life as a businessman.' 29 It is a formula that has much to be
said for it, but Socrates shows that it must be subordinated to other
considerations, both political and philosophical. 3 0
I.
Philosophy, including political philosophy, should be distinguished from
the kind of cracker-barrel shrewdness relied upon by Mr. Perot. Such
expressions, often one-liners, can have an immediate appeal, especially for
audiences shaped by television. But serious political judgments require much
more than the canniness evident in the folk wisdom invoked by Mr. Perot,
invocations which easily lose their appeal upon repetition.
It can soon become evident that what Mr. Perot says is not as fresh, and
hence is not as immediately relevant, as it can seem at first. What is needed
instead is an appreciation of the complexities that arise when the general rules,
which are drawn upon by what can be called his mind-bites, are applied to
particular situations.
Such applications require prudence, which both depends on sound first
principles and is nurtured and matured by experience. Among the
consequences of prudence are an appreciation of the self-discipline necessary
for sustained political talk and a suppression, if not elimination, of any
tendencies one may have to paranoia. 3 ' Immensely wealthy men, I am afraid,
may not be properly restrained since they are not likely to suffer materially
because of their mistakes.

128. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 183, 186-87;
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 455 (Index: Balancedbudget Amendment).
129. See PLATO, REPUBLIC 331 D, sq.
130. Seeid.at331C,sq.
131. On paranoia, see ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONA11SM 147-48 n.33 (Leo Paul S. de Alvarez ed., 1976).
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IV.
The insulation from public scrutiny that Mr. Perot prefers, and perhaps
personally requires and can purchase, leads him to rely primarily on
television, certainly not on the give-and-take of press conferences (which are
to be distinguished from guest-friendly talk shows). There is something both
attractive and questionable about Mr. Perot's desire to avoid what he
denounces as "personal" attacks. In thinking about him, it is instructive to
recall Shakespeare's Coriolanus.'
Mr. Perot is so dependent on television ads that he is now outspending for
this purpose Mr. Bush and Mr. Clinton combined. It can be troubling that
what he is doing relies so much on his personal fortune, a fortune which
obviously depended on his having been able for years to "work" the
governmental system.'3 3 Certain misguided readings of the First Amendment
by the United States Supreme Court have kept Congress from putting
somewhat effective limits on how much a candidate can spend on his
campaign for certain public offices.' 3 4
Is the constantly growing reliance on television, to which both
Republicans and Democrats have contributed in recent decades, a healthy
development?' 35 Mr. Perot's television barrage is primarily a national appeal,
and as such is apt to be shallow, at least in the short run. Local contacts,
organized political parties, and carefully developed polices are minimized.
This kind of national appeal goes against the spirit of our constitutional
system. Indeed, one brake upon a successful Perot intervention may well be
the States-oriented arrangement represented by the Electoral College. 3 6
Much of political life is inevitably local and personal. That life is apt to
be more sensible if people are encouraged to work from what they can know.
The Perot approach tends to be more ideological, even when it is put in terms
of common sense. Effective policies, if they are to endure, cannot simply be
ideological. In addition, ideology tends to make one "honest" at the expense
of prudence.
It would be sad, as well as serious [I could say in 1992], if the Perot factor
contributed significantly to the defeat of either Mr. Bush or Mr. Clinton. That
is, Mr. Perot can perhaps help someone lose but he cannot help anyone truly

132. On Coriolanus, see ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER, supranote 4, at 23-24.
133. For a more recent "working" of the governmental system, see George Anastaplo,
Prudence and the Constitution: On the Year 2000 PresidentialElection Controversy, in
TEMPERED STRENGTH 210-11 n.7 (Ethan Fishman ed., 2002) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Prudence
and the Constitution]. See also infra text accompanying notes 150, 333.
134. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
135. On the abolition of television, see supra text accompanying note 119.
136. On the Electoral College, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note
2, at 333; ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 457 (Index).
See also supra notes 44, 133.
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win because a "successful" intervention by him can adversely affect the kind
of country and government that we are to have.
V.
One consequence, if not implication, of the Perot approach, especially
with its massive reliance upon television, is that it confirms and reinforces the
plebiscitary tendencies that we have had in recent decades. These tendencies
are intimately related to the improper magnification of the Presidency in our
constitutional system, as could be seen during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf
crisis. The people are encouraged to authorize, and to rely upon, the President
to "take charge.' 37
Plebiscitary government means, among other things, a depreciation of
politics. The way is open thereby for demagoguery with direct appeals to the
people, bypassing various long-established institutions. Thus, the system of
"coordinated electorates" in the Constitution is undermined; checks and
balances are circumvented. 3 ' It is instructive, in thinking about this prospect,
to recall Shakespeare's Julius Caesar.
Caesar depended upon his wealth and reputation as a "doer," both of
which were derived from his remarkable military service, to appeal, past the
Senate of the Republic, to the people.139 There was something attractive about
his "no-nonsense" approach. All too many Roman Senators contributed to
this attractiveness by their inability to see or to do what was needed in that
troubled Republic. The Founders of the American republic warned that we
should be vigilant against such Caesarism, even if it is promoted with the best
of intentions, as it no doubt often is.
VI.
Caesarism stands for a repudiation of politicians. We can see the prelude
to such repudiation in the way we condemn politicians from time to time.
Consider, for example, the campaign for term limits. Experience and
institutional memory are important in politics and government, more so than
in business where innovation and risk-taking can be more important.
Businesses are routinely bought, sold, merged, and even liquidated. A
country, on the other hand, assumes perpetuity. Government and statesmen,
like a community, depend on traditions, much more so than business and

137. On plebiscitary government, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note
3, at 120-21,552; ANASTAPLO,THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,supra note 2, at 445-

46 n.25 1.
138.

On "coordinated electorates," see

ANASTAPLO,

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra

note 2,at 31, 222-23.
139. See. e.g., Plutarch's biography of Julius Caesar; see also ANASTAPLO,T1iEARTISTAS
THINKER, supra note 4, at 22-23.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 495 2002-2003

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:455

businessmen.'40
My opinions here were reinforced by a C-SPAN broadcast yesterday of
the October 21 st debates in the House of Commons about the Government's
proposed closing of a number of British coal mines. One could see in the
course of those debates that such wholesale mine-closings should depend on
much more than the economic or business factors that originally moved the
British Government on the current issue. This sort of action is certain 1to be
a political decision, and not only when an economy is partly socialist.14
One could also see, in those House of Commons debates, reliance on
traditions and well-established practices. It was heartening as well to listen
to politicians who are able to talk coherently and at length about the matters
in which they and the public are interested.
It is instructive in assessing popular repudiations of politicians, and
especially when the British setting is immediately before us, to recall
Shakespeare's Jack Cade (from the History Plays). He, too, made direct
appeals to the people. It is also appropriate, considering the intemperate
condemnations we have heard recently of the legal profession, that Jack
Cade's demagogic appeals should have included the exhortation that all the
lawyers be killed.' 2 Lawyers and judges, perhaps even more than politicians,
are, or at least should be, the guardians of worthy traditions among us.
VII.
It is only politic to notice the contribution Mr. Perot has made by raising
critical issues for public debate. I venture to add, however, that there seems
to me to be something both naive and presumptuous in much of what he says
and in the way he says it.
Mr. Perot, as well as the somewhat a-political people he influences, was
mistaken both about what is needed to understand things and about what it
takes to be prepared to deal with the considerable variety of matters that the
politician must confront. The fact is that but for his personal fortune, which
may be due more to chance than he appreciates, Mr. Perot would not have
been taken seriously at this time in his self-proclaimed role as champion of the
people.4'
Businessmen, who are the bulk of obviously successful men in this
country these days, are likely to be influential in their communities. Their

140. On term limitations, see ANASTAPLO,
supra note 2, at 465. See also infra note 148.

THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,

141. On the case for (as well as the limits of) private property, see supra notes 114, 121.
See also Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand the Good, supra note 2, Parts 2 and 3.
142. On Jack Cade, see
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SHAKESPEARE

2 HENRY VI; THE
93 (Oscar James Campbell ed., 1966).

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,

READER'S

143. Here we can again recall the considerably more gifted Julius Caesar, a man also
celebrated for his clemency.
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presence and experiences shape the standards and expectations of many.
people who are moved by the facile argument that the government should be
run like a business, and so forth.
The successful businessman who ventures into politics runs the risk of
being (or at least of seeming) superficial, however shrewd he may be in
certain respects. He can easily mislead his fellow citizens as to what is
needed both to understand the issues of the day and to deal sensibly with
difficult, usually complex, matters. There can be a kind of pandering to the
electorate, especially when it is suggested that there are "plans" lying around
Washington that an experienced "fixer" should be able to find and
implement.'" It is also naive to believe, as Mr. Perot evidently does, that
there should be no serious difficulty for a President in bringing people
together in Congress once the obviously proper "plan" has been found in the
national-policies cupboard in Washington.
The kind of naivete I have described has its presumptuous features as
well. It fails to see how most competent, hardworking, and conscientious
most career politicians are. It should be remembered, moreover, that the
Founders we admire spent much, if not most, of their own lives in public
service. A number of them were lawyers, which itself can be a kind of public
service. Relatively few of them were businessmen. 45
The presumptuousness of some wealthy men is that they seem to believe
that the money the political order has permitted them to make and to keep is
entirely theirs to use as they happen to please.
VIII.
What seems to be paramount for Mr. Perot are not experience and
knowledge with respect to political things, but rather the will. In the more
conscientious cases of willfulness, a natural or innate goodness may be
presupposed in human beings, if not also in the universe at large.
This kind of political fundamentalism elevates leaders who are both
stronger and weaker than regular political leaders. They are, or at least may
seem, stronger because they can bypass familiar institutions, rituals, and
processes. They find themselves armed with a popular mandate, if not a
determined righteousness, independent of party ties and other such
inconveniences.

144. This kind of naivete with respect to political matters may sometimes be seen in so
competent and genial an economist as Milton Friedman. For an instructive essay by Mr.
Friedman on the relation between freedom of the press and private property, see II LIBERTY,
EQUALITY & MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A SOURCE BOOK 138 (George Anastaplo ed.,

1999). See also supra note 122; infra note 313.
145. On the "bad habits" that the successful businessman is apt to acquire, see ANASTAPLO,
THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 661-62 n. 115.
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But such leaders are not likely, over the long run, to be effective without
the support of an organized and enduring political party. Consider how Mr.
Nixon eventually collapsed because he had alienated many of his own party,
partly because of the way that he, as if an outsider, had conducted his 1972 reelection campaign.14 1 Mr. Carter's difficulties are also instructive here, for he
too acted like an outsider. The way all too many Democrats conducted
themselves in the late 1960s and 1970s may have contributed to undermining
the salutary influence of political parties in American life. Mr. Clinton [I
could say in 1992] has had thus far a good influence here, coming in part from
his being an adept politician who has weathered one storm after another."4 7
Which is worse in these circumstances, that such a man in Mr. Perot's
circumstances should be effective in power or that he should not be? The
country which Mr. Perot sincerely wants to defend and to continue to benefit
from was not built without institutions, statesmanship, and consensus, all of
which do depend on experienced politicians and a healthy political life.
IX.
We the People need to recognize and reaffirm the ancient teaching that
politics is the master art. A political career, if it is not to be a flash in the pan,
requires talking, persuading, and graceful responses to victories as well as to
defeats. The politician who campaigns properly not only helps instruct the
people; he can also learn much from contacts with people and from a lot of
give-and-take.' One contribution Mr. Perot has made was to help us see that
television audiences can be convinced to sit still for extended expositions of
complicated matters.
Political men in a republic should practice the master art of politics in
such a way as to rein in the occasional well-financed Caesar. For one thing,
thoughtful politicians should make clear the limits of money-making and
money-spending. We see in one Platonic dialogue after another the ways in
which successful money-making
can foster selfishness and arrogance if it does
14 9
not even depend on them.
Competent political men, in order to be able to curb the potential
(however well-intentioned) Caesar, must act prudently in their conduct of the

146. On Mr. Nixon, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 616
(Index).
147. i did come to believe, however, that the time came for Mr. Clinton to resign. See
Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore and a ProperSeparation of Powers,supra note 44, at 103 n.6, 105
n. 17. See also infra text accompanying note 295-96.
148. Term-limitations for Presidents make more sense than they do for Members of
Congress, partly because the latter are, even when in office, rarely insulated from the daily lives
of their constituents. See supra note 140.
149. Mr. Perot's short-lived naval career is instructive as to what drives this remarkably
talented man.
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community's affairs. It is well to repeat the ancient teaching that no man of
wealth or of reputation, however well-earned, should be permitted to exploit,
to the detriment of a republic's constitution, the resources that his country has
permitted him to accumulate. 0 The common good, for the moment and in
.perpetuity,
should be paramount here.
A key question remains: What have been the deficiencies and
misunderstandings on the part of our political men and women, as well as on
the part of our educators, that have opened the way to the kind of troubleing
intervention we are now seeing by Mr. Perot? His appeal depends partly upon
the breakdown of civility and mutual respect among politicians, something to
which the mass media have contributed. Partisanship, including recourse to
anything that looks like "dirty tricks," should give way to a lively awareness
of the common good, an awareness that is vital to a healthy political life but
is not expected to guide the typical businessman as businessman.
We should be grateful to Mr. Perot, an ex-sailor of sorts, for having served
as an early warning of what lies ahead for the Ship of State if we do not
prudently change course.
7. THE PROPER OVERCOMING OF SELF-ASSERTIVENESS' 5 '

This day is called the Feast of Crispian.
He that outlives this day and comes safe home
Will stand a-tiptoe when this day is named
And rouse him at the name of Crispian.
He that shall see this day, and live old age
Will yearly on the vigil feast his neighbors

And say, "Tomorrow is Saint Crispian."
Then will he strip his sleeve and show his scars,
And say, "These wounds I had on Crispin's Day."
Old men forget; yet all shall be forgot,
But he'll remember with advantages
What feats he did that day ....
This story shall the good man teach his son;
And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be rememberedWe few, we happy few, we band of brothers....
Henry V

52

150. See, e.g., supra notes 132-33. Consider, also, the somewhat dubious institution of
ostracism in ancient Athens.
151. A talk given at the Summer Program of the Loyola University of Chicago School of
Law in the Rome Center, Rome, Italy, June 6, 1994.
152. WILUAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, act 4, sc. 3.
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1.
The newspapers and television screens have been filled this week with
reports about celebrations all over Western Europe of the anniversary of the
D-Day landings in Normandy fifty years ago today, the climactic moment of
the Second World War in which your grandparents served. The celebrations
in Britain, France, Italy, and elsewhere are dramatized for us Americans by
the public appearances in Europe by the President of the United States,
beginning with that welcoming ceremony on the Capitoline Hill here in Rome
last Thursday, which some of us could attend. That ceremony anticipated the
celebration Saturday night of the liberation of Rome on June 4, 1944.
Much of what I will say, on this deliberately ceremonial occasion, is an
elaboration of a faxed message sent back home to Maurice F. X. Donohue, the
dean who, almost forty years ago, first hired me as a university teacher:
A SALUTE FROM A GRATEFUL EUROPE TO A FELLOW OFFICER
IN THE ARMY AIR CORPS WHO, A HALF CENTURY AGO TODAY,
HELPED LAUNCH THE LIBERATION OF A CONTINENT IN
SHACKLES.' 53
When we reflect on the Second World War, perhaps "the last good war," we
can. be
what soldiers are for.
Thereminded
scope of of
the operations and effects of the Second World War is hard,
perhaps even impossible, to grasp. One historian opens his useful account of
that war, which extended for 2,174 days between the German attack on Poland
in September 1939 and the surrender of Japan in August 1945, with this
report: "The Second World War was among the most destructive conflicts in
human history; more than forty-six million soldiers and civilians perished,
many in circumstances of prolonged and horrifying cruelty."' 54
Within two weeks of the initial D-Day landing in Normandy, half a
million Allied solders were ashore in France. During that fortnight, four
thousand of those soldiers were killed, three thousand of them on the first day
on the Normandy beaches.' The Allied campaign up the Italian peninsula
and the massive Russian campaign against the Germans on the Eastern Front
were coordinated with the sweep across France to Germany itself, which was
first reached by Allied forces on September 10th, three months after D-Day.'"

153. See George Anastaplo, MauriceF. . Donohue, 1911-1995,U.OFCi. RECORD, May
29,1997, at 16; see also Maurice F. X. Donohue, Making a Living, Making a Life, in LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 597.
154. MARTIN GILBERT, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY 1 (1989); see
also id. at 745-47.
155. Id.at 543.
156. See id. at 540.
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There is a tendency, perhaps a natural tendency, to identify oneself with
great events, if only by recalling where one was when they happened.5 7 This
tendency to locate oneself in the grand sweep of history was illustrated this
week by the introduction of seven Romans on the Capitoline Hill to President
Clinton, Romans who had been born on the day that Rome was liberated and
who had been given variations of the name America.
The self-asserting tendency to identify oneself with the great events of
one's country is intimately related to what citizenship, ifnot humanity as well,
can mean. Furthermore, one not only exhibits an interest in the whole, but one
also tries to grasp that whole, if only in a limited and temporary way. I recall
my own inadvertently accurate prediction of the D-Day invasion. I was not
yet nineteen years old, an Air Cadet in a program preparing us for the Pacific
War and for the final assault on Japan, which would have been launched in
late 1945 or early 1946."8 I was stationed in Jackson, Tennessee. On the
night of June 5, 1944, I was visiting a family I knew in that town, sitting with
them that balmyevening on their front porch. I explained to my civilian hosts
(after all, I was by then a six-month veteran of military service)-I explained
that it looked like the long-anticipated invasion was not going to come that
summer after all. I explained, that is, that the lack of it thus far meant further
delays of at least one or two more months (because of the timing of the tides)
and by then an early winter could prove disastrous for the invading army and
so forth.
As I was solemnly speculating in that fashion, Allied troops were moving
that very hour across the Channel- 156,000 troops went ashore during the
first day of the invasion. That is, I had been inadvertently correct in
speculating, in effect, that it was either now or much later. It is prudent, at the
outset of these remarks, to recognize thus the limitations of the citizenobserver. 9
H.
The fifty years since the massive D-Day efforts of June 1944 naturally
invite our attention. We may be able to see that half-century better if we go
back still another fifty years to the 1890s, the decade that ushered in what
Winston Churchill, at its mid-term, was perhaps the first to call "This Terrible
Twentieth Century."' 60

157. This may be seen, for example, in Walt Whitman's Civil War chronicles, especially
in his accounts of Abraham Lincoln.
158. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 154, at 711, 725.
159. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 225 ("Vietnam and the
Presumption of Citizenship").
160. 1draw here upon Maurice F. X. Donohue's unpublished D-Day report, D-Day, Fifty
Years Later.
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The 1890s included the spectacular Columbian Exposition in Chicago.
This was an exuberant celebration of the accomplishments, marvels, and
prospects of the Industrial Revolution, with considerable emphasis placed
upon the magic of electricity. 6 ' The Columbian Exposition in turn looked
back to the voyages of Columbus, four hundred years earlier. 62
One of the most serious attractions of the Columbian Exposition was the
Parliament of the World's Religions. Religious leaders from around the world
gathered in Chicago to seek common ground in the promotion of mutual
understanding and harmony. This good-natured and hopeful effort, dominated
by "mainstream" American Protestant churches, was considered appropriate
for the Age of Enlightenment celebrated by the Columbian Exposition.163
At the same time, however, the European scramble for colonies was going
on in Africa and Asia. Furthermore, the seeds of the First World War (which
came to be known, at least for a couple of decades, as "the Great War") had
been planted at least since the Franco-German War of 1870, if not during the
French Revolution of 1789-1815 and the German Revolution of 1848-1849.
Indeed, it can be argued, the Second World War was really a continuation of
the First World War (of 1914-1918), making them a Thirty-Year War, in
effect.
I suggested to an Italian press association reporter on the Capitoline Hill,
who happened to interview me while we awaited the President's arrival, that
the date we should be most alert to these days was not the fiftieth anniversary
of the D-Day Invasion but the eightieth anniversary of the July 1914
ultimatums and stiffness of diplomatic protocol that led to the unbelievable
folly of the First World War, a war that was triggered by an assassination in
Sarajevo. 4
I have come to appreciate more and more one of my law school teacher's
characterization of the First World War as an instance of "governmental
insanity."' 65 David Lloyd George, one of the British Leaders during that war,
could say in 1920 that "all nations tumbled into war," that all participants
equally shared in the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. 66 Even worse
than allowing such a war to begin were the ways in which it was carried on,
161. Henry Adams, in his The Education of Henry Adams, reports on the Chicago
spectacle, having been particularly challenged by the power of the dynamo that he saw there.
162. On what should have been another great exposition in 1992, see ANASTAPLO, BUT
NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 366 n.4.
163. See id. at 345.
164. See George Anastaplo, Did Anyone "In Charge" Know What He was Doing? The
Thirty Years War ofthe Twentieth Century, in CAMPUS HATE-SPEECH CODES, NATURAL RIGHT,
AND TWENTIETH CENTURY ATROCITIES 49 (1999) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Did Anyone "In

Charge" Know What He Was Doing?].
165. On this teacher, Malcolm P. Sharp, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra
note 3, at 621 (Index).
166. See JULY 1914: THE OUTBREAK OFTHE FIRST WORLD WAR: SELECTED DOCUMENTS
10 (Imanuel Geiss ed., 1967). Compare id. at 365.
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and for four years, such ways that almost wrecked (perhaps, in the long run,
did wreck) European civilization. There were intellectual and moral blunders
all around, with an undue emphasis placed upon "honor."
It is worth recording that only two things "marred" Mr. Clinton's
welcome on the Capitoline Hill last Thursday: a young man's raising a banner
on behalf of the Bosnians and of Rwanda, and the anti-Fascist booing that
greeted the introduction of the newly-installed Italian prime minister. We are
causes, respectively, of the First World
reminded thereby of the underlying
167
War and the Second World War.
III.
So much, at least for the moment, for the fifty years before D-Day, 1944.
Also remarkable, of course, have been the fifty years since June 6, 1944.
It is now apparent that once the beachheads were established in Normandy
in June 1944, the end of the Second World War was in view, not only in
Europe but also in the Far East. Some commentators on these matters dwell
upon what a "near thing" the invasion was, how the Germans might have
destroyed the invading forces and so forth, but this may be mostly dramatics
conjured up for the fans of such things.
Critical errors of the First World War were avoided by the Allies in their
prosecution of the Second World War. This time they would not permit the
savage trench warfare of the First World War. The devastation of such
warfare is testified to by the rosters of young men (the best men of their
generation) sacrificed in that war, long lists that may be seen on the walls of
churches in Italy, Germany, France, and Britain. It can be difficult now to
determine what that war was all about, but it is not difficult to trace the
demoralizing effects it had on the European political and social order for a
generation, not least in the enthronement it permitted of the worst elements in
Germany, France, Italy, and Russia.
The liberation of one European colony after another in Asia and in Africa
was among the unintended consequences of the Second World War. The
colonies of those Allies around the world took seriously and put to effective
use the language of freedom that the Allies depended on so much in
mobilizing their forces against Germany and Japan. Our own misreading of
these developments contributed to our unfortunate entanglement for a decade
in Vietnam and to our capricious assaults upon countries such as Laos and
Cambodia.' 68 The final step in this formal development is [I could say in
1994] the recent surrender of white rule in the Republic of South Africa. I say
"formal" because much remains to be done in many of the ex-colonies, not

167. See, e.g., Anastaplo, Did Anyone "In Charge" Know What He Was Doing?, supra
note 164, at49, 71, 81.
168. On the Vietnam War, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at
623; ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 15 1.
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least in South Africa, if truly civilized and productive ways of life are to be
established or sustained. The current Rwandan massacres, with at least a half
million (and perhaps as many as two million) people dead in a very small
"country," warn us of what could be dreadful days ahead in much of Africa
and in parts of Asia.'69
The consequences of the Second World War include, of course, the Cold
War and its ramifications. There was, it has long seemed to me, considerable
misinterpretation of both the threats and the possibilities facing the United
States. We never appreciated what it meant to Soviet-American relations that
the Soviets lost in excess of twenty million citizens during the Second World
War while the United States (with very little damage suffered on its Home
Front) lost fewer than four hundred thousand, almost all of these military
personnel. 7 ' Had we been more sensitive with respect to these matters, we
could perhaps have been able to work out with the Russians a more sensible
transition from the Cold War, possibly avoiding disasters such as the
dismemberment of Yugoslavia with the risks thereby run in the volatile
Balkans region (where Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Croatia, Kosovo, Albania,
and Serbia are all stirring things up). After I pointed out the risks to my
Italian reporter, he observed in turn that "things are not so good in Italy" these
days either. (A proper sensitivity toward the Russians, without whom the
Nazis could not have been defeated anywhere near as soon as they were,
would have included inviting them to participate in the D-Day celebrations in
Western Europe. But then, had we not shut them off from the West after
1917? We told the Bolsheviks to make their own world-and they did, which
was good for neither them nor us. Similar reservations may be entered about
our relations with the Castro regime in Cuba.)
However this may be, we are groping toward a New World Order. How
Western that order will be remains to be seen. The most recent Parliament of
the World's Religions, also held in Chicago (in 1993), was dominated far
more by non-Western delegates and far less by mainstream Christians than its
1893 predecessor. The 1993 meeting was, perhaps
because of this, more
7
exotic but also less sober than the 1893 meeting.' '
IV.
I have suggested that D-Day 1944 was both a powerful culmination and
a revolutionary beginning. The Allied efforts in the Second World War took
on the form of what General Eisenhower called "a Great Crusade." What
such a crusade presupposes and where it aims may take decades, if not

169. On African thought and on Asian thought, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 3, at 31, 67, 99, 147.
170. See GILBERT, supra note 154, at 746.
171.

See ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 345.
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centuries, to assess properly. 7
The efforts of the Western Allies in the Second World War were
characterized by high-minded purposes and by large-scale organization.
Organization on such a large scale was unprecedented, a testimonial both to
Western technology and to a moral vision. That vision took it for granted that
tyranny should be suppressed and that freedom and the self-determination of
peoples are good. It was also believed that sacrifices could be reasonably
called for in the cause of liberty and decency.
The moral ascendancy of the Western Allies, even with Stalin on their
side, was evident throughout the war. The strength of the Russians and the
other Soviets, however tyrannical their regime, drew upon the defensive
character of their situation. However hateful Stalinism might have been, the
typical Russian could recognize the wickedness of their Nazi invaders.' 73
Even so, the principles and passions brought to bear against Hitler's regime
eventually undermined Stalin's regime as well.
The almost-incredible evil of the Axis Powers became a significant
burden for their leaders to bear, even though those leaders may have had in the
German army the best single fighting force (for its size) in the world.' 74 All
sides are bound to do terrible things during a fiercely-contested war.
However, the terrible things routinely done by the Nazis, and to a perhaps
lesser extent by the Japanese military, had to be systematically concealed from
75
public view, even though such deeds were characteristic of their regimes.1
No account of those regimes can ignore the atrocities and treachery that were
systematically promoted there. The most prestigious thinker in Hitler's
regime made much of "self-assertion" in his public identification with the
Nazis. Nothing--certainly nothing conventionally moral-seemed to matter
wherever Germany's drive to overcome its many enemies (at home as well as
abroad) was threatened. However vigorous the rationalizations developed in
support of the Nazi regime, one is moved to conclude that that regime was
simply mad at its core, mad with an obsession with the perpetual elevation of
one's own. 176

172. We do know that not all Crusades have been worthy enterprises. Let A.D. 1204 and
the assault on Constantinople stand for that recognition. See also YITZHAK F. BAER, GALUT 2226 (1947). The term "crusade," used at first for our "war on terrorism" after September 11,
200 1, was soon dropped as particularly offensive to Islamic peoples.
173. See GILBERT, supra note 154, at 571 (quoting Ilya Ehrenburg as saying "Woe to this
land of the evil-doers!" when Russian troops first entered Germany).
174. There was, at the core of the Nazi regime, that fierce, if not even insane,
implementation of principles which simply could not be publicly acknowledged. See, e.g.,
Anastaplo, On Trial, supra note 110, at 977; see also infra notes .175, 191.
175. See, e.g., GILBERT, Supra note 154, at 6, 8, 11-12, 14, 557, 559, 744.
176. On Martin Heidegger's remarkably troubling relations with the Nazis, see
ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 144. See also Geiss, supra note 167
(commenting on Kurt Riezler's political theory). Compare LEO STRAUSS, WHAT ISPOLITICAL
PHnoSOPHY? 233 (1959) (discussing Kurt Riezler in Chapter 10). See also Anastaplo,
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All this helps explain the unceasing and considerable Resistance activity
against the German occupiers of Europe during the Second World War,
activity that could be usefully relied upon by the Allies. This also helps
explain the involvement of eminently respectable people in the few plots
against Hitler during the War." This may help explain as well why the
Germans proved to be more vulnerable to organized deception than the
Allies.' 78 Certainly, the Germans had few volunteers both willing to make
sacrifices in their morally bankrupt cause and anxious to keep people
informed of what was really going on. 79
In short, however tangled human affairs often are, there may be an
inherent tendency for right to make might, something that the so-called realists
(including those in law) may not sufficiently appreciate.
V.
More needs to be said about the moral vision guiding the Allied cause
during the Second World War. But first, we should return, however briefly,
to the large-scale organization that the cause relied on and fashioned.
The gigantic military campaigns on three continents (Africa, Europe, and
Asia) led eventually to the transformation of the post-First World War League
of Nations into the United Nations. It also led to the development of
significant treaties and conventions, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. These movements reflect, in large part, the Westernization
of the world."s
To a considerable extent, the world is becoming
Westernized-and that means, in large part, secularized-because of the
influence (theoretical as well as technological) of the scientific development
grounded in philosophy. This is a development that can be expected to
continue to arouse fierce resistance in the Muslim world in the decades
ahead. ' 1

Constitutionalismand the Good, supra note 2, at Parts 6 and 7. Compare Friedrich Nietzsche's
more humane approach to these matters, testified to by his admiration of Ralph Waldo Emerson
(perhaps, in part, because of Emerson's advocacy of "self-reliance").
177. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 154, at 404-05, 410-14, 551, 553, 645.
178. See, e.g., id. at 523.
179. Here, as elsewhere, Shakespeare's Macbeth is instructive. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE
ARTIST AS TINKERsupra note 4, at 2 1-22. This may bear upon the inability ofthe Nazi regime
to develop the atomic bomb. But see, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 154, at 14,319,379,404,500,
645, 649-50, 667. It may also bear upon the fact that there was no significant Nazi or other
German resistance to the Occupation of Germany after 1945.
180. The West may be defined as a distinctive, more or less industrialized, combination
ofthe Biblical heritage and the Greek/Roman heritage. See ANASTAPLO, BUTNOTPHILOSOPHY,
supra note 3, at xv; see also supra text accompanying note 3.
181. This could be said in June 1994, well before the revealing September 11,2001 attacks
in New York and Washington. On Islamic thought, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 3, at 175.
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We may wonder how far the political unity of the peoples of the earth may
go. We heard much about a New World Order in connection with the Gulf
War of 1990-1991, but the limitations of that Crusade are already apparent.
The achievements of the European Economic Union seem more substantial,
but the ability of the Union to integrate Eastern Europe into its remarkably
prosperous economic system remains to be seen, especially if Russia should
undergo the convulsions that a proper phasing out of the Cold War might have
avoided. Even so, it should be noticed that the devastation of the continent of
Europe by the great wars of this century did contribute to the Franco-German
reconciliation upon which European stability in part depends, supported as it
has been by the generous contributions of the United States and by a deepseated fear of nuclear war.
The limits of world government are evident when we consider how
difficult it is for the great powers to deal effectively today with trouble spots
such as Bosnia, North Korea, Rwanda, and Haiti. Does world government
tend to be temporary in character, linked as it has been in effect to massive
military enterprises? Certainly, the contributions of the United States to North
American peace testify to the political, legal, and social/economic
presuppositions upon which our constitutional system depends.' 82
Still, it can be instructive to notice the extent and effectiveness of the
system of international relations upon which we all rely. It is that system
which guides the postal, crime control, financial, health, and transportation
services now considered vital to our everyday life. Perhaps even more critical
here is the worldwide market that is developing, a market (with its mixed
blessings) of which the mass media are an essential part (as may be seen in
how Western dress, "culture," and conduct have become routine worldwide).
For example, the transformation, even liberalization, of mainland China
seems inevitable, whatever its official ideology may be. In the decades
immediately ahead, however, the vital interests of the United States will
depend far more upon what happens in and to Russia (and not only because
of its nuclear power) than upon what happens in such places as Central
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, China, Japan, North Korea, and Latin
America. What is truly best for, as well as from, the Russians themselves [I
could say in 1994] remains to be discovered. For example, usefilly selfserving cooperation between Russia and the Western Europeans could help
develop a humane resolution of the Bosnian questions."8 3
VI.
A challenge confronts us whenever we rely on a moral vision, whether in
the course of massive military enterprises or in the furtherance of world order.

182. On the Constitutions of the Americans, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,
supranote 2, at 1.
183.

See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, CAMPUS HATE-SPEECH CODES, supra note 164, at 81.
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Are there enduring ethical standards that do not depend upon particular, or
accidental, "cultures"? Are there standards that do not ultimately depend
upon particular times and places? We should recognize, in any event, that
there may be tension between the universalism of enduring ethical standards
and the universalism of world government with its many accommodations to
a variety of circumstances.
Winston Churchill had occasion to warn the commander of the British air
forces, after a series of devastating Allied air raids in 1944, "You are piling
up an awful load of hatred."'1 4 A fundamentally moral approach may also be
seen in what Churchill wrote, upon learning in 1944 of the murder of
1,700,000 Jews at Auschwitz in the previous two years: "There is no doubt
that this is probably the greatest and the most horrible crime ever committed
in the whole history of the world, and it has been done by scientific machinery
by nominally civilized men in the name of a great State and one of the leading
races of Europe." ' Churchill then added: "It is quite clear that all concerned
in this crime who may fall into our hands, including the people who only
obeyed orders by carrying out the butcheries, should be put to death after their
association with the murders has been proved."' 6 The Nuremberg Trial of
1945-1946 was a particularly dramatic (and quite salutary) implementation of
this Churchill proposal. 7
The basis of this distinction between good and evil should be a critical
concern of the inquiry we will make in our study of the recent papal encyclical
on morality. What is at the foundation of the Pope's ethical system? Does he
rely on anything, available to non-Christians as well as to Christians, that is
independent of divinely-inspired revelation? Something more than particular
revelation, however devoutly accepted that may be in some quarters, may be
needed as the basis for an effective world order. Does nature provide a guide
here, including even a guide to the proper development and use of particular
revelations?'
If there are indeed universal standards of right and wrong and of good and
evil, we should not be surprised to notice that even the most terrible deeds by
human beings may draw on ethical aspirations and, hence, may themselves
aim (however perversely) at the good.8 9 Consider, as an example of evil
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See GILBERT, supra note 154, at 529.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 554.
See id. at 720f; see also Anastaplo, On Trial,supra note 110, at 977.

See

HARRY V. JAFFA, THOMISM AND ARISTOTELIANISM:

A STUDY OF THE

COMMENTARY BY THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE NICOMAcHEAN ETHICs 193 (1952); see also
ANATAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 323.

189. This observation is related to the argument that if anything could ever become
completely evil, it would necessarily cease to exist. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, at
VIII, 18; James Lehrberger, Intelligo Ut Credam: St. Augustine's Confessions, 52 THOMIST
31 (1988). On Augustine, see Anastaplo, Rome, Piety, and Law, supra note 35, at 83;
ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 376 (Index).
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deeds being perceived by their perpetrators as just, how the German
government responded in 1950 (that is, five years after the War) to the claims
for reparations made on behalf of the one hundred thousand Gypsies who,
despite their Aryan origins, had been slaughtered by the Nazis: "It should be
borne in mind that Gypsies have been persecuted under the Nazis not for any
racial reason but because of an asocial and criminal record."' We can sense
what it was that helped the Nazis to commit so many acts of inhumanity
against the unfortunate Gypsies when we notice among ourselves the
exaggerated wariness, even loathing, inspired by the miserable-looking Gypsy
women and children by whom we are accosted every day on the streets of
Rome. 191
Another way of putting this is to say that we need all the help we can get
if we are to curb both corrosive self-righteousness and a devastating
fearfulness in ourselves and in those for whom we happen to be responsible.
Vii.
I suggest that there is in the human being a natural tendency both to prefer
one's own and to identify oneself with something grander than oneself,
perhaps attempting thereby to nurture the best in oneself. Unless there is a
healthy sense of one's own-a sturdy self-respect-there is not likely to be a
reliable grasp of the whole, if only because one does not have a soul capable
of responding to genuine grandeur.'9 2
The vitality of local attachments, a healthy self-centeredness, may be seen
in the following observation by Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The axis of the

earth sticks out visibly through the center of each and every town or city."' 93
Another observation, made by a man as he looked upon the body of his dead
wife, reminds us of how self-centered local attachments can indeed be:

"Though no regrets are proper for the manner of her death, who can

contemplate the fact of it and not call the world irrational if out of deference
to a few particles of disordered matter, it excludes so fair a spirit?"' 94 The
190.

GILBERT, supra note 154, at 734; see also id. at 355, 361-62, 735.

191. One can imagine what men, such as the German Minister of the Interior I have quoted,
might have said a decade earlier (and perhaps still thought in 1950) about the "asocial and
criminal record" of the Jews in Europe. A diary entry by Joseph Goebbels noted, for example,
that "It's a life-and-death struggle between the Aryan race and the Jewish bacillus." GILBERT,
supra note 154, at 312; see supra note 174. On the Gypsies, see Anastaplo, Lessonsfor the
Student of Law, supra note 73, at 159-60. On Goebbels, see Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand
the Good, supra note 2, at Part 5; infra note 375.
192. See infra text accompanying note 199; see also, ANASTAPLO, THE ARTiSTAS THINKER,
supra note 4, at 7.
193. Epigraphfor RichardHoggart, TOWNSCAPE WITH FIGUREs-FARMHAM: PORTRAIT
OF AN ENGLISH TOWN (1994). The Holmes quoted here is the father of the Supreme Court
Justice; the text drawn upon is The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table.
194. John Haynes Holmes, The Affirmation ofImmortality, HARV. DIvINITY SCH. BuLL
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bearing of death upon morality and upon the meaning of life should be
considered in our study of the Pope's encyclical with its emphasis upon the
quest for "eternal life." It may not be rational for us to "call the world
irrational" merely because of the presence of death among us."'
The identification of oneself with something grander than oneself could
be sensed last Thursday night (June 2) when we joined the mile-long Corpus
Christi procession ("la processione eucarista") from St. Giovanni in Lateran
to Santa Maria Maggiore.' 9 6 We walked three to five abreast, on each side of
a wide, trafficless street (Via Matulana), which first sloped downhill from San
Giovanni and then uphill to Santa Maria Maggiore. All around us that balmy
evening were incense, candles, bells, music, chanting, and devotional
readings, with many more people (mostly women) in the procession than
among the spectators on the sidewalks. Banners and other decorations lined
the way that we walked at a sedate but steady pace. I expect that this will turn
out to be for us the most memorable single event during this [1994] visit to
Rome. Something is to be said for well-established ways-ways which, as in
this case, may go back to pre-Christian times (just as does, for example, the
impressive Papal title, Pontifex Maximus). 97 The more firmly a way is
established, the more likely it is that nature had a hand in shaping or refining
it. One can derive considerable satisfaction from the sense of community
generated by and manifested in such a procession as this, even when one does
not share the faith upon which that community somewhat depends.
I return, for my closing illustrations about the natural identification of
oneself with grander matters, to my opening remarks about the significance
of D-Day for people of my generation, one of many D-Days during the Second
World War that became the D-Day. The role played in our lives by that
war-a war made necessary by the follies of the First World War and of the
corrosive "peace" that followed it-the role of the Second World War for us
may be seen in the dedication I provided for my most recent book, The
American Moralist:
TO
THE SACRED MEMORY OF SEVEN VERY YOUNG MEN
we grew up with in Carterville, Illinois
and who went off to war with us a half-century ago
but
WHO NEVER RETURNED.' 9"

16 (1947) (quoting G.H. Palmer).
195. See ANASTAPLO, HuMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 214.
196. See L 'OsservatoreRomano, Weekly Edition in English, June 8, 1994, at 1.
197. See, e.g., Anastaplo, Rome, Piety, and Law, supra note 35, at 13, 121.
198. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at xiii (note). On the
relation between the post-First World War "peace" and the Nazi regime, see Anastaplo,
Constitutionalismand the Good, supra note 2, at Part 7.
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The spirit of D-Day itself happens to be best captured for me by what an
Air Corps Colonel said in briefing his pilots who were providing air support
for the men hitting the Normandy beaches on the morning of June 6, 1944:
"If you think you have engine trouble, think of the men in the 4,000 landing
craft below you, and make sure in your soul that the trouble's in the
engine. ' 1 99
A sound morality, as well as the community that both serves and depends
upon it, helps us make sure that the troubles we do confront from time to time
are only in the circumstances (including the institutions and equipment) all
around us and not in our own souls.
8. THE COMMON LAW AND THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789200

I went on [the United States Court of Appeals] with a prejudice against
[the diversity jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States]. I thought
it must be a big waste of time. I have now become very fond of
diversity. It takes me back to first year law school studies of contracts,
property, and torts. Diversity cases are a very good variation from
federal statutory questions. They are good for the judges to get them
back into a common law mode of interpreting law. The best recipe for
preventing the judiciary from becoming a bureaucracy is to have variety.
That is a great argument against any specialization, and against getting
rid of diversity. As long as we have variety, our minds are stretched in
various ways; so diversity is a good thing.

John T. Noonan, Jr.2"'
I.
The Judiciary Act of 1789202 has been described in this way:
Article III of the Constitution constitutes an authorizing charter for a system
of national courts to exercise the Judicial Power of the United States, but it
is not self-executing, needing legislation to bring it to life. Accordingly, the
First Congress, in its twentieth enactment, turned to the creation of a judicial
system for the new nation. Its work-the First Judiciary Act, approved
September 24, 1789-has ever since been celebrated as "a great law." The

statute, obeying a constitutional command, constituted a Supreme Court. It

199. Maurice F. X. Donohue, D-Day, Fifty Years Later,supra note 160, at 10 (quoting
Colonel John Murphy of the 359th Fighter Group); see alsosupra text accompanying note 192.
200. A talk given to the law panels at the Annual Convention, American Culture
Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 10, 1993. See also supratext accompanying notes
247-48.
201. John T. Noonan, Jr., JudicialImpartialityand the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 14 NOVA
L. REv. 123, 152 (1989).
202. I Stat. 73 (1789).

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 511 2002-2003

.TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:455

created the office of Attorney General of the United States. It devised a
judicial organization that was destined to survive for a century. And, by
providing for Supreme Court review of state court judgments involving
issues of federal law, it created a profoundly significant instrument for
consolidating and protecting national power.2"3
This Judiciary Act takes for granted various judicial institutions and legal
processes, institutions and processes that are both extensive and technical.
These include a general understanding of the nature and workings of trial
courts, appellate courts, and their functionaries, including justices, judges,
clerks, and marshals. These also include such safeguards for citizens as trial
by jury and the writ of habeas corpus."
Provisions for trial by jury take account both of the customary features of
such a proceeding and of the circumstances in which it should be relied
upon.2 °5 Writs of habeascorpus may be granted, we are told, "for the purpose
of an inquiry into the cause of commitment."2" A limitation is placed upon
recourse to what is a familiar remedy:
Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners
in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under orby colour of the authority
of the United States, or are committed for trial before some
court of the
20 7
same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
We may well wonder whether this is a limitation, perhaps even an
unwarranted limitation, placed by the Judiciary Act on the traditional reach
of the writ of habeas corpus in the courts to which Americans and their
English predecessors had had access for centuries. This writ's existence was
recognized, not created,in the Constitution of 1787.20'

In any event, we are reminded by the detailed provisions of the Judiciary
Act how much courts rely upon legislative guidance with respect to the very
203.

Paul M. Bator, Judiciary Act of 1789, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
1075 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1986).
204. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 209, 217.
205. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 9, 12, 26, 29, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
206. Id. § 14.
207. Id. The remarkable scope of habeas corpus is suggested by how it was used in the
great case of Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). On the Somerset case, see
ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 2-9.
208. There are not to be found, either in the Constitution of 1787 or in the 1791 Bill of
Rights, a completely new set of rights, but rather (for the most part) rights that had been
carefully developed and long accepted over centuries. Otherwise, the invocation of such rights
would not have been as effective as it has been for two centuries now. This observation, central
to the principles of our regimes, applies as well to most of the other provisions of the
Constitution. All this bears upon how the Ninth Amendment should be interpreted and applied.
On the Ninth Amendment, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra
CONSTITUTION

note 2, at 461. See also infra note 214; text accompanying notes 259, 283.
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existence, personnel, places, and times of courts as well as with respect to the
rules, processes, and substantive law employed by courts. This legislative
guidance can include, as in the Judiciary Act, reaffirmation of already
established "principles and usages of law." 2" The importance assumed by
Congress here is reflected in the fact that the Courts of the United States
(which we call the Federal Courts) still do not have recognized in statutes all
of the jurisdiction assigned to them by the Constitution of the United States. 10
It was evident from the Judiciary Act that courts in this country would
continue to do what they had always done, including conforming themselves
to adjustments of the law made from time to time by legislatures.2"'
In the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights of 1791, too, various
judicial institutions and legal processes are taken for granted. We remain
more familiar with these institutions and processes, however, because we are
reminded of them repeatedly upon reading those documents and have used
them continually since the Eighteenth Century. Other institutions and
processes that we do not still use, such as some provided for in the Articles of
Confederation, are far less familiar to us.212
II.
Also taken for granted in the Judiciary Act of 1789 are many terms, legal
and otherwise, that are not likely to be known to the layman now (nor,
perhaps, to many laymen then). These terms, which are in addition to the
names of the States and the elements of the calendar that do remain familiar,
may be found by the dozens in the Judiciary Act.
These terms are, for the most part, not defined in the Judiciary Act. They
are terms which take for granted the judicial institutions and legal processes
with which Englishmen (and, hence, Americans) had long been familiar.
These terms were developed and applied routinely in the Anglo-American
constitutional tradition, a tradition which included the common law as an
integral part. Common law actions, processes, and remedies are casually
referred to in the Judiciary Act.213 The common law supplies not only many
of the terms used but also guidance as to when and how the processes referred

209.
210.
211.

See Judiciary Act of1789, §§ 13, 17,30,33, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
See Bator, supra note 203, at 1075.
See George Anastaplo, The Supreme Court Is Indeed a Court, in IsTHE SUPREME

COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION?

22 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993) [hereinafter

Anastaplo, The Supreme Court Is Indeed a Court].
212. Consider, for example, the provisions in the Articles of Confederation for the
adjudication of controversies between States and for the exercise of various powers of Congress.
On the Articles of Confederation, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 361
(Index). Consider, also, the reference to now-obsolete "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" in the
Constitution of 1787.
213. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 9, 30, 34, 1 Stat. 73(1789).
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2t 4
to are to be used.
The judges and lawyers directed by this legislation are expected to know
what the processes referred to are and how they are to be used. It also seems
obvious that whatever differences there may have been from State to State in
this country, there should be no difficulty in applying the provisions laid down
in this Act. That is, it seems obvious that the common law was assumed to be
indeed common for the country at large in its principal features.2"'

I.
We have noticed that various judicial institutions and legal processes are
taken for granted in the Judiciary Act of 1789. We have noticed as well that
many legal and other terms are also taken for granted, with the British
constitutional tradition and its common law as a principal source.
Similarly taken for granted, of course, is the Constitution of the United
States, along with the law of nations, with the relations between the States of
the Union representing perhaps a special form of the law of nations.2 t6 A
reminder of what is taken for granted in such documents should help us
understand the meaning and aims of the Constitution of 1787.
It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of the common law as a part
of the foundation of the American constitutional system. The common law,
as well as the British Constitution generally, is drawn upon again and again
in the Declaration of Independence, the statement that provides the
authoritative account of the principles and ends to which the American people
are dedicated." 7
IV.
All of the things taken for granted-whether the Constitution and the law
of nations, or various judicial institutions and legal processes, or the common
law and the British Constitution-are shaped by moral assumptions and
purposes. They may also draw upon religious doctrines, however much they
reflect a wariness about age-old religious sensibilities, as may be seen in the
214.

On the common law and its relevance for constitutional understanding, see
supranote 2, at 332; ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 456. May not the workings of the common law affect
not only the development of rights before 1791 but also the emergence of rights since 1791
(with a view to Ninth Amendment applications)? See supra note 208.
215. Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra text
accompanying notes 239-47; see also supra text accompanying note 66.
216. On the lawofnations, seethe Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 9, 13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). On
the Constitutions of the Americans, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note
2, at 1.
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,

217.

On the Declaration of Independence, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supranote

9, at 1,9.
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allowances in the Judiciary Act made for those who prefer to "affirm" rather
than to "swear" upon taking a required oath. 18
Moral standards are implicitly drawn upon throughout the Judiciary Act,
as in its reliance upon the discretion of judges." 9 A moral sense is also
depended on in the reliance on oaths that reinforce moral obligations.2 The
oaths provided for in the Act are tailored to the offices addressed, with the
distinctive failings or temptations of each office anticipated.22 ' The judicial
oath, for example, recognizes that the juxtaposition of rich and poor is
fundamental, so much so that such language may be seen in the English
prototypes upon which American legislators drew in 1789.2 Other language
in the judicial oath, "without respect to person," seems to be a departure from
the British mode, where persons are recognized to have hereditary, as well as
perhaps other, advantages. One must wonder whether this kind of disavowal
of special advantages, which may be seen as well in the Constitution's
prohibitions of the granting of titles of nobility, ultimately calls into question
also the special status claimed by the owners of slaves. The principle of
equality may even be reflected in the provision, in the last section of the
Judiciary Act, that "in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead
and manage their own causes personally." Even so, this does not preclude the
recognition elsewhere of the prerogatives as well as the liabilities of age, other
things being equal.223
It is evident throughout the Judiciary Act of 1789 that the drafters
believed that they knew, and expectedjudges and others to know, whatjustice
is. Justice, it seems, depended for them on what the laws say, on what is right,
and on what is expected.224 Upon which of these three elements the emphasis
should be placed, in any particular situation, itself depends on the
circumstances, with prudence being brought to bear in the interest of an
enduring justice.22 Consider how this determination to have justice done is
expressed:
And be it further enacted, That no summons, writ, declaration, return,
process, judgment, or other proceedings in civil causes in any of the courts
of the United States, shall be abated, arrested, quashed or reversed, for any
218.
219.
220.

See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 7, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
See, e.g.,id. §§ 3,5.
See, e.g., id. §§ 7, 8, 27, 29, 35.

221. On the judicial oath, see Noonan, supra note 201, at 124, 127.
222. The prototype of prototypes here maybe the storytold byNathan to King David about
his appropriation of Bathsheba, as recorded in 2 Samuel 12:1-24. See, e.g., George Anastaplo,
Law & Literature and the Bible: Explorations, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 515, 641 (1998)
[hereinafter Anastaplo, Law & Literature and the Bible]; ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORAUST, supra note 3, at 491.
223. Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 1, 30, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
224.

225.

See, e.g., id. §§ 23, 27, 30.
See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHI1,OSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 515 2002-2003

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:455

defect or want of form, but the said courts respectively shall proceed and
give judgment according as the right of the cause and matter in law shall
appear to them, without regarding any imperfections, defects, or want of
form in such writ, declaration, ... or course of proceeding whatsoever,
except only in cases of demurrer ....
26

All this seems to be in the spirit of the Framers of the Constitution of 1787
who, in devising the Fugitive Slave Clause, refused to say that slaves were
being "lawfully" held in any of the States, lest it be implied by the use of this
term that they were being justly held.227
V.
There are, in addition to the ways we have already noticed, other
indications of the moral concerns and standards relied upon by the drafters of
the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Concerns are evident in the anticipations seen not only in the oaths of
office that we have referred to, but also in an awareness of the ways that
people are likely to conduct themselves if they are not curbed.22 The
Constitution of 1787 also reflects an awareness of likely temptations, as may
be seen, for example, in its provision for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
to counter the possible bias of local attachments.2 29

Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that "no district judge shall
[when sitting on the circuit court of appeals] give a vote in any case of appeal
or error from his own decision; but may assign the reasons of such his
decision. '"23 Thus, also, sureties are required in various situations,2 3' the facts
of a case should be made "fully to appear upon the record" on appeals,232
"disinterested" persons should be used to execute and return writs,233 and
"unnecessary expense" and undue burdens for citizens are to be avoided.234
The Act insists on keeping adversaries informed of proceedings. 23 5 Also
insisted upon is how depositions should be secured and dealt with:

226. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 32, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
227. See ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 170, 176-77.
228. See, e.g., Noonan, supra note 201, at 130f.
229. See U.S. CONST. art. 111 (1787); ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONOF 1787, supra note
2, at 127, 139.
230. Judiciary Act of 1789, §4, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). United States Supreme Court Justices,
however, are not similarly constrained when they sit on appeals from decisions of circuit courts
in which they have participated.
231. See, e.g., id. §§ 12, 17, 22.
232. Id. § 19.
233. Id. §§ 28, 29.
234. Id. § 29.
235. See id. § 30.
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And every person deposing as aforesaid shall be carefully examined and
cautioned, and sworn or affirmed to testify to the whole truth, and shall
subscribe the testimony by him or her given after the same shall be reduced
to writing, which shall be done only by the magistrate taking the deposition,
or by the deponent in his presence.236
VI.
Perhaps the most pervasive expression of moral concerns and the
implementation of moral standards may be seen in the Judiciary Act's
considerable reliance on the common law. We have already noticed that a
number of the provisions in the Judiciary Act, as in the Constitution and in the
Bill of Rights, draw upon the common law.237
The common law incorporated moral standards as well as constitutional
principles and long-established rights and privileges. These privileges look
to traditional notions of both ordered liberty and equal justice under law. It
remains to be seen how these notions are affected by the ever-increasing
influence of the emphasis on equality in our constitutional and political
system. However much equality the Declaration of Independence celebrated,
it is the determination to do justice, and to seem to do justice, that pervades
the Judiciary Act of 1789.238
VII.
The things taken for granted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, as in the
Constitution of 1787 before it, bear both upon what those great instruments
aimed and upon how they are to be interpreted.
It should be evident from both the Constitution and the Judiciary Act that
a national common law was relied upon, a common law which the Courts of
the United States would help keep national and, hence, truly common. For
many practical purposes, the common law is still studied, at least in law
schools, as basically national. This is reflected in what is routinely said about
"the better rule" when diverse routes have been taken in different States.
Congressional legislation, especially with respect to transactions in "interstate
commerce," tends to nudge the States toward a national rule in various areas
of the common law.

236. Id. § 30.
237. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
238. On the tension between adherence to the equality principle and adherence to the
liberty principle, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONOF 1787, supranote 2, at 333 (Index), 335
(Index); ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 205. See also infra text
accompanying note 311.
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The spirit, as well as the requirements, of the Judiciary Act looked to a
national common law, a conclusion recognized in Swift v. Tyson in 1842239 but
repudiated in Erie RailroadCompany v. Tompkins in 193 8.40 Critical to the
Erie argument is the insistence that "laws of the several states" (in Section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789) included the common law as it happens to be set
forth in the various States. However, there is much in the Judiciary Act to
support Justice Story's assumption in Swift v. Tyson that "laws of the several
states" did not include the common law.24' For example, the repeated
references to the "laws of the United States" in the Judiciary Act seem to be
to statutes.
If we keep in mind what the common law ultimately draws upon, we
should see that it does not make sense for it to be significantly and
permanently different from State to State, something that Erie is prepared to
accept. Of course, State court judges may chance to go off on questionable
tangents from time to time-and if the United States Supreme Court, with its
somewhat limited jurisdiction, does not happen to be in242
the position to correct
them, some legislature should be empowered to do so.
Judges, who are dependent upon chance in the cases they decide and in
the circumstances in which they decide them, cannot be left ultimately in
control of "readings" either of the common law or of the Constitution.
Legislative rules of decisions must take precedence over the common law,
especially because legislatures can provide deliberate and comprehensive
statutes that take account of changing circumstances.24 3
Even so, it is salutary to return, in closing, to a recognition of the moral
standards that have always permeated the common law, that common law
which the Constitution of 1787 very much takes for granted.'" Moral
standards are implicit in the branches of the common law referred to by Judge
Noonan in the epigraph for this talk.24 I have had this to say, in my
constitutional commentary, about the common law:
The common law is a way of applying, case-by-case, the enduring standards
of the community, and in such a way as to bring the community along, even

239. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
240. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
241. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO,THE CONSTITUTION OF1787, supra note 2, at 128-29; William
T. Braithwaite, The Common Law and the JudiciaryPower:An Introductionto Swift-Erie and
the Problem of Transcendental Versus Positive Law, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7,
at 774; Anastaplo, Constitutionalism,The Rule of Rules, supra note 7, at 177.
242. On legislative supremacy in our constitutional system, see supra note 97.
243. Is it not implied, by Section 34 and other provisions in the Judiciary Act, that
Congress could make the common law, especially as defined by the United States Supreme
Court in diversity cases, superior to State statutes?
244. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303; supra text
accompanying note 218 and following.
245. See supra text accompanying note 201.
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as reforms are being made. It is salutary to emphasize here that common-law
judges discover the law; they do not simply make it. Reason looks to nature
(instead of will looking to desire) in declaring the rule that is to be
followed.24 n
I go on to suggest that our federal judges "would be enlivened if the National
Courts had old-fashioned common-law questions put to them routinely to
consider properly, thereby linking them with great common-lawj udges across
'
the centuries."247
If our judges and legislators and scholars as well, were more securely
linked with great common law judges across the centuries, they would be
better equipped to notice and to pay due deference to the moral and other
presuppositions of the Judiciary Act of 1789.248 This should lead, in turn, to
sounder readings both of the Constitution of 1787 and of the Bill of Rights of
1791.
2 49
9. A RETURN TO BARRON V.BALTIMORE

The plaintiff.., contends that [he] comes within the clause in the fifth
amendment to the Constitution, which inhibits the taking of private property
for public use, without just compensation. He insists that this amendment,
being in favour of the liberty of the citizens, ought to be so construed as to
restrain the legislative power of a State, as well as that of the United States.
If this proposition be untrue, [this tribunal] can take no jurisdiction of the
cause. The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not
of much difficulty.
John Marshall25
I.
A colleague of ours, who is quite experienced in constitutional law, has
observed that Barron v. City of Baltimore2"5' requires no more than twenty
minutes of class discussion. This assessment is reflected in the single
paragraph allowed for this case in the four-volume Encyclopedia of the

246. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 138.
247. Id. at 138-39. Is not this recognized in the quotation taken from Judge Noonan in the
text at supra note 201 ?
248. See supra note 241. That is, it would be recognized that the Courts of the United
States are indeed courts. See supra note 211.
249. A talk given in the Faculty Workshop at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law,
Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 1998.
250. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,247 (1833). This is how the Chief
Justice assessed the issues in this case.
251. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). On Barron,see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 455 (Index).
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American Constitution where it is said:
When James Madison proposed to the First Congress the amendments that
became the Bill of Rights, he included a provision that no state shall violate
Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Press, or Trial by Jury incriminal cases;
the proposal to restrict the states was defeated. The amendments
constituting a Bill of Rights were understood to be a bill of restraints upon
the United States only. In Barron, Chief Justice John Marshall for a
unanimous Supreme Court ruled in conformance with the clear history of the
matter. [The plaintiff] invoked against Baltimore the clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibiting the taking of private property without just
compensation. The "fifth amendment," the Court held, "must be understood
as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the
states."2 52
On the other hand, I have had my students in constitutional law this semester
write one of their papers on Barron v. Baltimore, an assignment which could
suggest that there is still more to this case than is generally recognized.
The account of this 1833 case provided in the United States Reports opens
with these facts:
...Craig

and Barron, of whom the plaintiff is survivor, were owners of an
extensive and highly productive wharf in the eastern section of Baltimore,
enjoying, at the period of their purchase of it, the deepest water in the
harbour.
The city, inthe asserted exercise of its corporate authority over the
harbour, the paving of the streets, and regulating grades for paving, and over
the health of Baltimore, diverted from their accustomed and natural course,
certain streams of water which flow from the range of hills bordering the
city, and diverted them, partly by adopting new grades of streets, and partly
by the necessary results of paving, and partly by mounds, embankments and
other artificial means, purposely adapted to bend the course of the water to
the wharf in question. These streams becoming very full and violent in rains,
carried down with them from the hills and the soil over which they ran, large
masses of sand and earth, which they deposited along, and widely in front of
the wharf of the plaintiff. The alleged consequence was, that the water was
rendered so shallow that it ceased to be useful for vessels of any important
burthen, lost its income, and became of little or no value as a wharf.253
This account includes the following recapitulation of the litigation in
Maryland which ended up in the United States Supreme Court:
At the trial of the cause in Baltimore County Court, the plaintiff gave

252.

Leonard W. Levy, Barronv. City ofBaltimore, in 1ENCYCLOPEDIAOFTHEAMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 102 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1986).
253. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 243-44.
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evidence tending to prove the original and natural course of the streams, the
various works of the corporation from time to time to turn them in the
direction of this wharf, and the ruinous consequences of these measures to
the interests of the plaintiff. It was not asserted by the defendants that any
compensation for the injury was ever made or proffered; but they justified
under the authority they deduced from the charter of the city, granted by the
Legislature of Maryland, and under several acts of the Legislature conferring
powers on the corporation in regard to the grading and paving of streets, the
regulation of the harbour and its waters, and to the health of the city." 4
II.
We should notice some preliminary questions, if only in passing, before
we turn to our principal inquiry on this occasion. One such question is
whether there had indeed been the uncompensated "taking" by the City of
Baltimore of which the plaintiff complained. Although this may not have
been, strictly speaking, a "taking," it is likely that the plaintiff suffered a
tortious injury inflicted by the City of Baltimore.
It seems, however, that there was no remedy available under either
count-"taking" or "tort"--pursuant to the Constitution of the State of
Maryland. Nor, it seems, did the City of Baltimore or the State of Maryland
provide compensation for the plaintiff, which could have been done whether
or not a legal remedy was available for him. It should be noticed that a
Baltimore County Court jury did render a verdict on behalf of the plaintiff in
this case, a verdict for $4,500 which the Court of Appeals in Maryland
reversed.255
The plaintiff had argued that he was entitled to take advantage, in his
Maryland litigation, of the provision in the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution which says that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation."
The issues before the United States Supreme Court in this case are
disposed ofby Chief Justice Marshall in a couple of pages, which are summed
up in the Syllabus found in the Reports:
The provision in the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise
of power by the government of the United States; and is not applicable to the
legislation of the states.
The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the
United States, for themselves; for their own government; and not for the
government of individual States. Each State established a constitution for

254.
255.

Id. at 244.
See id.
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itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on
the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people
of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they
supposed best adapted to their situation, and best calculated to promote their
interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be
exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general
terms are naturally and necessarily applicable to the government created by
the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument
itself; not of distinct governments framed by different persons and for
different purposes."
Critical to the Chief Justice's opinion is the following argument about the
Ninth and Tenth Sections of Article I of the Constitution:
The ninth section having enumerated, in the nature of a bill of rights, the
limitations intended to be imposed on the powers of the general government,
the tenth proceeds to enumerate those which were to operate on the State
legislatures. These restrictions are brought together in the same section, and
are by express words applied to the States. "No State shall enter into any
treaty;" &c. Perceiving that in a constitution framed by the people of the
United States for the government of all, no limitation of the action of
government on the people would apply to the state government, unless
expressed in terms; the restrictions contained in the tenth section are in direct
words so applied to the States." 7
This argument, reinforced by historical and other data, has long been taken to
be both simple and conclusive.
H.
Even so, it might be useful to consider what might have encouraged
Barron's counsel to invoke the United States Constitution here, aside from the
difficulties faced by the plaintiff under the constitution and laws of Maryland.
Some lawyers of that day, it seems, did regard the Bill of Rights to be
applicable to the State governments as well as to the National government.
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution is directed against the United States
and Article I, Section 10 is directed against the States-this is made clear by
the context in each case. But the Bill or Rights (except for the First
Amendment and part of the Seventh Amendment) is general in its terms.
The "legislative history" of the Bill of Rights can be read in at least two
ways. If the Bill of Rights provisions had been placed in the parts of the
Constitution which James Madison had suggested for them when he
introduced them in the House of Representatives on June 10, 1789, it would

256.
257.

Id. at 243.
Id. at 248-49.
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have been obvious that all of the proposed restraints were directed only
against the United States.2"' This conclusion would have been reinforced, no
matter where these provisions were placed, if the provision had been retained
in which several restraints were directed explicitly against the States." 9
Furthermore, as Chief Justice Marshall notices, much (if not all) of the 17871789 agitation in the States for amendments had been with the powers of the
government of the United States in view.
Still, the final placement of the Bill of Rights does not provide a context
in which the United States government alone is addressed (as it is in Article
I, Section 9). Put another way, the only places that that government is
explicitly addressed in the Bill of Rights are the First and Seventh
Amendments. Not only are the Bill of Rights provisions set forth in general
terms, they are obviously declaratory of rights that had long been claimed by
the English-speaking peoples. "
A separate problem here is what, if anything, the Courts of the United
States can properly do to make State governments (1) respect longstanding (if
not "unalienable") rights, whether or not found in an American constitutional
document, (2) implement the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
of the Constitution, and (3) respect the Bill of Rights provisions that do sound
26 1
general in their application.
IV.
I venture to suggest that constitutional law scholars have yet to face up to
the significance of the fact-if "fact" it is-that the prevailing opinion in the
United States ever since the beginning has been that some rights are general,
if not inalienable and universal. For example, common usage has long, if not
always, considered "the First Amendment" as generally available against all
governments in this country (and indeed against other powerful bodies as
well). This usage does not depend upon any public awareness of the
"incorporation" exercises to which the courts have resorted.2 62

258.

For the originally proposed arrangement of June 10, 1789, see ANASTAPLO, THE

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 315-20.

259. The amendments proposed by the House of Representatives, passed on August 24,
1789, included this provision: "No State shall infringe the right of trial by Jury in criminal
cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the press." ANASTAPLO,
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 323-24.

260. See supra note 208.
261. The Fourteenth Amendment can be understood as having been designed to have these
effects on State governments. On the Fourteenth Amendment, see ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 458 (Index).

262. The "incorporation" referred to is that effected primarily through the interpretation
of one or more phrases in the Fourteenth Amendment. Article II of Section 14 of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 expresses the understanding that various traditional rights of the people,
especially in a republican regime, should be recognized for all of the inhabitants of the
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It has been evident for more than two hundred years now that if one
method for extending various fundamental rights against all governments in
this Country is denied, then another method is apt to be resorted to. Thus, we
have seen the attempts made with Barron in the 1820s, with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s and thereafter,
and with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1920s
and thereafter. 26 3
The Civil War stands for this tendency, which has culminated in the
virtually complete "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights as against the States.
That is to say, the nationalization of fundamental rights, implicit from the
beginning, will not be permanently denied, however thwarted and delayed it
may be in the Courts and elsewhere, especially when there is here a
population as mobile as ours has always been in principle and for the last
century or so in practice. This development is anticipated even in Barron, for
it should not be forgotten that the local jury did find that the plaintiff was
entitled to compensation for what had been done to his wharf by the local
government.
In short, there is, in critical respects, one people in the United States,
whatever the courts and their interpreters may seem to say from time to time.
This has been evident in the compelling arguments of civil rights activists in
the Twentieth Century.
V.
It is salutary in these matters not to rely simply upon the courts, something
testified to by the profound consequences of the voting rights and other
legislation enacted by Congress in the 1960s.2'
Because there is in the people at large a healthy desire for nationally
recognized rights, what more can Congress do to promote them? Perhaps
more use should be made than heretofore of the Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of Article IV of the Constitution and of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The use of the Commerce Clause to justify some of the civil
rights legislation in the 1960s is a monument to mistakes made by the
Supreme Court in reading the Fourteenth Amendment in the late Nineteenth

Northwest Territory. See

ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF

1787, supra note 2, at 262-63,

265 n.; see also supra note 208.

263. The same kind of flexibility has been seen inthe understandable determination to have
the government regulate effectively the economy of the United States, however the Commerce
Clause may happen to be read (or misread) by the Courts at any particular time. See, e.g., supra
note 65; infra text accompanying notes 277-78, 285; see also Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand
the Good, supra note 2, at Part 2.
264. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 439
n.209.
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It may also be salutary to rely much more on the Republican Form of
Government Guaranty in Article IV of the Constitution, a provision which has
been pretty much neglected, except for President Lincoln's invocation of it in
1861.266 Congress should have drawn upon that Guaranty in correcting the
legislative malapportionment that finally became such a scandal that the
Supreme Court was moved to intervene in the 1960s, but not as effectively as
Congress could have done.267
Perhaps Congress could experiment with providing the courts more
directions for the protection and implementation of various fundamental
rights, keeping in mind the "Blessings of Liberty" featured in the Preamble to
the Constitution.2 68
VI.
It is prudent to notice that the "constitutional" is often intertwined with
the "political," a relation which should encourage us to expect more
constitutional determinations to be made in the legislature, the branch of
government that is equipped and expected to take both elements into account.
The importance here of the enduring opinion of the people should be
emphasized.269
It is that opinion, grounded in an instinctive respect for morality, that has
long been evident in the common law. The common law was traditionally
regarded as a set of rules to be discovered by judges (and modified, as
circumstances changed, not only by judges but also by legislatures). These
rules were regarded as dictates of nature which were open to rational
development and implementation.27 °
To the extent that the traditional understanding of the common law has
been eclipsed, to that extent the foundations of the rights recognized in the
Constitution may have been weakened. It should be emphasized, again and
again, that the soundness of the people-that soundness to which the common
law ministered-is required if a constitutional system is to be sustained for

265.

See supra text accompanying note 51.

266. On republican government, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note
2, at 337 (Index).
267. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
see also ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 173-74.
268. On the Preamble and its uses, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra
note 2 at 337 (Index); Anastaplo, Constitutionalism, the Rule ofRules, supra note 7, at 68; see

also infra text accompanying note 334.
269. Consider a quotation taken from Benjamin R. Curtis's dissenting opinion in Dred
Scott v. Sandford in ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at xiii.
270. See, e.g., supra note 66; see also ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3,
at 303.
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centuries.27'
VII.
It is difficult to overestimate the significance in these matters of the
Declaration of Independence.272 It should be remembered, for example, that
various rights were invoked by the American people against the British
government without a written Colonial Bill of Rights, just as Barron can be
said to have done against the Baltimore government. The Colonists evidently
expected governments to respect those rights, or else face the consequences.
It may be instructive to recall here the warning recorded in FederalistNo.
84 against adding any bill of rights to the proposed American constitution.
Such an addition, it was said, might be interpreted to negate any rights not
listed therein. The Ninth Amendment was added, it seems, to guard against
this interpretation.2 73
Publius could also have warned that the listing of rights that the
Government of the United States should respect might be interpreted to
"liberate" any governments not considered to be covered directly by the
Constitution of the United States. That is, this could be taken to dilute the
universality of those rights which had previously been regarded as naturally
available against all governments, certainly wherever the common law and its
attendant constitutionalism had been ordained and established. As I have
argued, however, the people can be depended upon to insist that critical rights
should be considered "universal"--and they will be established generally one
way or another.274

271. The required soundness of the people depends, in large part, upon intelligent
community direction. See, e.g., supra Part 5; see also ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 452 n.259.

272. Also difficult to overestimate is the significance, in the entire Anglo-American
constitutional arrangement, of the English "Declaration of lndependence"--that is, Magna
Carta, "the Great Charter of Liberties." It took half a millennium to bring the Magna Carta's
presuppositions to the surface. See, e.g., Anastaplo, On Freedom, supra note 104, at 481.
273. On the Ninth Amendment, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, at 461. See also supra notes 208, 214; supra text accompanying note 74 (the
Ninth Amendment).
274. Consider, however, the limitations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
See Anastaplo, How to Read the Constitution, supra note 61, at 55.
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2 75
10. POLITICAL WILL, THE COMMON GOOD, AND THE CONSTITUTION

He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed
also the necessary means of its perfection-He willed
therefore the state.
Edmund Burke

2 76

The United States Supreme Court has recently made various efforts to
check what a few of the Justices consider the tendency of the National
Government to disregard the federalism elements in our constitutional
arrangements. My impression is that such judicial efforts-as in National
League of Cities v. Usery in 197677 and United States v. Lopez in
1995 27 -- are futile, attempting as they do to check social and political
movements that are longstanding, powerful, and (in our circumstances) mostly
salutary. These movements are reflected in the widespread recourse to
abortion in our time. That recourse in this Country, however questionable it
may be, is not due, ultimately, to our courts. After all, similar recourse may
be found in Europe, but without the intervention there of judges-that is,
among peoples and in regimes as decent as ours (with considerable respect
among them, too, for natural right). Cases such as Roe v. Wade in 1973279 did
dramatize in this Country the changes taking place worldwide, but our courts
were not as critical here as is often assumed.
The last explicit constitutional check of a federalism-protecting character
was the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798. None of the preceding
Amendments to the Constitution, including what we have long known as the
Bill of Rights, was of this character, not even the often-invoked Tenth
Amendment, which simply confirms, in effect, that the Constitution means
what it says."' Even the Eleventh Amendment has been effectively countered
by the Fourteenth Amendment, subjecting the States to far more scrutiny and
risk in the Courts of the United States than had been the concern of the

275.

A talk given at a panel of The Center for the Study.of the Constitution, Annual

Convention of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September
4, 1998. The other participants on this panel were Hadley Arkes, Gary Glenn, and Ralph
Rossum.
276. EDMUND BURKE, WORKS, at V, 186 (Rivington ed., 1803-1827); see supra text
accompanying note 6.
277. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
278. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see supra note 263.
279. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra note 40; see also infra text accompanying note 345.
280. On the Tenth Amendment, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 465 (Index).
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" ' As for the original Constitution itself,
drafters of the Eleventh Amendment. 28
it should be remembered that the title of the papers most famous in its
advocacy, The Federalist,was a title better suited for those more ardent
champions of federalism who were maneuvered (not altogether fairly) into
being identified as Anti-Federalists. 82
Particular emphasis as a federalism-subverting measure can be placed on
the Seventeenth Amendment, providing as it does for the popular election of
Senators. Once political parties were firmly established early in the
Nineteenth Century, it was only a matter of time before the role of State
legislatures in the selection of Senators would become anachronistic.
The Seventeenth Amendment was anticipated in this respect by the
Twelfth Amendment. That 1804 amendment provided for changes in the
original mode of identifying and counting electoral votes for President and
Vice President, changes that became necessary because the Framers had
evidently not foreseen in 1787 the emergence of strong party allegiances in
nationalpolitics. Similarly, it can be said, the Fourteenth Amendment was
anticipated, in critical implications, by the Ninth Amendment with its
recognition of rights which exist independently of the Constitution. 83
Another consequence of the emergence of political parties has been to
moderate the political difficulties that may have been provoked by the equal
representation of the States in the Senate of the United States.2" 4

II.
It can be expected, in the decade ahead, that the Supreme Court will have
little permanent effect in controlling the legislative powers of Congress, even
when the exercise of those powers places severe checks upon State
governmental activity. Virtually certain, for example, is the continued

281. On the Eleventh Amendment, see id. at 458 (Index).
282. It should also be remembered that much more was done with federalism in the
founding of the Canadian Confederation in the Nineteenth Century, something of which we
have been reminded by the opinion a few years ago of the Supreme Court of Canada with
respect to the prospect of Quebec Separation. We can see in that opinion that the Supreme
Court of Canada does not suggest that it will eventually have to rule upon whether a valid
separation from the rest of Canada has been effected by Quebec. Rather, the Court defers to "a
clear majority" and to a "clear expression ... of will" by the people of that Province. On
Quebec separatism, see ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 139. On The
Federalist, see George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred,Explorations, 22 TEx.
TECH. L. REv. 967, 1042 (1991); ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTTuTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at
334; ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 458; Anastaplo,
Constitutionalism and the Good, supra note 2, at Part 13.
283. See supra note 208; see also supra text accompanying note 260.
284. Thus, there is far greater interest shown today in whether a Senator is a Republican
or a Democrat than in whether he or she is from a large State or a small State or even from a
Southern State or a Northern State.
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exercise of the Commerce Power in such a way as to regulate, to whatever
degree the Congress deems expedient, the economic life of this Country. Why
should the United States be different in this respect from all of the other
industrialized nations on Earth? The vital issues here will be as to the
wisdom, not as to the constitutionality, of the regulation Congress undertakes.
This is not usurpation on the part of Congress, but rather a necessary
adaptation to an ever-more-complicated economic life, with very little purely
local "commercial" activity remaining, at least in this Country. A quite broad
Congressional power in this respect was recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden in
1824, 285 a recognition that was acknowledged by Justice Jackson when he
said in 1942: "At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. 286
All this was prepared for in the Constitution itself, in a roundabout way,
by the Article I, Section 9 clause prohibiting Congressional interference with
the international slave trade before 1808. This clause recognized, in effect,
that "from the beginning" Congress had the power to interfere even with the
"interstate" slave trade, a Commerce Clause power that could override state
pretensions when Congress had the political will to do so.28 The South made
its desperate move to secede in 1860-1861 when it became apparent that the
National Government was likely to exhibit, within the coming generation, the
political will to begin to put slavery "out of business. "288
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of political will in these matters.
It will be remembered, for instance, that in 1883 and thereafter the United
States Supreme Court severely limited the usefulness of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the principal means for
making fundamental rights applicable in the Courts against the States. Within
a few decades, however, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, although ill-suited for this sensible and humane use, was pressed
into service to do what had been intended to be done by means of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.28 9
in.
The political will evident here is related to what could be expected as one
of the major consequences of the Civil War; that is, the States would be bound
by most of the restraints placed upon the National Government for the sake of
personal liberty and decent government. It is to be hoped that the same kind
of legislative adaptation will be resorted to if the Supreme Court should ever

285. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
286. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I11, 120 (1942); see supra note 263.
287. See ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 64-65. On the
international slave trade, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 369 (Index).
288. SeeANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 113, 149, 157, 177.
289. See also supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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presume to declare all affirmative-action measures "unconstitutional. 2 9 °
The importance of political will is evident also in how lines of authority
are laid out in the Constitution. Among the three branches of the National
Government, the Congress is ultimately in control. We have been reminded
of this in times of crisis, such as the Watergate fiasco of the 1970s, 29l the Iran
arms-Contra aid usurpation of the 1980s, 292 and the Presidential scandals of
the 1990s. 293 This also means that the assumption by the Supreme Court of
the function of judicial review, a more benign form of usurpation (but
usurpation nevertheless), cannot have a permanent effect, however much it
may oblige Congress to contrive means (such as using, perhaps even misusing,
its taxing and spending powers) in order for it to get on with what "has" to be
done.294 Permit me [I could say in 1998] to add, if only in passing, the opinion
that the least serious of the crises I have just listed is, by far, that generated by
the current Presidential scandals. But that which we have now is serious
enough to call both for a Presidential resignation (as, unfortunately, the only
honorable option left to Mr. Clinton) 295 and for an informed repudiation of the
Independent Counsel Act (still another, perhaps more dangerous, form of
dubious usurpation).296

290. On affirmative-action measures, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 455 (Index); George Anastaplo, The O.J. Simpson Case
Revisited, 28 Loy. U. Cal.L.J. 461,489 (1997) [hereinafter Anastaplo, The O.J. Simpson Case
Revisited].
291.

On the Watergate fiasco, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORAUST, supra note 3,

at 623 (Index).
292. On the Iran arms-Contra aid usurpation, see id. at 612 (Index); ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 335 (Index); ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 459 (Index).
293. See George Anastaplo, ConstitutionDoesn 't-andShouldn't-ShieldPresidentfrom
Trial,CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 24, 1998, at 2; George Anastaplo, Crisisand Continuity in the
Clinton Presidency,PUB. INT. L. REP. (Loyola Univ. Chicago School of Law), July 1998, at 1;
George Anastaplo, What Do We Really Want to Learn About the President?,PUB. INT. L. REP.
(Loyola Univ. Chicago School of Law), Apr. 1998, at 2.
294. On judicial review, see supra note 41.
295. See supra note 147.
296. The Independent Counsel Act has been allowed to lapse. Much is to be said for
having automatic expiration dates built into questionable legislation. Consider, for example,
my letter to the editor of September 2001:
It is likely that the current anti-terrorist legislative proposals of the national
administration, some of which are apt to be enacted in these troubled times, include
provisions that will turn out to be dubious for security purposes as well as for liberty
interests.
Would it not be prudent, therefore, for Congress to follow the lead of the Congress
which enacted the now-much-criticized Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798? That Congress,
aware of the distorting passions of that day, limited the life of the Alien and Sedition Acts
to two years, subject to renewal by Congress.
Those acts were not renewed once the people of this country had had time to assess both
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The precise meaning and use of the Bill of Rights provisions depend upon
what the Legislature and the Executive, as well as upon what the Judiciary,
say and do. The legal principles found in those provisions are not "to be
applied by the courts" alone, whatever Justice Jackson assumed in West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnettein 1943297
One source of confusion here can be traced to a common misreading of
the Supremacy Clause: the "supreme Law of the Land" identified there, it
needs to be pointed out, includes "the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution. If Congress's ultimate control is
recognized, it is more likely to be recognized as well that "in Pursuance
thereof' need not mean what it is taken to mean for the sake of judicial
review,.to wit, "in conformity thereto." That is, the "in Pursuance" language
may be primarily concerned to identify the authoritative legislation here, that
which is enacted by Congress according to the constitutionally-prescribed
forms.29 Congress, of course, is duty-bound to keep the Constitution in view
in enacting whatever it does, but a failure on its part to do so does not
necessarily invalidate what it has done, any more than what the Supreme
Court has done in any particular case is invalidated because of a like failure
on its part. Very much in need of qualification, then, is the assertion in
Marbury v. Madison that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."299
In short, politicians and, hence, political scientists should appreciate, at
least better than law professors and hence lawyers are likely to do, the
decisive role of the "political," even in judicial determinations and legal
applications, especially when, as is the case of the Constitution of 1787, the
political is regarded as paramount in the proper ordering of human affairs.
This sovereignty of the political is reflected, according to the men of 17761787, even in the divine governance of the world."°

risks and remedies properly.
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 28,2001, at 2; CI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 2,2001, at 38; see infra notes
326, 369.
297. 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943).
298. On the Supremacy Clause, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note
2, at 338 (Index); see also supra text accompanying note 42.
299. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see supra text accompanying notes 62-64; infra
note 360.
300. An oblique anticipation of the separation of powers established in the Constitution
may be seen in the references to divinity in the Declaration of Independence. See ANASTAPLO,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 25-26.
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11. TOCQUEVILLE ON THE ROADS TO EQUALITY 301
Tocqueville in his famous book on democracy in America seems to
say, at least at first glance, that the case for democracy is in itself
not stronger than the case for aristocracy. Democracy has its
particular virtues and vices and so has aristocracy. But,
Tocqueville continues, Providence has decided in favor of
democracy. Practically there is no longer a choice. We have to
make the best of democracy; we cannot have a romantic longing for
aristocracy. Now what Tocqueville understands by Providence is
now called by most people who speak in these terms, History, with
a capital "H." History has decided in favor of democracy.
Leo Strauss

°2

PROLOGUE

Seventeen years ago the Fall Weekend of the Basic Program also here at
the Alpine Valley Resort was devoted to George Orwell's 1984. This was a
couple of months before the onset of the fateful year described in Orwell's
novel. I observed, in the course of my talk about the 1984 novel:
All men, we have been taught by Aristotle, aim at the good in all that they
do. (There may even be something good in mere perseverance, in the
perpetuation of even a bad regime. Existence itself is thus celebrated,
however much that existence is outweighed in some instances by the evil of
the regime.) One must wonder about the morale of [such cynical leaders as
those depicted in 1984]. Do they not need some sincere belief, aside from
mere self-interest, if they are to consider their own lives meaningful and
worthwhile? Otherwise, would there not be a void that they or their
successors, the youth of the following generation, will fall into and be
engulfed by?3 3
I then added in 1983 this sentiment: "This is, it has long seemed to me, one
of the serious problems faced by Russian leaders since at least the Second
World War." 3" This sentiment, looking, as it turned out, to the collapse of the
Soviet Union within a decade, was reinforced by what we had observed during

301. A talk given at a Weekend Conference of the Basic Program of Liberal Education for
Adults of the University of Chicago, held at the Alpine Valley Resort, East Troy, Wisconsin,
Nov. 5, 2000. The original title of this talk was Tocqueville on the Roads to Equality: Is It the
Same No Matter How You Get There? On Tocqueville, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINcoLN,
supra note 9, at 81.
302. This epigraph is taken from Leo Strauss's Spring 1966 course on Plato's Meno at the
University of Chicago. See ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINcoLN, supra note 9, at 288 n. 206.
303. ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORAIIST, supra note 3, at 165.
304. Id.
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a camping visit to the Soviet Union in 1960, prompting me to ask at that time
whether anyone in that country really "believed in" the established system.3" 5
Thus, I could wonder, in my remarks at the Fall 1983 Basic Program
Weekend, about the staying power of the Soviet Union. But a Tocquevillian
analysis of modem egalitarianism and its passions should alert us, despite the
collapse of the Soviet Union, to anticipate the revival of the revolutionary
spirit upon which Marxism depends.3
I.
The French Revolution, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, drew upon
and intensified developments which had been centuries in the making.
Particularly important, according to him, was the longstanding tendency of the
French toward centralization of both their political and their social
organization. The United States of Tocqueville's day, on the other hand, still
made more of local government than did the French.
The centralization of much of French life was dramatized for us, many
years ago, when we took a boat train from Le Havre to Paris. (Le Havre
happened also to be the port from which Tocqueville sailed to the United
States.) Traveling with us in our compartment was a couple whose
automobile had already been delivered at another French port, Cherbourg,
which is not far from Le Havre. Even so, it proved to be easier for our fellow
travelers to go all the way into Paris in order to catch another train back to
Cherbourg (to collect their automobile)-it was far easier for them to do this
than to try to go by public transportation directly from Le Havre to Cherbourg.
Similar centralization could be seen, in those years (and perhaps to some
extent still today), in the role that Les Halles, the central markets of Paris,
played in the economy of France.3" 7 Much of the foodstuff collected each
night in Les Halles came from all over the country, mostly by trucks. It would
be bought by dealers who would truck it out that very night all over the
country for sale the next day in local markets.
Other indications of centralization may be seen in the opening lines of
Stendahl's The Red and the Black, where it is recorded that a minor
construction project in a provincial town had to be approved by a Ministry in
Paris.3" 8 Then there is the constant effort made by the Academie Francaise to
control changes in their revered language.

305.

See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 3; see also

ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 555.

306. The revolutionary spirit upon which Marxism depends seems now to be drawn upon
by various Islamist radical movements. On Islamic thought, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 175. See also infra note 332.
307. These markets are now found in a Paris suburb.
308. On Stendahl, see Anastaplo, Law& Literatureand the Moderns, supra note 7, at 358.
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With centralization come reverberations throughout the entire community
whenever anything unplanned happens in any realm that is controlled
centrally. We can see this, for example, in disruptions to commercial air
traffic all over the United States when something goes wrong in one part of
the country (because of weather conditions or labor difficulties or whatever).
It is obvious to us that a number of mundane activities have to be
controlled by some central authority. These activities can include the
designation of time zones, the regulation of the money supply, the allocation
of broadcast frequencies, the monitoring of and responses to epidemics, and
the defense of the country from foreign enemies. Even so, some see
centralization as a threat to liberty, even while others see it as a means of
controlling the whole efficiently for the common good.30 9
Centralization is also seen as promoting uniformity, which, too, can have
both good and bad aspects. Uniformity, in turn, is regarded as closely allied
to equality.
II.
Tocqueville, a member of the French aristocracy, argued that the
movement toward equality was dominant in his time-and that it was apt to
become even stronger, at least in the Western World, for some time to come.
Equality means, in political terms, the emergence of democracy, or rule
by (or at least for) the people. Democracy can appear, in these circumstances,
as the form of government very much in the ascendancy. Tocqueville
counsels the partisans of aristocracy, or of the traditional way in France, to
accommodate themselves to what was virtually inevitable. If they should do
that, he seems to say, they might be able to guide somewhat and hence
moderate the emerging democratic movement. He develops this argument in,
among other places, his major treatise, On Democracy in America (1835,
1840).310
Technological and other developments, for which superior people may
have been in large part responsible, had made a recognition of equality
feasible and more effective-and people at large would continue to demand
such recognition in one form or another. That demand may even draw upon
the egalitarianism, which can be said to be at the core of the Christian faith
(about which I will say more further on).
The struggle between the aristocratic movement and the egalitarian
movement can be translated into the struggle between those dedicated
primarily to liberty and those dedicated primarily to equality, insofar as these
find themselves in conflict. A particularly telling argument for aristocracy is
the fact that Tocqueville, in his thirties, could produce the book that he did.

309.

On the Confederate Constitution of 1861 and its tendencies and consequences, see
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 125. See also infra
text accompanying note 345.
310. Tocqueville's dates are 1805-1859.
ANASTAPLO,
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I.
There has traditionally been, at least in the West, tension (if not even
conflict) between liberty and equality. Insofar as liberty and equality are
distinguished, one can be seen to stand for excellence, the other can be seen
to stand forjustice.31'
Circumstances and personal temperament may affect where and how one
places the emphasis in such matters. And circumstances can help shape one's
habits and perhaps even one's temperament.
It is fairly easy these days to accept the attacks made, in the name of
equality, against those who claim privileges, especially hereditary
privileges." 2 These attacks can include an insistence upon liberty as a
condition naturally due to every human being.
It is more difficult to recognize any merit in the claims of the privileged,
even when those claims are made in the name of superior talents and of
recognized accomplishments, whether in an earlier generation or even in the
present. Particularly troublesome today is any suggestion that one's liberty
or entitlements can extend to any sustained exploitation of beings considered
inferior.'33
A recognized champion of equality these days has been Martin Luther
King, Jr. He could look forward to a time when all of the downtrodden can
proclaim themselves to be "free at last," but his emphasis did seem to be more
on the desire to make everyone free than it was on the quality of that freedom.
On the other hand, Martin Luther, a champion of Christian liberty, insisted
that a healthy society cannot do without inequality.3 14 Tocqueville anticipated
by decades the Old Regime sentiments I have been discussing, having
concluded On Democracy in America with this thought: "The nations of our
day cannot prevent conditions of equality from spreading in their midst. But
it depends upon themselves whether equality is to lead to servitude or
freedom, knowledge or barbarism, prosperity or wretchedness."3 5

311. See supra note 238.
312. The Constitution of 1787, we recall, keeps both the State Governments and the
General Government from granting titles to nobility on anyone. For the 1810 attempt to keep
American citizens from holding any title of nobility granted by a foreign government, see
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 298-99.
313. The issue of what one may do with the property one happens to accumulate may be
critical here.
On the relation between liberty and property, see ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 213; Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand the Good, supra
note 2, at Part 2 and 3. See also supra note 144.
314. On Martin Luther, see George Anastaplo, Law & Literature and the Christian
Heritage,40 BRANDEIS L.J. 191,318 (2001) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand the
ChristianHeritage].
315. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVaILE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 765 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969)
[hereinafter TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA]. A more careful translation of this text,

by Harvey Mansfield, Jr. and Delba Winthrop, is now available.
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IV.
A passage in Tocqueville's book, The Old Regime and the Revolution
(published in 1856), suggests what the emergence of a dedication to equality
and hence to democracy does, and does not, mean for him.316 Our passage
from The Old Regime begins with the observation: "It is in colonies that one
can best judge the form of the metropolitan [the home] government, because
there all its characteristic traits are usually enlarged, and become more
visible."3'17
Tocqueville describes the centralizing tendencies of the French
government, particularly as seen in the time of Louis XIV:
In Canada the government never adopted the great principles which can
render a colony populous and prosperous, but, on the contrary, employed all
kinds of petty artificial procedures and little regulatory tyrannies to increase
and spread the population: forced cultivation, all lawsuits arising from land
concessions taken away from the courts and returned to the judgment of the
government alone, requirements to farm in a certain way, obligations to live
in certain places rather than others, etc....
He continues by noticing that there was in French Canada a government "that
is almost as numerous as the population, dominant, active, regulatory,
constraining, wanting to foresee everything, taking everything over, always
more familiar with the interests of the governed than they are themselves,
constantly active and sterile."3 9
Tocqueville then sketches the English alternative mode of colonization in
North America as he describes how matters stood there in his own time:
In the Untied States, on the contrary, the English system of decentralization
is exaggerated: the towns become almost independent municipalities, kinds
of democratic republics. The republican element which is the base of
English mores and the English constitution displays itself without opposition
and develops. Government, properly speaking, does little in England, and
individuals do much; in America, the government is no longer involved in
anything, so to speak, and individuals uniting together do everything. The
absence of upper classes, which made the inhabitant of Canada still more
submissive to the government than the inhabitant of France was at that time,
made the inhabitant of the English colonies more and more independent of

316. Comparable passages may be found in the Democracy in America book, such as at
the end of its third chapter.
317.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION 180 (Alan S.

Kahan trans., 1998) (1856). This passage continues, "When I want to judge the spirit of the
government of Louis XIV and its vices, it is to Canada I must go." Id.
318. Id. at 281.
319. Id.
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authority.32
Tocqueville then adds an observation that challenges, in an instructive way,
our own notions of democracy: "In both colonies one ended up with the
foundation of an entirely democratic society; but in Canada, at least as long
as Canada remained French, equality was joined with absolute government;
in the United States it was combined with freedom."32 ' The passage
concludes with this report: "And as for the material consequences of these
two methods of colonization, we know that in 1763, the time of the English
conquest of Canada, its population was 60,000, and the population of the
English colonies 3 million." '2 2
We can be reminded here of Tocqueville's insistence, two decades earlier
in his America book, that the emergence of democracy or the ascendancy of
the movement to equality, was virtually inevitable. 32 3 But we can also see,
here in The Old Regime, that critical aspects of the democratic regimes
thereupon established in various countries depend greatly on fundamental
tendencies already long established (one way or another) among the peoples
thus provided for. Particularly to be noticed is that democratic government,
or the political enthronement of the principle of equality, does not mean (for
Tocqueville) that the regime either will be grounded in or will promote
freedom. Indeed, a democratic regime, expressive of egalitarian principles,
can be in some circumstances what we (coming out of a liberty-minded
tradition) would consider quite oppressive. Tocqueville anticipated by
decades The OldRegime sentiments I have been discussing, having concluded
On Democracy in America (as we have seen) with this thought:
The nations of our day cannot prevent conditions of equality from spreading
in their midst. But it depends upon themselves whether equality is to lead to
servitude or freedom, knowledge or barbarism, prosperity or wretchedness.324
V.
The scientific student of regimes might be tempted to argue, in response
to the use of such terms as "oppressive" and "barbarism," that the formal
aspects of forms of government are all that can be reliably studied, that
preferences for, say, freedom as against absolutism depend primarily, if not
even solely, upon incalculable and hence unknowable temperamental and

320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.

323. See supra text accompanying note 302.
324. TOCQuEvILLE,

DEMOCRACY INAMEIICA, supra

note 315, at 765.
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other accidental differences among peoples. 3"
The underlying need here may be to determine the proper relations
between, to use old-fashioned terms, ends and means. Does the absolutist,
with his proneness toward centralization, look more to the ends, with
everything marshaled to serve those ends? People thus dedicated to equality
may ultimately look not simply to equality of opportunity but even more to
equality of results, aiming at a general homogeneity.
On the other hand, do not the liberty-minded look more, often without
knowing it, to the means and hence to the state of being, especially to the
condition of one's soul? It is expected, among other things, that one should
act humanely and sensibly, again to use old-fashioned terms. Humanity
depends, in part, upon the means used in securing both personal and political
ends. Should we not be reluctant, therefore, to permit something called either
"policy" or "prudence" to be used to override routinely one's reluctance to be
harsh in the measures resorted to from time to time? Care must be taken lest
one's "realism" and even "rationalism" lead to callousness, if not also to
cruelty.326
Invaluable guidance is provided here by Socrates, who recalls in Plato's
Apology his defiance of the authorities of his day on two different occasions.
On one occasion, he refused to do what the democratic forces in the assembly
wanted him to do; on another occasion he refused to do what the oligarchic
forces in the city (the Thirty Tyrants) wanted him to do.327 In both cases he
balked at cooperating in unseemly executions. In both cases, also, his innate
decency and self-respect asserted itself, aside from (not necessarily in
opposition to) calculations as to what the city needed. And in both cases he
risked his own life by refusing to do what was demanded of him.328

325.

On the guidance provided by nature in these and like matters, see ANASTAPLO, BUT
3, at 303. See also supra Part 4 of this Article.
326. In his Second Discourse Jean-Jacques Rousseau criticizes the philosopher who,
immersed in his books, can ignore the calls for help by a fellow creature being attacked in the
street below his study window. See infra text accompanying note 330. Consider, for example,
NOT PILOSOPHY, supra note

the opening paragraphs of a Chicago Tribune editorial, Security and Liberty, June 9, 2003, at

18:
In his testimony Thursday [June 5, 2003] before the House Judiciary Committee, Atty.
Gen. John Ashcroft displayed poor timing and tone-deafness to rising concerns about
whether the delicate balance between national security and liberty is tipping in the wrong
direction.
Three days earlier, Aschroft's own inspector general had released a 239-page report
highly critical of the Justice Department for overreaching in the handling of hundreds of
immigrants who were detained for weeks and months after the Sept. II terrorist attacks.
Ashcroft's response: He's asking for broader powers.
See supra note 296; infra note 369.
327. See PLATO, APOLOGY 32A-E.

328.

On Plato's Apology, see

ANASTAPLO,

HUMAN

BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4,
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A systematic failure to be concerned enough about the means employed
by the authorities contributed to the worst atrocities in the Twentieth
Century.329 The elementary demands of humanity were deliberately
suppressed on a large scale and for years at a time, with reluctant executioners
being urged to disregard their natural instincts for compassion.3 3 °
VI.
The oppressiveness that can be encountered here is not cured simply by
a regime becoming "democratic." The regimes of both Hitler and Stalin could
be regarded as "democratic" in the sense that Tocqueville uses the term, a
term which encompasses regimes that come out of and employ absolutism as
well as regimes that come out of and employ freedom. Both of these regimes
(with the Hitler approach culminating in the grotesque death camps and with
the Stalin approach culminating in the ferocious Pol Pot regime in Cambodia)
proclaimed Tthat various distinctions among a people should be ruthlessly
eliminated.
It is significant that the term "democratic" was insisted upon for the
names of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in mainland China.
The case for equality is, in principle, insisted upon when such nomenclature
is used; the official doctrines of those regimes (and perhaps of Nazi Germany
as well) depended upon a radical egalitarianism. This was not mere
hypocrisy, however corrupt various men in authority became in implementing
their high-minded doctrines so as to look out primarily for themselves and for
their families.
Even with the corruption and cruelty of the Soviet regime, for example,
it was evident that traditional privileges (especially those associated with
either aristocratic or wealthy families) were systematically attacked, and
educational and other opportunities were made available to vast numbers of
peasants and workers who had long been little more than serfs--or, at least,
this was widely believed for some time.
It can be expected, therefore, that the fundamental appeal of Marxism,
perhaps under another name, will be revived in the decades ahead.332 One
consequence of modem technology is not only to make unprecedented

8.
329. See ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 99-100, 108.
330. See supra note 326; see also John 18:14.
331. On the Pol Pot regime, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supranote 3, at
96, 171; infra text accompanying notes 344, 347. Consider in the light of such atrocities how
"practical" an insistence upon "the good, the true, and the beautiful" can seem. See infra note
349.
332. Something of the Marxist appeal has been aroused by the disclosures in 2001-02 of
remarkably blatant abuse of their shareholders' and employees' trust by the principal officers
of several very large corporations in the United States. See also supra note 306.
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prosperity and great fortunes possible but also to make it painfully apparent
to everyone that there are great discrepancies in the distribution of the goods
of a society. It is almost natural, in such circumstances, that the "haves" will
arouse the envy of the "have nots," especially if the "haves" act and even talk
as if they do not owe much, if anything at all, to society for the wealth they
both enjoy and are protected by society in possessing.3 3
When the equality movement is successful in circumstances where the
temperament and habits of a people have been shaped by absolutism, the
controls by government tend to be comprehensive. One can be reminded of
an old joke: The agitator for change proclaims, "Come the Revolution, we
will all have peaches and cream." "But," someone protests, "I don't like
peaches and cream." To this the response is made, "Come the Revolution, we
will all have peaches and cream-and you will like it!"
A democratic regime that comes out of a freedom-minded background, on
the other hand, is likely to try to leave options for something other than
"peaches and cream."
VII.
Unfortunately, a simple reliance upon a comprehensive liberty does not
suffice to assure the decent and the humane. It should be remembered, for
example, that the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States speaks of
securing "the Blessings of Liberty." This suggests that there may be
consequences of exercises of liberty which are anything but blessings. 34
An undue emphasis upon liberty can lead, in some instances, to mere
lawlessness, with citizens coming to believe that no one is entitled to tell them
how to behave. Abraham Lincoln's first notable speech was in 1838, when
he was not yet thirty. He dedicated that speech to promoting law-abidingness,

333. See supra note 133. Still, the "have nots" of our day should be encouraged to
appreciate what the more enterprising among us do contribute to the general welfare. Consider,
for example, the introductory paragraph in a recent paper by D. Gale Johnson, Population,
Food, and Knowledge:
People today have more adequate nutrition than ever before and acquire that nutrition at
the lowest cost in all human history, while the world has more people than ever before-not
by a little, but by a lot. This is an achievement that many have argued could not be
realized. Throughout history there have been those who believed that food shortages and
famine were the fate of humanity and that the world's population was restricted not by
human decisions on fertility but by limitations imposed by nature. Unfortunately for nearly
all of human history and for the vast majority of the world's people, this pessimism was
justified. In the last two centuries, and especially in the twentieth century, all has changed
to a remarkable degree. The twentieth century can be remembered as the century in which
hunger could have been eliminated and, to a significant extent, has been.
90 AM. ECONOMIC Rnv. 1 (2000). This remarkable (anti-Malthusian?) statement was quoted
by Chauncey D. Harris at a memorial service in Chicago for Mr. Johnson, June 7, 2003.
334. On the Preamble, see supra note 268.
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attempting thereby to counter the growing lawlessness of his day. 3 That
lawlessness culminated in a civil war when Secessionists claimed the liberty
to repudiate the American dedication to the proposition that "all men are
created equal."
An apparently benign form of lawlessness may be seen in the current
promotion of personal privacy among us. The emphasis here is not on
defiance of law but rather on immunity from regulation by law--or by the
community at large. Each of us is to be insulated, far more than was ever
possible, from supervision by any authority, official or unofficial. This
liberation extends to calling into question both the right and the ability of the
community to insist upon distinguishing the good from the bad, except
perhaps
to protect people from physical violence and theft at the hands of
3 36
others.
Liberation of the individual is reinforced by a free-enterprise economy.
This, too, tends to depreciate the opinions and authority of the community,
with massive economic forces on a global scale coming to be regarded as
almost a deity to which all must defer. A promotion ofnovelty and innovation
is implicit in this development. This can mean, in effect, the rule of chance
and history in human affairs-and hence anything but the continuing rule of
that very systematized rationality which has made possible the astonishing
development in technology, productivity, and world markets that we have
both draws upon and reinforces the worldwide
seen, a development which
337
movement to equality.
The dubious consequences sometimes associated with personal liberty and
individualism can remind us of the serious reservations about democracy
expressed in Plato's Republic. Indeed, liberty can take decentralization to
an extreme; that is, it comes to be believed that the autonomous person is
entitled to do virtually whatever he happens to please. 39 The supreme
importance of the individual, of each soul looking out primarily for itself, may
be grounded for us in Christianity. An ethereal self-centeredness is reflected
in the refrain of the hymn, In the Garden. The hymn opens with this stanza:
I come to the garden alone,
While the dew is still on the roses;
And the voice I hear, falling on my ear;
The Son of God discloses. 3"
335. On this speech (the Lyceum Speech, On the Perpetuation of Our Political
Institutions),see ANASTAP'LO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 9, at 366 (Index).
336. The very meaning of "community" is thus radically reconsidered. See, e.g.,
ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 46, 74, 97.
337. See supra text accompanying note 121; see also supra note 333.
338. See PLATO, REPUBIC, bks. VIII, IX.
339. On the soulless "self," see ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at
87.
340. C. Austin Miles, In the Garden, in WORSHIP AND SERVICE HYMNAL (1912).
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And here is the refrain:
And He walks with me, and He talks with me,
And He tells me I am his own,
And the joy we share as we tarry there,
None other has ever known.34'
citizen who selflessly identifies
These do not seem to be the sentiments of 3the
42
his interests with those of his community.
VIII.
Be that as it may, how is a truly humane spirit developed and protected,
both in the human being and in the citizen body? The form of government
may not be all that counts. Certainly, democracy, in its broadest scope, does
not suffice to guarantee the existence of decent people and a humane way of
life. There is a need to be reminded-to be continually reminded--of what
the "good" looks like.
Art, philosophy, and sensible politics can provide useful instruction in
goodness. A sound religious revelation can also provide this instruction, but
that may be harder to come by, however much Providence rules our
destinies.34 3 It is well to remain aware of our personal mortality, which means

341.

Id.

342. Consider, for example, the career of Junius Brutus and how he "had" to deal with two
of his children. See ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 36 1.
343. On prophecy, see Anastaplo, Law& Literatureand the Bible, supra note 222, at 521;
Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand the Christian Heritage, supra note 314, at 193-94, 228.
Consider, also, this epilogue, that I prepared after a discussion at a Loyola University of
Chicago School of Law Faculty Workshop on October 22, 2002, where I presented a paper,
Aeschylus' Orestes, His Companion Pylades, and the Nature of Justice:

One should avoid the temptation to discount any reliance upon Apollo, in such
circumstances as confronted Orestes, because it happens to be obvious to us that
Apollo never existed, etc.-unless one is prepared to argue as well that all revelations
should be suspect. Of course, one might respond that the true revelation should be
relied upon-but most people usually do not receive and accept even the true
revelation upon any better ground than the Greeks received their principal stories
about Apollo and his fellow-divinities.
Besides, there always remains the question, then as now, of who provides the
appropriate interpretation of the revelation of one's day. In any event, even Apollo's
directives may not seem sufficient to everyone, as may be seen in how the Furies
persist in their deadly pursuit of Orestes despite Apollo's emphatic endorsement of
him.
The persistence of the Furies testifies to, at least, the enormity of matricide,
which might not seem to matter much to the homicidal child (when ambition and
revenge move one) if there is not an authoritative set of opinions about the divine to
guide a community. It testifies as well to the importance for Orestes of Pylades'
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(among other things) that neither social perfection nor earthly immortality is
available to us. No form of government is likely to be immune indefinitely
from delusion and corruption-and precautions should be taken against the
consequences of such infections.
The democratic form of government must particularly concern us at this
time, considering the centuries-long, world-wide movement toward the
recognition of equality. The absolutism (or should we say, the extremism?)
with which equality may be established and implemented can lead to
monstrous measures.'" A sensible people, accustomed to and shaped by
sound politics, should be able to recognize the limits of the dogmatic
"theories" that they are relying upon. Also in need of recognition are the
inherent temperament and established habits of a people. Such recognition
permits appropriate adjustments in whatever form of government happens to
be in vogue at any particular time or place.
Implicit in much of what I have said on this occasion is the assumption
(and perhaps our experience and reason permit us to believe it is more than an
assumption) that nature, properly studied, can serve as a reliable guide in these
matters. Nature teaches us, for example, that there is something to be said for
each side in any enduring controversy. Nature also teaches us, therefore, that
prudence calls for shifting one's support from one side to the other in political
alignments as circumstances change. Among other things, this can mean that
absolutism as well as liberty may be needed on occasion, just as they are
subject to abuse. One should keep in mind here both the fact that the divine
is the model for absolutism and the fact that Socrates flourished for decades
in a regime characterized by liberty.
Ix.
I have noticed, on this occasion, the risks of that questionable absolutism
that some people may be "naturally" inclined toward. Such risks are very
much in the calculations of those who resist centralization as an absolutist
threat to liberty.

support, inducing us perhaps to wonder about what the considerations are that a
Pylades should himself take into account in the most "awkward" situations....
Whatever Pylades is like in the tradition, and however he is used in the
matricide-scene by other artists, Aeschylus does seem to present him in a way, with
his lone dramatic intervention, which invites speculations about the respect that
decent human beings should indeed exhibit when they venture to challenge the
authoritative opinions of the community which has already nurtured their families for
generations and upon which their families will thereafter rely for generations to come.
For the complete 2002 Aeschylus paper, see Anastaplo, Constitutionalism andthe Good, supra
note 2, at Part 4.
344. See supra text accompanying note 33 1.
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But the refusal, almost on principle, to permit any centralization can
eventually be destructive of a productive liberty, especially if it is believed
that the community at large is thereby prevented from dealing adequately with
massive problems that simply will not "go away" and that cannot be addressed
effectively at the local level. The usefulness of centralization, especially in
the service of self-defense and nationwide efficiency in response to an
unprecedented globalization, can become apparent to conscientious citizens
who are
not limited in their deliberations by the constitutional dogmas of their
45
day.

3

This is not to deny that constitutional arrangements can be helpful here.
The threatening aspects of any necessary centralization can be moderated
among us by a substantial "separation of powers," not least by that separation
of powers inherent in a bicameral legislature, and even more so when one
chamber of that legislature is dependent on local constituents. An additional
source of moderation for us in these matters is our Electoral College
arrangement (rather than a nationwide popular vote) for the election of
Presidents. That arrangement, which seems to many to subvert the
"democratic" principle, helps keep useful local differences more significant
than they might otherwise be, thereby placing a brake on mindless
centralization and perhaps upon demagoguery. 346
I notice in passing that Tocqueville's grasp of American constitutionalism
may be somewhat faulty. This may be symptomatic of his limitations as an
observer of the United States. In the final analysis, however, institutional
arrangements-whether grounded ultimately in absolutism or grounded
ultimately in liberty-must take second place to the character and judgment
of citizens. Here, as elsewhere, the good that is reflected in enduring moral
standards must somehow be grasped. It is that good that judgment takes into
account in weighing alternatives in ever-changing circumstances, even as it
recognizes that "not all is permitted" even in good causes.347
It is such judgment that Tocqueville himself brings to bear upon the
various situations that he examines, suggesting as he does the course that we
modems should chart. In doing so, he would have us distinguish between
principles and doctrines, especially when fashionable doctrines urge us to
disregard the venerable principled promptings of humanity, including that
form of humanity seen in a disciplined effort to understand the highest things.

345.

See supra text accompanying notes 279, 309.

346. On the Electoral College, see supra note 136. It was a curious aspect of the year 2000
political campaign that the Presidential candidates of both of our major political parties could
blithely talk about ever more intensive regulation by the National Government of what goes on
inthe thousands of local school districts in this country.
347.

See TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA, supra note 315, at 292; see also supra

note 331.
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EPILOGUE

There can be, depending upon the long-established temperament of a
people, salutary limits placed on political dogmas and social movements by
the circumstances of a community. I began my comments on Tocqueville's
work by recalling a train trip from Le Havre to Paris several decades ago. I
return, in closing, to another visit to Paris and to a lesson taught us on that
occasion:
Some [fifty] years ago we rented an apartment in Paris. In the course of
things-one is tempted to say, "in the natural course of things"--we came
to need a plumber. Our landlord, a successful businessman who had recently
purchased and remodeled our building, instructed me to make the necessary
arrangements with the plumbing shop in our neighborhood, which I did. I
reported to my wife, after leaving the shop, that the proprietor-a short, fat
man in his seventies-had positively glowered at me when I gave him our
address, "12, rue Pierre Mille." She blamed the man's reaction on my poor
French.
A plumber did come from the shop but, unfortunately, he was not sober
enough to be entrusted with the serious operation that he wanted us to take
the responsibility for. (Our consent was sought and denied as he poised a
sledgehammer over the offending porcelain fixture.) A second plumber had
to be sent a day or two later. Thereafter, the plumbing shop charged for two
calls. Our landlord and the proprietor had to settle accounts between
them-out of which heated negotiations came the proprietor's angry
declaration, "When I heard '12, rue Pierre Mille,' I knew there would be
trouble." Only then did we learn that the last time that that proprietor had
sent a plumber to our address there had also been an argument about the bill.
That, it turned out, had been a few years before the FirstWorld War, more
than a decade before I was even bom-and here I was, in my middle
twenties, several years after the Second World War."S
This proved for us a most useful lesson in the French, perhaps the European,
way of life. Indeed, perhaps, this can remind us of limits upon the
malleability of human communities once Providence or History has done the
decisive shaping of them. Such shaping, if it should happen to be somewhat
respectful of nature, can help those among us who are privileged to resist that
decline to barbarism which ill-conceived doctrines can sometimes seem to
require and even to legitimate.
It is here that the partisan of egalitarianism should welcome guidance by
the truly aristocratic-that is, by the very best to which both human beings
and citizens aspire and are surely somehow capable of.349
348. ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 17-18
349. The very best should be able to deal properly with the tension between "the noble"
and "the just." On that tension, see ANASTAPLO, THE THiNKER AS ARTIST, supranote 4, at 182.

See also supra note 33 1.
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STATEMANSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW3 50

The moderate natures look for a partner like themselves, and so far as
they can, they choose their wives from women of this quiet type. When
they have daughters to bestow in marriage, once again they look for this
type of character in the prospective husband. The courageous class does
just the same thing and looks for others of the same type. All this goes
on, though both types should be doing exactly the opposite.... Because
if a courageous character is reproduced for many generations without
any admixture of the moderate type, the natural course of development
is that at first it becomes superlatively powerful but in the end it breaks
out into sheer fury and madness.... But the character which is too full
of modest reticence and untinged by valour and audacity, if reproduced
after its kind for many generations, becomes too dull to respond to the
challenges of life and in the end becomes quite incapable of acting at all.
The Elean Stranger"'
I.
A proper celebration of St. George's Day, as our Constitutional Law
course draws to its end, should include a forthright confrontation of the
Dragons that prowl in this field.352 These Dragons include both illusions
about what "really happens" and obstacles to a sensible grasp of things.
One needs a reliable view of the law to be effective in one's forays. Also
needed is instruction in how one should prepare and conduct oneself,not only
with respect to constitutional law but also with respect to the law generally.3" 3
I have several times counseled the reading of complete cases (as well as
complete documents, both constitutional and statutory). One should not be
confident in one's reading of any part of the thing studied unless one has an
informed sense of the whole in which that part is to be found. The folly of
excessive reliance in law schools upon casebooks, with their snippets of
opinions, should be evident to anyone who is familiar with how the facts,
arguments, and counter-arguments are developed in the opinions in a case.
Matters are likely to be made worse because of the growing use of the Internet
to locate ever more snippets, often undocumented, which seem to illuminate
350. A talk given at the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, Chicago, Illinois,
April 23, 2001. The original title of this talk was Statesmanshipand ConstitutionalLaw: On
the Dragons of Our Day.
351.

PLATO, STATESMAN 31 OC-E; see ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1390b25-3 1; seealso supra

text accompanying note 6.
352. On St. George and his Dragon, see George Anastaplo, Law, Education, and Legal
Education: Explorations, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 585, 744 (1998) [hereinafter Anastaplo, Law,
Education, and Legal Education].
353. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Lawyers, First Principles, and Contemporary
Challenges: Explorations, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 353 (1999).
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the issues in which one is interested.354
Related to this is the need to identify and to study properly the
fundamental documents of the regime. Of course, the Declaration of
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance, and
the Constitution of 1787 with its Amendments are essential.355 Also important
are key English documents, such as Magna Carta and the English Bill of
Rights.356 It should not need to be said that our entire way of life continues to
be grounded in lessons taught by Shakespeare and the Bible, a thorough
knowledge of which can be invaluable for the lawyer.357
II.
How should we understand the constitutional law that we have been
studying? I have argued again and again that it is virtually impossible to
separate the political from the legal when the great issues of one's day are to
be resolved.35 8
This means, among other things, that constitutional adjudications by
courts, except perhaps when individual rights of citizens (usually in criminal
proceedings) are invoked, tend to be dubious. Great debates about the major
powers of the National Government are not usually suitable for courts to pass
judgment.
Legislatures do not need to distinguish, as courts are said to do, between
the political and the legal. Nor should legislators be encouraged to rely upon
judges to tell them whether they have constitutional authority for what they
do. Rather, legislators should be taught that they, too, are obliged to take the
Constitution into account when they act, especially since much, if not most of
the things legislators do are not subject to effective judicial scrutiny.359
What courts can be good at is not what they have claimed for themselves
through Marbury v. Madison,360 but rather what they have given up from

354. On the scope and limitations of the Internet, see Anastaplo, Legal Education,
Economics, and Law School Governance, supra note 121, at 219. See also supra text
accompanying notes 119, 135.
355. On the Organic Laws ofthe United States, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra
note 9, at 267 n.14 (which draws on the work of Richard Cox).
356. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Individualism, Professional Ethics, and the Sense of
Community: From Runnymede to a London Telephone Booth, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 285,286
(1996); Anastaplo, On Freedom,supra note 104, at 481; supratext accompanying notes 77,92.
357. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand Shakespeare: Explorations,26
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand the Bible, supra note 222.
358. This has recently been seen most dramatically in the case of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98 (2000). See, e.g., supra note 44.
359. On judicial review, see supra note 41.
360. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see supra text accompanying notes 62-63, 299.
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themselves in Erie RailroadCompany v. Tompkins.36'
in.
The deeper issues here extend beyond questions about the propriety and
effectiveness ofjudicial review. They are issues that oblige us to consider the
very nature of government.
It can be instructive to consider from time to time the guidance provided
by such texts as Plato's Statesman, a dialogue in which the nature of
statesmanship is examined. There can be said to be here a somewhat technical
and far less interesting, yet still instructive, version of what may be found in
a much more familiar dialogue, Plato's Republic.362
The technicalities in the Statesman include a series of divisions and
subdivisions designed to separate out the art of the statesman from all the
other arts on which human beings depend. The first extended series of
divisions assumes that statesmanship is a kind of herding, and so the question
becomes precisely what kind of herding is involved.363 The final extended
series of divisions assumes that statesmanship is a kind of weaving, and so the
question becomes precisely what kind of weaving is involved.3"
Each of these divisions and subdivisions contains something forced, if not
even perverse, but yet instructive (as well as somewhat comical). The
interconnectedness of all things may be seen here, something which is
developed elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues.36
IV.
The "herding" that is investigated is something we can accept as relevant
to political life, at least to a limited extent. This herding may be what we
know as the police power. The "animals in the herd"-that is, the people in
the community-should be protected and they can well be provided services
that contribute to their comfort and efficiency, services such as traffic control
and public utilities. Such services permit people to live together and to do
much of what they want to do.
On the other hand, the "weaving" that is investigated is much more of a
problem for us, especially if it includes the shaping of the character and
expectations of people so that they can work together with a view to the
common good, as well as to their own interest.
Particularly challenging, if not even troublesome, for us is the following
inquiry: What is the character that is needed for a regime such as ours, and

364.

304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also supra text accompanying note 66; supra notes 211,241.
On Plato, see ANASTAPLO, THE TiNKER AS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 279.
See PLATO, STATESMAN 261D et seq.
See PLATO, STATESMAN 279A et seq.

365.

See, e.g., PLATO, MENO 81B-D.

361.

362.
363.
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what needs to be done to the community to secure it? We are reluctant to ask
such questions today, which may be seen in what incipient libertarians have
tried to do both with the Speech and Press Clauses in the First Amendment
and with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3"
Thus, the First Amendment now tends to be read as primarily a defense
of a virtually unlimited "freedom of expression" rather than as protection for
the political discourse needed for effective self-government.36 7 The Takings
Clause is beginning to be read as protecting one's assets against any
governmental measures which diminish their value, almost as if it is forgotten
that most property depends on government, and that government may have to
change its policies from time to time.368
It is not generally appreciated, by the libertarian advocates here, how
much of a departure from our long-established constitutional principles their
approach to these matters represents.
V.
The question of whether the Country has become far too large for its
institutions bears upon these developments. About four million people lived
in this country when its institutions were given the form that they more or less
have today. But we now have almost a third of a billion people.
We can wonder what holds us all together to the extent that we are united.
Many subordinate associations in the country, some of them larger than the
total population of the country in 1776, provide the guidance that multitudes
rely upon. Most of those associations are still, by and large, fairly patriotic.
In addition, the economic system itself, which is reinforced by
"globalization," promotes efficiency and, hence, discipline. But it also
promotes considerable personal autonomy, which can deteriorate into
irresponsibility. It promotes as well a sense of personal vulnerability, which
can at time be so distressing as to threaten political stability.3 69
VI.
Citizens of the United States generally respect the rule of law, partly
perhaps because of what it means for the security of property. One can

366. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922); see also Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand the Good,supra note 2, at Part 2.
367. On "freedom of speech," see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2,

at 93.
368. On property, see id. at 213.
369. We have seen this in the sometimes exaggerated, or at least misdirected, responses in
the United States to the treacherous assaults of September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Anastaplo, Bush
v. Gore and a ProperSeparationof Powers,supra note 44, at 106 n.21, 107 n.26, 118 n.63;
supra note 295; see also supra notes 296, 326.
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wonder, however, what developments such as the growing disregard for traffic
regulations portend. A minor illustration of this, which is particularly
aggravating for me as a cyclist, is the growing recourse by bicyclists to riding
sidewalks when there are pedestrians present, a rather uncivilized form of selfexpression. It seems that they feel safer there than out in traffic-but at least
they know enough, while on the streets, to watch out for automobiles, while
pedestrians cannot be expected to be on the watch for cyclists.370
The rule of law is recognized, in Plato's Statesman, as second-best. Even
so, it is also recognized that for such rule to be as good as it can be depends
on the character of a people.37 ' This becomes evident when attempts are made
to export to other countries the institutions that we are accustomed to-and
which we continue to be fairly adept in using.
Much of our reliance on the rule of law takes place in the political arena,
not in the judicial arena (although it is obviously of importance there also).
It is usually better to have controversial social issues resolved politically
rather than judicially-issues such as what to do about abortion, about school
financing, about race relations, and about whether was should be entered
into.372 A political resolution tends to have enough give-and-take involved to
provide something for everybody, including the sense that one has played a
part in determining what is to happen in the community at large.373
VII.
It is difficult to ignore completely the powers and obligations of the
community in shaping the character of the people who will respect the rule of
law and who will make more or less sensible use of the institutions they have
inherited.
The best contribution that courts can make to maintaining and refining the
character of a people is through the adjudication of common-law cases and in
the application of statutes. Courts make moral judgments both in commonlaw adjudications and in the interpretation of statutes. Standards of right and
wrong, of the good and the bad, are naturally brought to bear upon the
resolution of particular controversies, more reliably so than when courts
decide "constitutional" issues-for it is difficult for judges to do so without
leaving observers suspicious that they have dressed up their political
preferences in constitutional garb.374
One more lesson can be drawn from all this, which should be of use to
you as practitioners: we continue to enjoy a regime that produces judges who,

370. See Anastaplo, Prudenceand the Constitution, supra note 133, at 216 n.53.
371. See, e.g., supra Part 5 of this Article.
372. This means, among other things, that Congress should both insist upon its
prerogatives and face up to its duties.
373. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 45.
374. See supra note 44.
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by and large, would much prefer, in the typical case, to do justice when it can
be shown how that might be done in plausible conformity with the apparently
controlling rule on that occasion.375
13. ON BEING AN OPPOTUNIST

37 6

As for Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old... I have
had experience of his deeds, and his deeds show that he is entitled to
noble sentiments and complete freedom of speech. And if his words
accord [with his deeds], then I am of one mind with him, and shall be
delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be

annoyed at having to learn of him, for I agree with Solon, "that I would
fain grow old, learning many things."

Laches

37

I.

Seventy-five years ago this week I was bom in St. Louis, Missouri. This
has been commented on at a birthday party mounted a few days ago by my
Basic Program alumni class. We did not anticipate then that my birthday
way that the Presidential
would be made so memorable this year by the 37
out.
turn
to
happened
day,
very
that
held
election,
However important November 7 may be, there is in some ways an even
more significant date: November 10. Fifty years ago today, three days after
my twenty-fifth birthday, I first ran afoul of the Committee on Character and
Fitness for the Illinois Bar, down at the Chicago Bar Association headquarters
at 29 South LaSalle Street. This was, in some ways, a chance event, or rather
a perhaps predictable response by me to a chance challenge. However it is
understood, this represented for me a new birth, which led to profound
changes in my life. That is, I was directed to a career quite different from
what seemed to follow from my military service and my schooling up to that
point.

375. One can see, in the propaganda speeches crafted by Joseph Goebbels, how even the
most ruthlessly evil leaders of the German Nazi Party had to appeal to justice as commonly
understood. See, e.g., Goebbel's Sportpalast Speech of February 18, 1943; see also Anastaplo,
On Trial,supra note 110, at 977; supra note 191.
376. A talk given at a seventy-fifth birthday celebration organized by the Staff of the Basic
Program of Liberal Education for Adults, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois,
November 10, 2000. The original title of this talk was On Being an Opportunist: Thoughts at
Seventy-five.
377.

PLATO, LACHES 188E-189A.

378. On that election and its outcome, see Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore and a Proper
SeparationofPowers,supranote 44, at 101; Anastaplo, Prudenceandthe Constitution,supra
note 133, at 181.
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It can be argued, of course, that if it had not been this, then something else
would have led me into an unconventional course. But things had been more
or less conventional for me up to that point.379
II.
The immediate consequences of my November 10th encounter with the
Character and Fitness Committee were the derailment of a legal career, the
substantial prolongation of my formal education, and, of course, a decade of
litigation.8 0
The case began in November 1950 and continued into 1961, when the
United States Supreme Court finally disposed of my appeal, a disposition
which included a magnificent dissenting opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black,
part of which he later directed to be read at his funeral.3 ' I notice in passing
that two of our children, who were in college out East at the time, were in the
congregation at that funeral in the Washington National Cathedral.
This decade of litigation permitted a steady refinement of my position.
If I had not had the opportunity to work and rework what I meant and why, my
position would have seemed far more "ideological" than it was. The entire
379. That there might have been "something else" is suggested by this recapitulation of my
career by C. Herman Pritchett, a former President of the American Political Science
Association:
On 24 April 1961 the Supreme Court of the United States, by a vote of five to
four, affirmed the action of the Illinois Supreme Court which, by a vote of four to
three, had upheld the decision of the Committee on Character and Fitness of the
Illinois bar which, by a vote of eleven to six, had decided that George Anastaplo was
unfit for admission to the Illinois bar. This was not Anastaplo's only such experience
with power structures. In 1960 he was expelled from Soviet Russia for protesting
harassment of another American, and in 1970 from the Greece of the Colonels. As
W. C. Fields might have said, any man who is kicked out of Russia, Greece, and the
Illinois bar can't be all bad.
C. Herman Pritchett, Review of George Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist:Notes on the First
Amendment, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 539; see infra note 387; infra text
accompanying note 391.
380. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALST, supra note 2, at 331; George
Anastaplo, What Is Still Wrong with George Anastaplo? A Sequel to 366 U.S. 82 (1961), 35
DEPAUL L. REV. 551 (1986) [hereinafter Anastaplo, What is Still Wrong with George
Anastaplo?].
381. Thatwasin 1971. Justice Black's selection was the closing passage of his dissent in
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). See also Irving Dilliard, Mr. Justice Black and In re
Anastaplo, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 478-79; HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY
TRADITION: FREEDOM OFSPEECH IN AMERICA 570-74, 673 (1988); Harry Kalven, Jr., Wondrous
Complexity: The BarAdmission Cases, in LAW AND PHOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 413; ROGER
K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 503-07 (1994); George Anastaplo, Mr. JusticeBlack,
His Generous Common Sense and the BarAdmission Cases, 9 Sw. U. L. REv. 977 (1977).
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matter thereby assumed a form with which I could easily live thereafter, a
form which no organized group found fully attractive." 2
Perhaps the most sensible decision I made in that matter was to drop all
efforts on my part to secure admission to the bar after 1961. Nor did I
encourage others to act on my behalf, although friendly organizations have
done so from time to time, including the Committee on Character and Fitness
itself when a brother of Justice John Paul Stevens became its chairman. 3 But
those well-meaning efforts have not been enough to persuade the Illinois
Supreme Court to admit me to the bar, the difficulty now being (in the Court's
view) my refusal to renew my application.384
After a while, such a contest as the one in which I found myself can take
on the aura of inevitability, so much as to make one appreciate the Oedipus

382. See, e.g., George Anastaplo's Petition for Rehearing, In re Anastaplo, 361 U.S. 82
(1961). This petition was drawn upon by John A. Murley, In re George Anastaplo, in LEO
STRAUSS, THE STRAUSSANS, AND THE AMERiCAN REGIME 159, 177-79 (Kenneth L. Deutsch &
John A. Murley eds., 1999).
383. 1made the following remarks, Richard James Stevens (1915-2001), on the occasion

of a talk I gave in the First Friday Lecture Series of the University of Chicago at the Chicago
Cultural Center on December 7, 2001:

I hold up for emulation, in my talk today about William Shakespeare's King Lear, the
faithful son of the Earl of Gloucester. That much-imposed-upon son displays what it can
mean to be both highminded and practical in the everyday affairs of the world. It seems
to me fitting, therefore, to dedicate this talk to the memory of a distinguished Chicago
attorney, American civil libertarian, and fellow Hyde Parker, Richard James Stevens, who
died on September 29. The somewhat philosophic hero in King Lear could well have
served as a model for this distinguished lawyer's career.
Mr. Stevens (a devoted son of the University of Chicago) was cheerful and modest, yet
properly confident about his capabilities (which included, besides lawyering, bridgeplaying and choral singing). He was determined, again and again, to see that the right
thing be done and (whenever possible) that the wrong thing be undone, in the community
that he considered himself privileged to serve. It is a community which continues to be
graced by the celebrated Stevens Hotel for which his family had originally been
responsible.
Not only was Mr. Stevens able and willing to be helpful when applied to, but he could
also be troubled by longstanding inequities which he believed could and therefore should
be addressed by him on his own motion. That is, he could be deeply disturbed by what he
took to be blatant injustice, but not in such a way as to produce in him either blinding
indignation or a sense of helplessness. Just because one could not do everything, this
forthright man seemed to say again and again, one should not be discouraged from doing
something-and in this resolution he, as a man of good will, was very much our genial
mentor.
For a sampling of Richard James Stevens's public service, see Anastaplo, What Is Still Wrong
with GeorgeAnastaplo?, supra note 380, at 611-23.
384. See, e.g., Anastaplo, "McCarthyism,"the Cold War, and Their Aftermath,supra note
72, at 125; Anastaplo, Legal Education, Economics, andLaw School Governance,supra note

121, at 295.
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story better than one might otherwise have." 5 Happily, my story is far less
momentous and far less grim, and so I can continue to see, and continue to
want to see, what is going on all around me.
Ill.

I must confess to having been, in this matter, an opportunist, taking
advantage of what Machiavelli called an occassione, one which proved
decisive." 6 Others around me, including in my law school class, chanced to
have similar occassioni of which they were not able to take advantage. And,
'
as a poet has observed, "that made all the difference."387
But then, I have been an opportunist all my life. Thus, I was able to take
advantage of the Second World War, which proved for me a wonderfully
liberating experience. Related to this was the opportunism reflected in my
response upon encountering a particularly engaging, eventually captivating,
college student in Austin, Texas.
Thereafter, of course, were the opportunities provided by the University
of Chicago during my years as a student and my decades in the Basic
Program.3 88 Thus, Inever refuse invitations to give staffbriefings or to deliver
lectures, no matter what the subject. Invariably these are matters that I should
investigate and think about. 89
In recent years, I have had the opportunity to resist the demands of
political correctness, especially in academic life. 9
This follows the
resistance I was privileged to express in 1960 against the Soviet regime in
Russia and in 1970 against the Colonels' regime in Greece.3 9'
It is inevitable, therefore, that I should now take advantage of the
opportunity provided me by this occassione, an opportunity to bring my
autobiographical sketches up-to-date.

385. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO,THETHINKERAS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 119.
386. On Machiavelli, see supraPart 1 of this Article. See also Anastaplo, Law, Education,
and Legal Education, supra note 352, at 636.

387. In The Prince,Machiavelli speaks of the "conquest of fortune." To what extent, one
might wonder, does one "make one's breaks"? See supra note 379.
388. See, e.g., Maurice F. X. Donohue, Making a Living, Making a Life, in LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 597.
389. For the Basic Program reading list, see ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS TINKER, supra
note 4, at 284.
390. See George Anastaplo, "Racism,'- Political Correctness,and ConstitutionalLaw:
A Law School Case Study, 42 S.D. L. REv. 108 (1997); Anastaplo, "McCarthyism,"the Cold
War, and TheirAftermath, supra note 72, at 103; Anastaplo, Legal Education.Economics, and
Law School Governance, supranote 121, at 103,300-01.
391. See supra note 379.
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IV.
It is salutary to emphasize at this time that one should seefully whatever
one happens to encounter from time to time.392
Among the things one should notice in the light provided by my
anniversaries this week is the remarkable fact that I have been alive for onethird of the life of the United States, counting from 1776. That one's country
is so young points to how different it is, in critical respects, from most of the
nations on this earth. This bears upon the status among us of myths and
legends, most of which we must import since we are bound by knowable
history from the earliest days of the Country. This may be related to the
continuing vitality (as well as the sometimes troubling volatility) of the United
States.3 93
One should also notice, of course, the texts we read, year after year, in the
Basic Program. The texts we read, and the way we read them, are both
rejuvenating and maturing. They encourage us to see what is going on all
around us and within us-to see these things and to think about them, and then
really to see them.
Fellow-travelers along this road are very much needed; most of us, if not
all of us, need to check with others whatever we discover from time to time,
as well as to build upon what others have discovered. One may even get the
sense, from participation in such a common endeavor, that one is associating
oneself with something that goes on forever. In short, these texts help do for
us what the questioning Socrates did for those who encountered him.394
V.
A caution is in order here, however confident one's sense of vitality may
happen to be. One's mortality does place limitations on one's existence as a
thinking being.
Mortality means, among other things, that chance occurrences can be
critical, if not decisive, in what one learns and how. Thus, the languages one
is fluent in may affect precisely how one understands things, if not even what
things one undertakes to understand. One's experiences with fatigue, from
very early on, warn one that the quality and reliability of one's grasp of things
may be seriously affected, if not even marred, by a debilitating illness or by
the seeping away of one's energy.'"

392.

See George Anastaplo, The Forms of Our Knowing:

A Somewhat Socratic

Introduction,in JACQUES MARITAIN AND THE MANY WAYS OF KNOWING 1 (Douglas A. Ollivant
ed., 2002); see also supra note 31.
393. See, e.g., Anastaplo, The OJ. Simpson Case Revisited, supra note 290, at 463.
394. See, e.g., PLATO, MENO 81D-E.
395. A dramatic reminder of one's mortality may also have this effect. This may be seen
perhaps in how Americans have generally responded to the assaults of September 11, 2001. See
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I do not yet feel physically vulnerable. That is, I have been blessed with
good health ever since I almost died of diphtheria as a child. Once I recovered
from that disease, I have never missed a class either as student or as teacher
because of illness. Obviously, this "streak" is hardly likely to extend much
longer.
I have come to believe that no matter how long one lives and remains in
good health, there is probably a limit to what one is apt to learn. One is
usually limited to that seeing and understanding which is keyed to how one
happens to have been shaped. My study of non-Western texts and movements
over several years has suggested that however carefully we work at this, only
a limited (perhaps somewhat unreliable) grasp of such things is possible by
us. a96 There are things drawn upon in such texts and movements which are not
'
only not in our languages but also not "in our bones."397
Furthermore, I find myself rediscovering things previously learned-and
things forgotten. I can thus discover "nice things" in a text which I find, upon
consulting another copy of the text that I marked up years before, that I had
discovered and enjoyed before. Should this keep one young in spirit-and is
that good? I hasten to add that forgetting need not be a function of age, but
rather of time (which is not the same thing). After all, one did forget many
things when one was young as is revealed in exams taken on materials studied
as a youngster the day before.
The fact that one does learn makes it likely that one will forget; learning
is a process of change, and because one is constantly changing, it is likely that
forgetting is part of that natural process. Another way of putting this is to say
that change does not stop; the process of learning and forgetting can and
perhaps should go both ways.39 It can be instructive to discover this, to
reflect upon its significance, and not to forget it.
The phenomena I have described-learning and forgetting-are not new
for me. They are, I have argued, not the consequences, at least for me, simply
of old age.
In fact, I have yet to feel my age. I do not regard myself as increasingly
aged, even though more and more people obviously so regard me-and to
which the celebration, graciously hosted by Joel and Nancy Rich testifies. a99
Nor do I have a feel for any debilitating illness or any accident of a serious
supra note 309.
396. See ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at xv.
397. Those things that do happen to be in our languages and in our bones are likely to have
for us the "feel" of the natural. Even so, we seem to need the help of conventions-heavy
languages in order to reason our way beyond conventions and accidents to the natural.
398. Some things-such as the errors one has happened to accumulate-may have to be
discarded if genuine learning is to take place. The things to be discarded (often as prudently
as possible) may include opinions cherished by one's associates.
399. Mr. and Mrs. Rich operate a website that includes materials of interest to those
associated with the Basic Program of Liberal Education for Adults of The University of
Chicago. The address of this website is www.cygneis.com.
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character. Even headaches have become rare in recent decades (and
hyperventilating, I have learned, is quite good when a headache threatens).
Nor do I personally remember my bout with near-fatal diphtheria, although it
may be that my body somehow remembers it.
There is, of course, something desirable in not feeling old, so much so that
some people make great efforts not to appear to be old. Even so, not-feelingold, when one is up in years, may mean that one is not learning what one
could, and perhaps should, learn. That is, one may not, in such circumstances,
truly know oneself.
VII.
I have already shared with you one lesson of an advanced age: one
discovers that one may, unawares, learn the same things again and again.
An advanced age can also affect one's judgment, including one's moral
judgment. One can especially come to appreciate what can be said for "the
other side" in any continuing controversy. It is rare for the sane human being
to be without any defensible grounding for a position taken.4'
Related to these observations is the fact that an advanced age can permit
one to see, from "the outside," the things in which one was involved long ago.
When I glance back at the bar admission matter which began fifty years ago
today, I find ever more questionable the conduct of those all around me
(except for my family, a few friends, and a few teachers)-the conduct of
those who acted as they did in the 1950s.
After all, they were destroying, or at least permitting the destruction of,
the career of a rash young man, who was still an officer in the Air Force
Reserve, with a wife and child and no financial reserves, and with a very good
record. The conduct of the Character Committee (and then of the courts) was
bad enough; but even worse, perhaps, was the conduct of those in my law
school and elsewhere, who really knew me and should have known better than
to allow all this to happen as it did. These were people of considerable
influence who could probably have, with relatively little risk to themselves,
stopped what the Character Committee was doing."
Such people, who were really good people at heart but who were
intimidated by the political tone of the day, had their chance to rise to the
occasion-and they simply failed. The shamelessness they exhibited was far
too general to make them personally blameworthy.""
It is sad to recognize that people with noteworthy talents and aspirations
simply could not recognize and do what was called for by the situation they

400.
401.

See, e.g., the opening lines of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.
See, e.g., Anastaplo, Legal Education, Economics, and Law School Governance,

supra note 121, at 304.
402. See, e.g., Anastaplo, "McCarthyism, "the Cold War, and Their Aftermath,supra note
72, at 108, 118.
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confronted, something that some of them did come to regret over the years.
The worse they conducted themselves, the better I came to seem. Certainly,
they did not foresee that the Character Committee may really have been doing
me a favor. All this is not to deny that I have been treated generously by
faculty members here and there in the University of Chicago. For instance,
David Bevington, who is here this evening, was instrumental in having the
University of Chicago Archives solicit my papers. My wife, for one, was
delighted to see a van-load of those papers (the first of many such loads, she
hopes) removed from our attic.
VIII.
I had occasion last Sunday, in the course of a lecture on Tocqueville's
discourses on modem democracy, to argue that attachments to forms of
government should be moderated by the demands of decency and a sense of
proportion. 3 One should not permit "ideology" to suppress the demands of
humanity, even as one attempts to be rigorous in one's thinking. All this bears
upon an assessment of the systematic atrocities witnessed in the Twentieth
Century.
It is decency, no doubt, that tends to make people tolerant of the elderly.
Perhaps this has contributed to my becoming more respectable in recent
decades.'
Respectability can take the form of one telephone call after
another, the last few days, from newspapers all over the country, asking for
guidance and opinions with respect to the current Presidential standoff." 5
I am reminded of the days when the Colonels tried to run Greek affairs.
In those days, the calls came in from across the Atlantic as well. It was
believed that I knew something about what was going on in Greece, at least
enough to have been declaredpersonanon grata.'
I am also reminded of the Bicentennial Years of 1976 and 1987. Those
were the years when anybody with a reputation in constitutional studies was
much in demand. There was one period, for example, when I made repeated
trips to the East and West coasts, moving across the continent several times
in one month.
The current political controversy [I could say on November 10, 2000]
elicited one of my Letters to the Editor, which I will be passing out with the
party favors previously prepared for this occasion, copies of the birthday talks

403. On Tocqueville, see supra Part I I of this Article.
404. See, e.g., Cornelia Grumman, The Wrong Question, Cm. TRIB. MAG, Nov. 26, 2000,
sc. 10, at 14; see also Letters to the Editor,CHi. TRIB. MAG. (in subsequent issues).
405. On that standoff, see Anastaplo, Prudenceand the Constitution, supra note 133, at
184; Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore and a ProperSeparation of Powers, supra note 44, at 102.
406. See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 3; ANASTAPLO, THE
AMERICAN MORAUST, supra note 3, at 501; supra note 379. See also my contribution to the
article on modem Greece in the current edition of the EncyclopediaBritannica.
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I have given on other occasions, talks prompted by my desire to figure out
what is really going on."O' This most recent Letter to the Editor, suggesting
a resort to the drawing of lots to resolve the current Presidential Election
difficulty, is designed to encourage looking beyond personal ambition and
ordinary party politics. 0 8
I have been moved, by a recent visit to my barber, to wonder whether
there was anything truly distinctive to my career. The stimulus here was an
article in Sports Illustrated(read in the barber shop) about the greatest records
in sports history, records which (it was said) would never be surpassed:
Wilt Chamberlain's 100 points in a game (1962) ....
Joe DiMaggio's 56-game hitting streak (1941) ....
Wayne Gretzky's 2,857 career points (1979-99) ....
Rickey Henderson's 1,370 career steals (1979-present) ....
5. Byron Nelson's 11 straight PGA Tour victories (1945) .... 09

1.
2.
3.
4.

I digress by noticing that immediately after my visit to my barber I went
to a Physics Colloquium during which it was recognized that it is "obvious"
to all of us that there are only four dimensions (three spatial and one
temporal), and that each is infinite in extent.4 t 0 But, it was argued, the
prevailing theories in physics today make sense only if there are at least ten
dimensions. Indeed, it was said that "in all likelihood they exist," even though
it was also said that we may never be able to discover and confirm extra
dimensions.
I was puzzled by how one could say that "in all likelihood" things could
be said to exist (with their virtual certainty spoken of) which we may not ever
be able to confirm.41 ' The mysterious character of such talk was nicely
407. For earlier "birthday talks," see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note
3, at 582 (at age 50); Anastaplo, On Freedom, supra note 104, at 153 (at age 65); id. at 174 (at
age 70).
408. For my November 10, 2000 letter, see Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore and a Proper
SeparationofPowers,supra note 44, at 102; CtIf. D. L. BULL., Nov. 13, 2000, at 20, Ci-n. TRiB.,
Nov. 15, 2000, sc. 1, at 20.
409. Albert Kim & Mark Mravic, The Untouchables,SPORTS ILLUS., Oct. 23, 2000, at 27.
410. On the weekly Physics Colloquium, see George Anastaplo, Thursday Afternoons, in
S. CHANDRASEKHAR: THE MAN BEHIND THE LEGEND 122 (Kameshwar C. Wali ed., 1997).
There is, at page 127, note 4 of that article, a recollection of my 1974 speculations about
something that I called an "ultron." It has recently been suggested to me, by Laurence Bems
(of St. John's College), that what I have called an "ultron" resembles what the ancient Greeks
called an "atom." Mr. Berns and I are collaborating in a translation of Plato's Meno to be
published in 2003 by the Focus Publishing Company. On the Physics Colloquium, see also
Hellmut Fritzsche, Of Things That Are Not, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, at 3;
Anastaplo, Constitutionalismand the Good, supra note 2, at n.64.
411. Some scientists seem to be confident that there are other rational beings in the
Universe, beings which they do not believe will ever make contact with human beings on this
planet. On UFOs, see Anastaplo, Lessonsfor the Student of Law, supra note 73, at 187.
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dramatized by something I had never before witnessed at that weekly
Colloquium: a telephone, being carried in the lecturer's handbag which was
lying on the podium, suddenly began ringing. What, one may well ask, was
that a sign of? Out of which dimension did it come?
Back to the barber shop and the unbreakable records: I wondered whether
I had any such distinction. I finally realized that I surely did, although it may
not be a truly distinguished distinction. I believe it is highly unlikely that
anyone will ever surpass my record as a member of the Basic Program Staff,
which membership is now in its forty-fourth year. This distinction I owe, in
part, to my bar admissions troubles. Besides, graduate students are better able
than some of us once were to go on to other positions after a few years-and
they are not likely to be able to support themselves with other work in this
area as I have been. Few have been as privileged as I have been, because of
circumstances, to keep on trying to educate myself in this adult education
program.
I have been both surprised and pleased to learn this evening that the
University of Chicago has been generous enough to name after me "in
perpetuity," the annual Works of the Mind Lecture in November. And I can
be thankful that it is not yet the George Anastaplo Memorial Lecture. 12
But the most interesting thing about my barbershop visit was the exchange
I had with the lively, self-confident, Italian-born barber as we prepared to part.
I asked him whether there was a difference in the rates of growth of hair on
various parts of the head. His first "reaction" was that of shock and then a
look of befuddlement as he confessed that he had never been asked this
before. He did tell me other things, told to him by his teachers many years
ago: that the hair grows one-half inch a month, that the rate of growth does
vary with the seasons although it may appear otherwise, and that no hair
restoratives work.
It was obvious because of the way that he was shaken by my question that
it reached him "where he lived," as they say. 13 He ventured a couple of
surmises, working from the growth of sideburns, but it soon became evident
to both of us that he simply did not know. That did not seem to bother him for
long, for his startled look eventually turned to that of pleasure as he concluded
our conversation with a nicely ambiguous comment that I should be glad to
have as an epitaph: "That is some question!" 14

412. See Anastaplo, Legal Education, Economics, and Law School Governance, supra
note 121, at 313.
413. On questions which can appear distressingly "relevant," see ANASTAPLo, THE ARTIST
AS THINKER, supra note 4, at 2-3 (about the Golden Gate Bridge).
414. For fundamental questions about war, property and one's way of life, see Anastaplo,
Legal Education, Economics, and Law School Governance,supra note 121, at 25 3-95; see

also supra note 208.
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